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H
uman population growth, increasing urbanization, and rising incomes have fueled 
unprecedented growth in the demand for livestock products in the developing world. 
This creates pressures on world feedgrain and oilseed markets, but presents opportu-
nities for poor people who rear, process, or market livestock products to enhance their liveli-
hoods. However, large-scale, industrialized forms of poultry, pig, and dairy production are 
also growing rapidly to compete for these new markets, and poor people may find it increas-
ingly difficult to compete. Additionally, the growing concentration of animals in large units 
near cities is associated with greater pollution and increased risk of transmission of diseases, 
including to humans. Finally, the transformation of traditional animal husbandry into an in-
dustrial process raises ethical issues in places where adequate safeguards for animal welfare 
are not fully developed.
  To better understand why the average size of livestock operations in developing countries 
is growing and what the implications of this are for smallholder incomes and the environment, 
the International Food Policy Research Institute has partnered with the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to study the competitiveness of smallholder live-
stock production systems vis-à-vis large-scale systems operating in the same environment. 
Using farm-level data, the study explores the relationships among average farm sizes, the 
profit efficiency of individual enterprises, economies of scale in input supply, policy distor-
tions favoring larger enterprises, negative environmental externalities, and transaction costs. 
  Results show that smallholder livestock producers can still compete with larger producers 
in many of the cases studied under current market conditions, despite frequently paying higher 
prices for inputs due to economies of scale, receiving lower prices for their output due to 
higher transaction costs, and internalizing more of their environmental costs. This is because 
of the savings of smaller units on overhead items, lower labor costs per unit, and possibly 
more intensive supervision, leading to relatively high profit efficiencies. Strengthening pro-
ducers’ associations and promoting contract farming may help smallholders deal with events 
beyond the farm gate—such as growing retailer demand for consistency and demonstrable 
safety—that might eventually displace them even if they are relatively efficient producers. 
  Public policy can play a role in assisting private-sector firms to reduce the transaction costs 
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T
he research underlying this report investigated factors affecting the scaling-up of se-
lected livestock products in Brazil, India, the Philippines, and Thailand, with particular 
attention directed at understanding issues affecting small-scale producers.2 Scaling-up 
is defined here as growth in the average size of farm in terms of annual livestock sales. The 
urgency of the topic is driven by the fact that livestock are among the few commodities that 
smallholder farmers widely produce that are growing rapidly in demand, and thus the interest 
for poverty alleviation is strong. However, there are signs that smallholders may ultimately be 
displaced from this source of livelihood by competition from larger-scale farms. Furthermore, 
the rapid growth in production of pigs and poultry has also been associated with significant 
environmental problems in the zones of most rapid growth. The interactions between overall 
growth in production, size of farms, and sustainability are crucial to rural poverty alleviation 
in a sustainable manner.
  Therefore, the objectives of the research were to assess whether the market share of large 
farms is growing relative to small farms and, if so, why. The analysis is directed primarily 
toward the issues of efficiency in production and its determinants, but also deals with the unit 
costs of inputs received and the unit prices for outputs obtained. The study specifically does 
not investigate the likely existence of economies of scale in output marketing, which are anec-
dotally thought to be large and will over time largely work to the disadvantage of independent 
(nonintegrated) farmers, especially small-scale ones. This important topic is deferred to a dif-
ferent study on contract farming in poultry and dairy using different data and approaches.
  The research was pursued by setting up models and collecting farm-level data to test the 
following hypotheses:
•	 	 Small-scale	producers	have	profits	per	unit	of	output	that	are	higher	than	or	equal	to	
those of large producers.
•	 	 Small-scale	producers	are	more	efficient	users	of	farm	resources	to	secure	profits	than	
are large producers, other things equal.
•	 	 Small	farmers	expend	a	greater	amount	of	effort	or	investment	in	abatement	of	negative	
environmental externalities per unit of output than do large farmers.
•	 	 Uncompensated	negative	environmental	externalities	favor	the	nominal	profit	efficiency	






2The commodity samples are: Brazil—broilers, eggs, swine, and milk; India—broilers, eggs, and milk; the Philippines 
—broilers and swine; and Thailand—broilers, swine, eggs, and milk.  Chapter 2 looks at evidence of growth and concentration of the livestock sector and estab-
lishes that scaling-up in livestock production is in fact occurring in all four countries studied. 
It suggests that production in the 1980s and 1990s tended to concentrate around capital cities 
and other major demand centers with the exception of Brazil. Since the late 1990s, larger-scale 
farms have been increasingly locating in remoter areas farther away from population centers, 
disease, and environmental challenges. Smallholder output continues to grow at high rates in 
certain cases, such as that of dairy farmers in India and swine producers in the Philippines, 
but the output from large-scale enterprises is growing even more rapidly, taking market share 
away from smallholders. This is particularly relevant in Brazil and Thailand, where there are 
relatively small numbers of small-scale producers left in the broiler business and the role of 
smallholders in both dairy farming and swine production is shrinking in relative terms. The 
question, then, is whether large-scale livestock production will outcompete that of smallholder 
producers everywhere and eventually provoke their exit from the sector.
  To analyze the scaling-up of livestock production, Chapter 3 defines a quantitative mea-
sure of relative farm competitiveness in production based on the use of stochastic profit 
frontiers  estimated  for  each  country  and  commodity,  with  technical  inefficiency  effects 
included, following the approach of Battese and Coelli (1995). It looks at factors that differ 
across farms that might explain higher relative competitiveness of specific farms. These fac-
tors include the usual determinants of profit efficiency, such as prices faced by the farm and 
fixed farm resources not traded in markets, asymmetries in access to assets (credit, liquidity, 
fixed capital) and information (education, experience, communication facilities), externalities 
(some farmers get away with uncompensated pollution, while others do not), and policies 
(some get a better deal from the state than do others). Chapter 4 describes field surveys that 
were conducted on cross-sections of farms of different sizes (small-scale, medium-scale, and 
large-scale or commercial) and type of production arrangement (independent and contract).
  Chapter 5 summarizes the descriptive results of the survey and seeks to establish through 
descriptive statistics scale-related differences in farm-specific transaction costs, such as access 
to information and input and output markets, to direct further analytical work on explaining 
farm profit per unit of output. Results show that small-scale producers across the countries 
studied are characterized by small landholdings, low levels of education, few years of experi-
ence in livestock production, moderate use of inputs, and limited access to input and output 
markets. Large-scale farm households, therefore, may have a better chance of overcoming 
high transaction costs than do small-scale producers. On the other hand, smallholders have a 
chance to compete with larger-scale producers if they can cost family labor at less than the full 
opportunity cost of hired labor doing the same tasks on larger farms, perhaps because much 
of the labor on small farms consists of extra tasks performed by women or children who are 
at home for other reasons. The study does not claim that the opportunity cost of family labor 
is zero, but it repeats the relevant calculations with family labor costed either at full market 
wage rates or not at all, with the correct answer postulated to fall somewhere in the resulting 
range between the two.
  Chapter 6 first discusses the likely impact of scaling-up of livestock production on the 
environment, then investigates the issue of whether large-scale sample farms make less of 
an effort per unit of output to mitigate pollution through expenditures on lagoons, manure 
spreading on farm land, and other mitigation activities than do small-scale sample farms in 
the study countries. If so, by hypothesis they would be polluting more per unit of output than 
are small farms, assuming that each unit of output produces the same effluent regardless of 
production system. Results show that across countries and commodities, small-scale farms 
have	higher	environmental	mitigation	“expenditures”	per	unit	of	output	than	large-scale	farms.	
The exceptions are poultry farmers in Thailand, where large-scale operations in the densely 
summary      xixii      summary
3Monogastrics are animals with one stomach compartment; examples are pigs and poultry.
settled export-certified zone spend more per unit than smaller farms, and dairy farmers in 
Thailand, where the larger-scale farmers have more crop land per animal than do the smaller-
scale farmers in the sample. Results are backed up by a second, more conventional procedure 
that estimates mass balances of nutrients per hectare added to farm soils on different farms. 
Again, it is shown that large farms load more excess nutrients per hectare of land than do small 
farms, suggesting that in fact large farms benefit from a higher uncompensated environmental 
externality per unit of output than do small farms, giving them a distorted cost advantage.
  Chapter 7 reports the econometric evidence from stochastic profit frontier analysis using 
the Battese-Coelli (1995) approach to technical inefficiencies on why some farms are relatively 
more profit-efficient than others at making farm profits from livestock. Chapter 8 then ties these 
results together with the preceding descriptive analysis. The main findings are as follows:
•	 	 Independent	small	farms	in	India	and	the	Philippines	typically	have	higher	profits	per	
unit than do independent large farms, but this is not the case for large and small contract 
farms. On the other hand, large independent farms are relatively more profit-efficient 
than small independents almost everywhere, suggesting that over time they will continue 
to outcompete smallholders and gain further market share. India, where most farms are 
small and dairy dominates, is a notable exception.
•	 	 In	Brazil	and	Thailand	in	particular,	where	scaling-up	has	already	occurred	to	a	large	 
extent in monogastrics,3 the outlook for independent smallholder producers of the items 
studied is not rosy. In the Philippines, there is considerable scope on economic grounds 
for the improvement of smallholder farming through vertical coordination of those farms 
that are presently a little larger than the bottom 20 percent of the size distribution of 
farms, especially for swine producers.
•	 	 Small	farms	have	less	of	a	negative	impact	on	the	environment	than	do	large	farms.	
Hence, environmental concerns are compatible with promoting small-scale livestock  
production. Large farms that are more environmentally responsible are also more com-
petitive within the class of large farms (particularly Philippine broiler and swine farms). 
Efficient large-scale production is compatible with good environmental behavior,  
although it seems likely that both are correlated with some third factor, such as the 
chicken and swine inventory held on-farm or the ability to sell manure produced on-
farm. It seems plausible that over time enforcement of environmental regulations will  
be more similar to enforcement of health regulations, and all producers will be forced 
to bear the same costs regardless of size. While a level environmental playing field will 
probably benefit small farms more than large ones, it will not by itself reverse the profit-
efficiency advantage of large farms over small ones.
•	 	 Beyond	maximizing	the	use	of	(assumed)	lower-opportunity-cost	family	labor,	the	rela-
tive competitiveness of smallholders is largely determined by farm-specific abilities 
to overcome barriers to information and assets, such as credit and market information. 
Therefore, a possible key to pro-poor livestock development is institutional development 
that overcomes the disproportionately high transaction costs that smallholders face in  
securing quality inputs and getting market recognition for quality outputs. This is also  
in line with the finding that as markets gravitate to higher-end concerns of quality, 
safety, and reliability of supply, smallholders will have to be associated with institutions 
that can supply the technology, inputs, information, and accreditation necessary for com-
peting in higher-value markets.•	 	 Contract	farmers	have	higher	profits	per	unit	of	output	than	do	independent	farmers	 
in some but not all cases, and they tend to be more profit-efficient than independent 
farmers at all scales (except for small swine farms in the Philippines). Therefore, con-
tract farming has real potential to better help incorporate smallholders in high-value  
supply chains that require specialized inputs and sell to markets for specialized outputs. 
However, the country studies reveal that contract farming covers a multitude of arrange-
ments, some of which are more beneficial to smallholders than others.
•	 	 Contract	farming	is	shown	to	be	even	more	useful	in	improving	the	competitiveness	of	
large farms than in improving that of small ones. From the integrator standpoint, there 
are also likely to be cost savings in dealing with a few large farms than in dealing with 
lots of small ones. Therefore, the policy environment for contracting will be especially 
important to its usefulness as a tool for poverty alleviation.
  Overall, the study concludes that in many cases smallholders other than the smallest back-
yard producers will be able to stay in the livestock business for a long time. However, if the 
opportunity cost of family labor rises and begins to approach local market wage rates, as is 
beginning to happen in periurban areas of China, for example, much of the competitiveness 
of smallholder operations vis-à-vis large farms will be vitiated. Furthermore, emerging dis-
ease threats and environmental backlash suggest that the future of large and small producers 
will sink or rise together in a context of growing demand and the ability to act collectively 
to deal with emerging threats. Finding ways to increase synergies between the two groups is 
very much in the social interest. Finally, there is reason to believe that there are significant 
economies of scale in livestock product distribution as supply chains become longer, wider, 
and more anonymous, although this is not investigated in the present study. If so, the future for 
independent livestock farmers, whether large or small, will eventually depend on the options 
for integration with input supply and output marketing operations, which must necessarily be 
the subject of a different study.
summary      xiiiCHAPTER 1
Introduction
T
he world is entering a period of rapid change in the way that animal products are 
produced, processed, marketed, and consumed. At the farm level, the trends that in-
creasingly have been observed in developed countries—scaling-up of production and 
increased concentration of larger-scale operations with increased environmental problems 
(Abdalla, Lanyon, and Hallberg 1995)—are becoming apparent in the developing countries 
(Sere and Steinfeld 1996; Steinfeld, de Haan, and Blackburn 1997; Nell 1998). The number of 
large-scale industrial livestock enterprises has increased steadily since the 1970s in developed 
countries, while the rate of growth of large-scale production has outstripped the growth of 
small-scale producers (Martinez 2002; Morrison Paul et al. 2004).
  It is plausible that the same trend will occur in developing countries, especially for poultry 
and swine. The issues of concern in developing countries arise out of the much higher share 
of the population who are small-scale livestock producers, their lack of attractive employ-
ment options, and the sheer speed with which change is occurring. Livestock production in 
developing countries as a whole, and most particularly in Asia and Latin America, has been 
steadily transiting over the last 25 years from a multipurpose activity producing food, savings, 
traction power, hides, and manure with family labor and farm-produced feed on smallholder 
crop farms to a more specialized enterprise using hired labor, borrowed capital, and pur-
chased inputs in systems producing more uniform-quality food items under industrial modes 
of organization more reminiscent of factories than of traditional smallholder farms (Sere and 
Steinfeld 1996; Delgado et al. 1999). This transformation is overwhelmingly associated with 
the growth of poultry and pig production and is referred to in this research report as “livestock 
industrialization.” The growing scale of poultry and swine farms in developing countries will 
be taken in this research report to mean the movement toward livestock industrialization, and 
for simplicity is taken as synonymous with it.
Main Objective, Assumptions, and Approach
This study investigates factors affecting scaling-up in the sense of growth in mean number of 
animals per farm kept at any one point—of livestock farms in Brazil, India, the Philippines, 
and Thailand, four fast-changing countries with growing metropolitan areas, rapidly rising 
consumption of animal-source foods, and significant livestock production coming from a 
diverse mix of farm sizes. The main purpose of the study is to examine whether smallholder 
livestock producers in these countries—and, by extension, in other developing countries—can 
hope to stay in business over the medium to long run when faced with competition from large-
scale and increasingly industrialized livestock operations.
  Two untested assumptions underlie the analysis: (1) in market-oriented systems, non- 
competitive entities will eventually move to some other pursuit or at least lose significant market 
1share, and (2) factors that promote increas- 
ingly large sizes of farm also progressively 
promote  livestock  industrialization  as  de-
fined  earlier.  With  regard  to  the  first  as-
sumption, structural factors such as an en-
trenched  peasantry  or  institutional  factors 
such as property rights systems could slow 
down  changes  in  size  relative  to  optimal 
farm  sizes  dictated  by  profitability  (Gardner 
and Pope 1978; Koester 2004). Yet it seems 
reasonable to assume that over time units 
that are not competitive will not stay en-
gaged in the sector, or at least will not ex- 
pand  at  a  time  when  the  competition  is 
growing rapidly. With regard to the second 
assumption, it seems likely that changing 
consumer  and  wholesale  demand  toward 
safer, more reliable, and more predictable 
products (in terms of attributes) could speed 
up the process of industrialization per se, 
as opposed to simply larger farms, but that 
must  necessarily  be  the  topic  of  another, 
larger, study. The present work is focused 
solely on whether small farms can compete 
with large, as opposed to the separate and 
difficult question of whether they can pro-
duce items that meet the industrial demand 
for confidence in safety and reliability.
  The approach is to establish a measur-
able yardstick of relative farm competitive-
ness in livestock, construct a view of what 
drives relative farm competitiveness, assess 
the competitiveness performance of farms 
of different sizes from samples collected in 
the four countries, and then empirically de- 
compose the separate effects of the chosen 
drivers  on  relative  competitiveness.  Com-
petitiveness is defined here as the ability to 
stay  in  business  over  time,  under  the  as-
sumption  that  in  market-oriented  systems 
those who can produce items more cheaply 
at a given common level of input and output 
prices  will  eventually  prevail  over  more 
costly suppliers if there are no barriers to 
market entry or exit.
  A first, necessary, condition for a farm 
to be competitive over time is that it is a   
relatively efficient producer of profits com-
pared  to  other  farms  producing  the  same 
product in the same area, and faced with a 
common set of input and output prices and 
a common set of fixed resources. Real profit 
efficiency in this sense includes both techni-
cal efficiency and allocative efficiency in 
production (Coelli, Rao, and Battese 1998; 
Kumbhakar  and  Lovell  2000).  Inefficient 
farms in this sense in market-oriented sys-
tems can and will (by assumption) eventu-
ally be undercut to the point where they can 
no longer make a profit.
  In the context of developing countries, 
provided that the small farms are relatively 
efficient, there is a second, sufficient, con-
dition for them to be competitive vis-à-vis 
larger farms. This is that the small farms 
have higher or equal unit profits than large 
farms in equilibrium. This is because, in the 
context of most developing countries, farms 
have such small output and are sufficiently 
constrained  from  borrowing  that  farmers 
need to cover a minimum threshold profit 
per  unit  of  output  to  stay  alive,  whereas 
large farms need only to cover average total 
cost, and can if necessary even stay in busi-
ness for some time covering only average 
variable  cost,  something  not  possible  for 
people who need to feed their families from 
farm profits. In other words, even a less ef-
ficient large farm sector could drive small-
holders out of the livestock business if they 
can undercut the minimum necessary profit 
per unit of smallholders for survival by op- 
erating at close to nonprofit levels. This be- 
havior is not likely to be feasible.
  In sum, the yardstick of competitiveness 
for smallholders in livestock production ap- 
plied in this study is that both of the follow-
ing conditions obtain: (1) they are more ef-
ficient at generating profits from a fixed kit 
of resources and facing a given set of prices 
than are large-scale farms and (2) in equi-
librium their average unit profits are higher 
than those of large farms such that the latter 
do not have much latitude to drive them out 
by driving their own profit margins to zero. 
Other factors, such as economies of scale 
in  procurement  and  processing  (Ollinger, 
MacDonald, and Madison 2005), changing 
2      CHAPTER 1consumer preferences for a more uniform 
industrial  product  (Martinez  2002),  and 
supply-driven concentration of procurement 
through investments in supermarket consol-
idation (Reardon and Timmer 2005) could 
also affect the viability of smallholder farm-
ing. The present study is necessarily limited 
to  assessing  whether  production  factors 
alone, having primarily to do with events at 
the  farm  level  (technology,  management, 
access to resources and information, and so 
on) will doom smallholders in livestock over 
time.  The  other  topics  are  separate  large 
studies on their own.
Possible Drivers of 
Livestock Industrialization
Technological Change
It has been suggested that the principal rea-
son for the exit of smallholders from live-
stock production in developed countries is 
that they are not competitive with the larger 
operations that benefit from both technical 
and allocative economies of scale embod-
ied in genetic improvement of animals and 
feeds or improved organization, especially 
for  poultry  and  pigs,  where  profitable   
adoption simply requires larger farm sizes 
(Gardner  and  Pope  1978;  Narrod  1997; 
Martinez 2002; Morrison Paul et al. 2004).   
This  is  a  particularly  difficult  issue  for 
smallholders, because it conveys a sense of 
inevitable economic doom over time, pro-
pelled by irreversible technological progress. 
Anecdotal  experience  suggests  that  many 
livestock  production  experts  do  not  go 
much beyond this explanation in assuming 
the  inevitability  of  livestock  industrializa-
tion in developing countries.
Economies of Scale in Input Supply
The importance of understanding cost ad-
vantages in input procurement is heightened 
by the growing importance of monogastric 
livestock in total meat production costs in 
developing countries and by the fact that up 
to 70 percent of the cost of production of 
monogastric  livestock  is  feed  costs  (Del-
gado et al. 1999). If larger-scale farms can 
regularly secure access to feed of a given 
quality at a lower price per unit, they gain 
a  great  cost  advantage  over  small-scale 
producers. This could arise simply because 
it costs less per kilogram to deliver a full 
truckload of feed to a farm than to deliver 
one bag. Yet while there are undoubtedly 
true  economies  of  scale  to  be  reaped  in 
bulk purchasing of inputs, these need to be 
distinguished  from  other  feed-related  cost 
advantages of large farms.
  If large, vertically integrated operators 
avoid paying sales taxes on feed but small 
independent producers do not, small inde- 
pendent production is at a disadvantage be- 
cause of a policy distortion (discussed later) 
and not an economy of scale. Similarly, feed 
concentrates by definition have multiple in- 
gredients, many of which cannot be ascer- 
tained  by  looking  at  the  final  product. 
Where public enforcement of the truthful-
ness of ingredient labels is lax or branding is 
unreliable, as is often the case in developing 
countries, producers who are large enough 
to mix their own feed are more assured of 
receiving  good-quality  inputs.  Put  differ-
ently,  smallholders  face  a  higher  “trans- 
action cost” in terms of having less informa-
tion about what their feeds contain or, put 
differently, they would need to spend more 
per unit to know in advance what their ani-
mals are actually eating. This “transaction 
cost” is also not a true economy of scale 
but a form of structural barrier specific to 
individual farms (discussed later).
Policy Distortions and Externalities
As we hinted earlier in the case of differen-
tial input taxation of large and small farms, 
another driver of growing farm sizes might 
be policy-induced distortions (Gardner and 
Pope 1978). Examples of policy distortions 
include  both  scale-specific  subsidies  and 
scale-specific differences in uncompensated 
negative environmental externalities. An ex- 
ample  of  the  former  would  be  if  policy 
deliberately  targeted  direct  subsidies  such 
inTRoduCTion      3as those on credit to larger farms within a 
strategy of favoring rural notables for politi-
cal reasons (Bates 1981).
  A different sort of policy distortion af-
fecting the incentive to scaling-up would be 
the case if large farms “get away with” more 
pollution  downstream  per  unit  of  output 
than do small farms. If farmers reap the ben-
efits of production but do not compensate 
neighbors for negative environmental exter- 
nalities such as bad odors, flies, and polluted 
water,  they  are  gaining  a  cost  advantage 
relative to more eco-friendly or considerate 
farmers who incur less negative externali-
ties. An incentive for scaling-up would exist 
if the net uncompensated negative externali-
ties from livestock production benefit large 
producers more per unit of output than they 
do  small  producers.  An  example  would 
be the dumping of large amounts of waste 
into  watercourses  by  larger  farms  unable 
to absorb more manure on their fields, pre-
sumably  unlike  smallholders,  whose  ratio 
of stock to cropped land on-farm is typi-
cally much lower (Steinfeld, de Haan, and 
Blackburn 1997).
Transaction Costs Arising from 
Asymmetries in Information
As hinted earlier in the case of the hard-
to-know composition of concentrate feeds, 
other important factors beside technology-
driven economies of scale and policy distor-
tions may provide incentives to scaling-up 
in the sense of individual farms’ becoming 
larger.  An  important  group  of  these  are 
manifested as “transaction cost barriers” to 
smallholder participation in markets, where 
transaction costs are the hidden extra costs 
of search, bargaining, monitoring, and en-
forcement of exchange.
  Transaction costs in their purest sense 
are  the  costs  of  exchange  that  arise  from 
asymmetries across market actors in access 
to  information  (Williamson  1989).  Trans- 
action costs arise if buyers and sellers cannot 
know the same important pieces of infor- 
mation about what is being sold at the time of 
sale and what the alternatives are. On the 
output  market  side,  if  both  buyers  and 
sellers  can  easily  ascertain  the  quality  of 
an item being sold at the time of sale and 
prices  in  alternative  markets,  competitive 
forces would eventually equal market prices 
across different categories of farmers. But if 
buyers cannot be sure of the true quality of 
the good they are purchasing, for example, 
they will presumably be less willing to pay 
a premium for it based on claimed quality.
  Smallholders  that  have  trouble  selling 
milk outside the local market provide an ex- 
ample of the latter situation, because pur-
chasers  in  anonymous  markets  cannot  be 
sure without a bacteriological test that un-
branded milk is safe. Large-scale producers 
and cooperatives of small-scale ones, how-
ever, may be able to establish trust and rep-
utation in markets, because they will be able 
to depend on repeat sales of quasi-branded 
product to the same clients, who can iden-
tify the source of the milk (Staal, Delgado, 
and Nicholson 1997). The clients can judge 
the quality of the next purchase based on 
a history of purchases from the same farm 
or co-op. Similarly, the use of poor-quality 
feeds for hogs produces off flavors in the 
meat that can only be detected when eat-
ing the final product, and poor genetics can 
lead to excessive back fat that is not observ-
able until the animal is slaughtered (Payne 
and Wilson 1999). For this reason, larger 
producers may also be able to get higher   
prices per unit through regular large sales   
by developing a steady clientele that gains 
confidence  in  the  quality  of  the  product   
(Staal, Delgado, and Nicholson 1997). Gener-
ally, rising demand for food safety and qual- 
ity is likely, ceteris paribus, to exacerbate   
transaction  costs  in  livestock  product  ex-
change arising from asymmetries in access 
to information.
  Transaction costs arising from asymme- 
tries in information are especially prevalent 
in the livestock product business and repre- 
sent net social losses in the sense that nei-
ther buyers nor sellers gain from their pres-
ence (Williamson 1989). They are real costs 
incurred as lower prices received or higher 
4      CHAPTER 1prices paid. They are likely to play a grow-
ing role in the displacement of smallholders 
as  markets  become  more  demanding  in 
terms of information about the quality of the 
product at the time of sale (Holloway et al. 
2000).
  Differences  in  market  power  between 
large and small farms can also be thought 
of as transaction cost differences between 
large and small farms arising from differ-
ences in access to assets (De Janvry, Faf- 
champs, and Sadoulet 1991). A feed seller 
may discount feed prices to larger farms if 
so doing ensures continued business with   
an important customer. A key element of 
this form of transaction cost facing small 
farms is that they are farm-specific and not 
product-specific  (De  Janvry,  Fafchamps, 
and Sadoulet 1991; Key, Sadoulet, and de   
Janvry 2000). Whether the underlying issue 
is  assets  of  information  is  often  moot. 
Large-scale  producers  are  typically  more 
creditworthy because their ability to repay 
is more easily known. The capital-intensive 
nature of livestock farms that must regularly 
buy stock and feed well in advance of sell-
ing  the  final  product  suggests  that  asym-
metry in access to assets, even if it arises 
from asymmetries in information, is likely 
to  make  asset-poor  livestock  farms  more 
subject to unfavourable deals on both the 
input and the output sides.
  In  effect,  transaction  costs  arise  from 
the existence of market failures for certain 
households;  the  examples  mentioned  ear-
lier are failures of markets for information 
or  credit.  When  there  is  no  exchange  of 
information and credit on these farms due 
to market failure, the shadow price of infor-
mation or capital (as the case may be) is in 
effect the relevant transaction cost, but it is   
by definition not directly observable (De Jan-
vry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991). Even 
when  manifested  as  price  differentials  in 
different transactions, the differentials could 
be explained by a variety of other factors, 
such as quality differences or even differ-
ences  in  the  daily  aggregate  supply  and 
demand presented on the market at differ-
ent moments. A typical approach, then, is 
to  proxy  the  underlying  asymmetries  in 
information  and  assets  across  households 
by the use of household-level variables such 
as  education,  production  experience,  or 
wealth. These household differences in proxy 
variables are then used in conjunction with 
non-transaction costs related to explainers 
of price outcomes (such as time of day or 
distance  to  market  or  observable  quality 
differences)  to  explain  why  some  trans- 
actions occur at more remunerative prices 
to a farmer A than to farmer B (Staal, Del-
gado, and Nicholson 1997).
  The  market  failures  associated  with 
transaction costs and affecting smallholders 
in developing countries are usually thought 
of  as  leading  to  the  nonindependence  of 
household decisions concerning production 
and consumption (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 
1986). This framework has the interesting 
corollary for our present purposes that ra-
tional smallholders can be shown to supply 
labor  to  their  own  farms  for  returns  well 
below what would be required to get them 
to work on someone else’s farm, even as-
suming rational utility maximization (Lopez 
1986;  Rosenzweig  1988;  De  Janvry,  Faf- 
champs, and Sadoulet 1991).
  Empirical as opposed to theoretical sub- 
stantiation of the willingness of farm house-
holds to work on their own farms for mar- 
ginal revenue products lower than the local 
market wage is inconclusive, with different 
studies coming to different results (Rosen-
zweig  1988).  Feder  (1985)  provides  sup-
port using Indian data. Tokle and Huffman 
(1991) provide support for the willingness 
of U.S. Midwest farmers to work for less at 
home. Abdulai and Delgado (1999) demon-
strate in the case of Ghana that the supply of 
peasant  labor  to  off-farm  wage  work  is 
highly influenced by the job profile of one’s 
spouse  and  that  women  were  less  likely   
to work off-farm, ceteris paribus. Because 
smallholder  livestock-keeping  is  over-
whelmingly carried out by women of child-
raising  age  in  developing  countries,  it  is 
quite plausible that such farmers cost their 
inTRoduCTion      5own labor time at home caring for a few ani- 
mals in the backyard at significantly less than 
market wages for casual labor off-farm.
  This view for livestock is very much in 
keeping  with  the  classical  literature  over 
three  decades  surveyed  by  Mellor  and   
Mudahar (1992) explaining the widely ob-
served  inverse  relationship  between  farm 
size and crop productivity in Asia. A vari-
ety of surveyed authors in different Asian 
countries explained the higher relative pro-
ductivity of smaller farms by the increased 
family  labor  input  per  hectare  on  small 
farms, presumably at a lower shadow wage 
than the market wage rate. This finding is 
consistent  with  the  findings  of  nonhomo-
geneity of family and hired labor in Asian 
agriculture for the purposes of productivity 
analysis (Deolalikar and Vijverberg 1987). 
It is also consistent with the work for Paki-
stan of Ali and Flinn (1989), who apply the 
concept of profit efficiency, combining both 
technical and allocative efficiency, to Paki-
stani smallholders.
  There is, on the other hand, little justi-
fication for the view that family labor has 
zero opportunity cost. In most cases people 
have alternative ways to produce income, 
and in any event it seems likely that, other 
things  equal,  many  people  would  prefer   
leisure to work activities. The approach to 
be adopted in the present work is that un-
paid family labor input to livestock produc-
tion at home has a shadow price less than 
the market wage rate for hired labor doing 
similar tasks, but is above zero. Most results 
will be computed using both an assumption 
of zero opportunity cost of family labor and 
again costing family labor at a market wage 
rate, to produce a range of results, with the 
right  answer  lying  somewhere  inside  the 
range.
  Family  labor  input  per  unit  of  output 
is typically highest on the smallest farms. 
Thus, if such farms compare unfavourably 
in performance to larger farms while still 
not costing family labor, it is not necessary 
to inquire much further, because even as-
sumptions that were likely to give the small-
est farms the best showing relative to other 
farms were still not enough to show them   
as  competitive.  In  other  words,  assuming 
zero opportunity cost for family labor only 
strengthens  conclusions  that  are  unfavor-
able to the relative efficiency of smallhold-
ers. Conversely, a finding that smallholders 
are more competitive than large farms when 
family labor is not costed is suspect, for the 
assumption  tends  to  favor  the  estimated 
performance of small farms more than that 
of big ones.
Cost Savings from  
Vertical Coordination
Vertical coordination arises when different 
elements  of  the  animal  supply  chain  are 
integrated through some form of contractual 
arrangement.  Cost  savings,  for  example, 
could occur from purchasing inputs or sell-
ing outputs in bulk (economies of scale), 
from  avoiding  taxation  of  inputs  (policy 
subsidy),  or  from  reduction  of  the  trans- 
action costs between actors along the sup-
ply  chain.  Martinez  (2002)  suggests  that 
some of the reasons for vertical coordina-
tion in the pork and poultry sectors in the 
United States were as follows: “Contracting 
and vertical integration produced a means 
for  reducing  transaction  costs  associated 
with  relationship-specific  transactions,  es-
pecially in regions of expanding production. 
Contracts would provide some safeguards 
against opportunistic behavior, and vertical 
integration  eliminated  the  exchange  rela-
tionship. For attributes that are difficult to 
measure, gaining additional control over re-
lated production inputs may reduce measur-
ing costs by reducing the need to measure 
quality” (Martinez 2002, iii).
  It is thus reasonable to suppose that the 
costs of administering contract farming, say, 
with a few large farmers might be lower per 
unit of output than administering the same 
scheme with a large number of small farms. 
This has been offered as the principal ex-
planation for the very rapid rise in hog farm 
sizes in the United States in the 1990s, when 
the share of independent farms in U.S. hog 
6      CHAPTER 1output fell from three quarters to one quar-
ter of the farms in less than a decade at the 
same time that rapid increases in hog farm 
size occurred (Martinez 2002). In this case, 
the  benefits  of  vertical  coordination  are 
themselves a driver of increasing farm size. 
However, in most cases in developing coun-
tries it would be more appropriate to think 
of the underlying transactions costs facing 
individual farms, especially smaller ones, as 
the driving forces that provide the incentive 
for vertical coordination at the same time as 
they increase the competitiveness of larger 
operations relative to smaller ones.
Why Scaling-up of 
Production Matters for  
Pro-Poor and Sustainable 
Growth Policies
Livestock Is the Main Game 
Outside Town
From the beginning of the 1970s to the mid-
1990s, consumption of meat in developing 
countries  increased  by  70  million  metric 
tons (MMT), almost triple the increase in 
developed  countries,  and  consumption  of 
milk by 105 MMT of liquid milk equiva-
lents, more than twice the increase that oc- 
curred in developed countries. The market 
value of that increase in meat and milk con-
sumption  totaled  approximately  US$155 
billion  (1990  US$),  more  than  twice  the 
market value of increased cereal consump-
tion  under  the  better-known  supply-led 
“Green  Revolution”  in  wheat,  rice,  and 
maize.  The  population  growth,  urbaniza-
tion,  and  income  growth  that  fueled  the 
increase  in  meat  and  milk  consumption 
are expected to continue well into the new 
millennium, creating a veritable “Livestock 
Revolution” (Delgado et al. 1999).
  The Livestock Revolution in meat has 
been  most  evident  in  East  and  Southeast 
Asia,  particularly  China  and  Brazil,  as 
shown in Table 1.1. The share of the world’s 
meat  consumed  in  developing  countries 
rose from 36 to 67 percent. Pork and poultry 
accounted for 60 percent of the large net 
consumption increase of meat in developing 
countries from 1990 to 2005. The big actors 
in the milk story are India and Brazil. The 
share of developing countries in producing 
the world’s milk rose from 34 to 47 percent 
(Table 1.1).
Opportunities and Threats  
for Smallholders
A  critical  issue  raised  by  these  trends  is 
that for once a sector on which the poor are 
heavily  involved  is  growing.  Table  1.2 
shows that in fact pork and poultry are the 
prominent  growth  sectors  of  developing 
countries’ agriculture. If the poor fail to par- 
ticipate, they will have missed a tremendous 
opportunity  to  improve  per  capita  liveli-
hoods.  If  they  participate,  farm  income   
could rise dramatically, but the conditions 
under which this could occur are still un- 
determined. Furthermore, whether the seem- 
ingly unstoppable growth of livestock de-
mand is a good or bad thing for the poor will 
also depend on the environmental and pub-
lic health impact of rapidly rising livestock 
production in close proximity to where the 
poor live (Delgado et al. 1999).
  Some reasons that small farmers could 
have a cost advantage in producing high-
value meat, egg, and milk commodities rel- 
ative to large-scale producers are as follows 
(Delgado and Minot 2003):
•	 	 If	farmers	are	more	willing	to	work	 
at home or have lower transaction costs 
in working at home on their own farm 
activities than for pay elsewhere, it sug-
gests that the implicit wage rate for  
family labor is generally below the 
prevailing wage rate for agricultural 
labor, particularly for tasks requiring 
only momentary but frequent attention 
throughout the day.
•	 	 The	family	labor	used	by	small	farmers	
is likely to be more motivated and re-
quires less monitoring than hired labor 
used by large-scale farms, so small 
farms are better able than large ones to 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.apply careful husbandry and respond to 
problems in the field.
•	 	 Small	livestock	producers	may	face	
lower waste-disposal costs (or generate 
lower environmental costs) if produc-
tion is sufficiently dispersed to allow 
natural absorption.
  On the other hand, rising market share 
in developing countries for larger-scale pro-
ducers of pork, eggs, and poultry meat sug-
gests that other factors may be prevailing in 
determining who in developing countries is 
able to capture the fast-expanding market:
•	 	 Small	farmers	may	not	have	the	 
technical skills needed to produce these 
commodities. Even if they are familiar 
with producing chickens or milk for 
home consumption, the production 
techniques may be different for com-
mercial production.
•	 	 Lack	of	credit	or	liquidity	makes	it	
difficult for small farmers to purchase 
specialized agricultural inputs or to 
make the investments needed to pro-
duce these commodities.
•	 	 Small	farmers	are	less	able	than	large	
ones to bear the risk associated with pro- 
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Table 1.2    Production growth rates  
(in volume) in developing countries, 
1975–2005 
  Growth in volume








Source: Calculated from data in the FAO Statistics 
Database, http://FAOSTAT.FAO.ORG/default.htm.
Notes: “Fish” includes marine and freshwater fishes; 
“poultry” includes chicken, duck, and turkey meat.
ducing highly perishable commodi- 
ties. Not only do perishable commodities 
experience greater price fluctuations 
and risk of spoilage than do non- 
perishable ones, but once the com- 
modity is ready for sale, perishability 
puts the farmer in a weak bargaining 
position relative to the buyer.
•	 	 Small	farmers	frequently	do	not	have	
access to the information about market 
demand they need to make production 
decisions. The problem is not just lack 
of price information, but also lack of 
information about the relationship be-
tween price and product characteristics 
such as color, size, shape, texture, fat 
content, freshness, and so on.
•	 	 Buyers	may	not	have	access	to	infor- 
mation about the quality of output from 
specific smallholder farms, which 
makes them less willing to purchase 
from any smallholders at any given 
price level, compared to buying from a 
well-identified large-scale provider.
•	 	 Larger	farms	may	be	more	able	than	
smaller ones to secure policy subsidies 
such as subsidized credit or better  
infrastructure.
•	 	 Larger	farms	may	be	relatively	more	
able than smaller farms to get away 
with creating negative externalities 
through pollution.
  The presence of the latter factors sug-
gests  that  rapidly  rising  demand  for  live-
stock products in developing countries may 
do more to stimulate the large-scale sectors 
than smallholder farmers. In fact, the rise of 
large-scale industrialized farms made possi-
ble by crossing some threshold of minimum 
assured  demand  could  conceivably  even 
lead to the reduction of smallholder sales 
below where they were before the demand 
surge.
Hypotheses to Be Tested
A literature review suggests that the main 
determinants  of  the  hypothesized  greater competitiveness of large farms, and thus by 
assumption scaling-up, are
•	 	 increasing	technical	and	allocative	
economies of scale in livestock,  





mental externalities per unit of output 
and land by larger farmers; and
•	 	 the	role	of	posited	higher	transaction	
costs from asymmetries in access to  
information and assets facing small-
holders in reducing their competitive-
ness relative to those of larger-scale 
farms.
  Knowing  which  driving  forces  create   
the  incentives  for  larger-scale  livestock 
farms  is  critical  to  knowing  what  to  do 
about it and whether to do so. The issues 
just cited can be clarified by the empirical 
testing of a number of specific hypotheses. 
Table  1.3  summarizes  the  links  between 
testable hypotheses and inferences from test 
results for what is driving incentives for the 
scaling-up of livestock farms.
  If true economies of scale from technol- 
ogy, management, or transport (for exam- 
ple)  are  driving  the  incentives  for  larger 
scales of livestock farming, we would ex-
pect, ceteris paribus, larger farms both to be 
more profit-efficient and to have unit profits 
larger than or equal to those of small farms, 
where all variables are measured in finan-
cial  rather  than  social  prices.  Such  larger 
farms  could  eliminate  competition  from 
small  family  farms  over  time  by  cutting 
their profit margins. However, if small farms 
both are more profit-efficient and have unit 
profits higher than or equal to those of large 
farms, they are unlikely to be displaced by 
large farms, except possibly by events in 
supply  chains  occurring  beyond  the  farm 
level,  which  is  outside  the  scope  of  this 
study.  On  the  other  hand,  if  small  farms 
are more profit-efficient than large ones but 
still have lower unit profits, either it is a 
temporary phenomenon or it reflects higher 
unit subsidies or other distortions bolstering 
the unit profits of large farms. Hence the 
rationale for two key hypotheses:
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Table 1.3    Linking issues to expected empirical findings and tests
Issue investigated  Expected empirical findings  Test
Whether economies of scale (e.g., from   Small farms have lower unit profits and   Hypotheses 1 and 2 are rejected 
    technology) are contributing to scaling-up      lower relative profit efficiency 
Whether policy distortions (subsidies to   Small farms have lower unit profits and   Hypothesis 1 is rejected and there is a  
    large-scale farms) are contributing to       higher profit efficiency than large farms      failure to reject Hypothesis 2   
    scaling-up   
Whether environmental externalities are   Small farms internalize more per unit of the  Failure to reject Hypothesis 3; failure to  
    contributing to scaling-up      cost of pollution from livestock production       reject Hypothesis 4 
      than do large farms 
Whether transaction costs are contributing   Transaction cost proxies have a greater  Failure to reject Hypothesis 5  
    to scaling-up      negative effect on the relative profitability  
      of small farms than do large ones 
Whether contract farming is more profit-  Contract farms have higher relative profit   Failure to reject Hypothesis 6 
    efficient than independent farming      efficiency and unit profits than do  
      independent ones at comparable levels  
      of scale 
The relative importance of each driver in a  See Chapter 3  See Chapter 3  
    simultaneous experimentHypothesis 1: Small-scale producers have 
higher or equal profits per unit of output 
than do large producers. This can be di-
rectly calculated from farm survey data, 
and it represents a benchmark. If sup-
ported, smallholders still have a chance 
to compete. If rejected, it is unlikely that 
smallholders will be able to compete in 
the same markets as larger-scale produc- 
ers, because smallholders have, by defi-
nition, a small volume of output with 
which to make a living, and large farms 
will eventually drive small ones out of 
business. Even if supported, there is still 
the possibility that large-scale producers 
will drive smallholders out of the market 
by reducing prices if they are more effi- 
cient users of resources.
Hypothesis  2:  Small-scale  producers  are 
more efficient users of farm resources to 
secure profits than are large-scale pro-
ducers, other things equal. This issue re- 
quires  an  analytical  methodology  for 
empirical testing (see Chapter 3). By ef-
ficiency we mean the amalgam of tech-
nical  efficiency  in  terms  of  producing 
the most valuable output with a given 
set of inputs and allocative efficiency, in 
terms of using the most efficient combi-
nation of inputs given prevailing prices.1 
If Hypothesis 1 and the present hypoth-
esis are both supported, the outlook for 
smallholders is pretty good, because the 
combination of higher unit profits and 
greater efficiency would mean that the 
small farmers could either displace large 
farmers, or possibly they could eventu-
ally become large farmers!
  If Hypothesis 1 holds and Hypothesis 2 
does  not,  implicit  subsidies  to  large-scale 
operations may be at work, and if so they 
may even overcome the efficiency advan-
tage of small-scale production. If both hy-
potheses are rejected, there is little apparent 
scope  for  keeping  smallholders  involved 
without explicit subsidies for this purpose, 
and even then it is unlikely that their pres-
ence will be felt for long.
  A  spin-off  subhypothesis  here  is  that 
the relative profit efficiency of small farms 
compared to large ones depends greatly on 
how family labor input is valued in both 
cases. Because family labor is a much higher 
share of total labor on smaller farms, not 
valuing  family  labor  favors  the  estimated 
relative efficiency of smallholders. In fact, 
consistent with the literature cited earlier, it 
seems likely that one way smallholders can 
avoid  being  displaced  is  by  undervaluing 
their own labor relative to the market wage 
rates paid by commercial operators for simi- 
lar work. If this turns out to be the basis of 
smallholders’ competitiveness, the latter is 
likely to become more fragile as labor mar-
kets become more integrated over time.
  There are other hypotheses to be tested 
as well.
Hypothesis  3:  Small  farmers  expend  a 
greater  amount  of  effort/investment  in 
abatement of negative environmental ex- 
ternalities  per  unit  of  output  than  do 
large farmers. This hypothesis requires 
an empirical approach for measuring ex- 
ternalities that can be attributed to spe-
cific  farms  (see  Chapter  3).  If  such  a 
methodology is feasible, it allows us to 
indirectly  address  a  fascinating  ques- 
tion: do large farmers reap more benefits 
per unit of output from environmental   
externalities than do small ones? If so, 
lack  of  enforcement  of  environmental 
laws is probably contributing to scaling- 
up. If not, smallholders may have been 
able to hang on in the livestock sector in 
part because they get away with pollu-
tion and larger-scale operators do not. 
However, increasing densities of small-
holders producing livestock near human 
inTRoduCTion      11
1Kumbhakar (2001) shows that under neoclassical assumptions overall efficiency is the product of technical and 
allocative efficiency.population  centers  under  the  Live- 
stock Revolution will bring increasing 
problems.
Hypothesis 4: Uncompensated negative en- 
vironmental externalities favor the nom-
inal profit efficiency of large farms over 
small  ones,  ceteris  paribus.  If  small 
farmers consistently internalize a larger 
share of negative externalities than do 
large farms, as in Hypothesis 3, it stands 
to reason that environmental externali-
ties favor the nominal profit efficiency 
of large farms. However, a model is re- 
quired to test Hypothesis 4, even if de-
scriptive analysis is enough to support 
the assertion in Hypothesis 3. This is be- 
cause  the  value  of  an  uncompensated 
externality  to  the  relative  profit  effi-
ciency  of  a  given  farm  is  just  one  of 
many  influences,  and  it  may  also  be   
correlated  with  other  relevant  factors. 
Empirical  methods  used  to  assess  the 
differential  impacts  of  uncompensated 
externalities  on  relative  profitability 
must also simultaneously account for all 
the other factors that explain differences 
in profitability across farms, especially 
differences  in  technical  and  allocative 
efficiency and differences in policy dis-
tortions  and  transaction  costs  as  they   
affect different farms. If a satisfactory 
approach to these problems can be de-
vised, the pay-off will be an unbiased 
view of the relative importance of un-
compensated  environmental  externali-
ties in promoting scaling-up.
Hypothesis 5: Profits of small-scale produc-
ers are more sensitive to “transaction 
costs” than are those of large-scale pro- 
ducers.  The  previous  discussion  sug-
gested that transaction costs are likely to 
diminish the competitiveness of smaller 
farms more than that of larger ones. If 
that is true, it suggests that policies that 
reduce  transaction  costs  proportionate   
to  output  for  all  producers  will  be  of   
particular benefit to smallholders. It also 
suggests  that  institutional  solutions  to 
high  transaction  costs,  such  as  dairy   
cooperatives and contract farming, will   
be  of  the  greatest  benefit  to  small- 
holders. However, there are methodolog-
ical problems in investigating this issue. 
First, transaction costs may be difficult 
to  observe,  and  therefore  must  be  in-
ferred from farm characteristics that are 
likely to be collinear with differences in 
access to information and assets. Sec-
ond, there is a problem similar to the one 
under the previous hypothesis involving 
sorting out different influences on rela-
tive profitability. As before, a satisfac-
tory  approach  to  these  joint  problems 
will yield an unbiased view of the rela-
tive importance of different kinds of in- 
formation  or  asset  asymmetry  in  pro-
moting scaling-up.
Hypothesis 6: Contract farmers are more 
profit efficient than independent farmers 
at  comparable  scales  of  operation.  If 
contract  farming  is  a  way  around  the 
high  transaction  costs  plaguing  small-
holders, it should increase the efficiency 
with which they use their fixed farm re- 
sources  to  secure  profits.  This  can  be 
expected to also show up in higher aver- 
age unit profits for contract farmers, al-
though the latter will vary from year to 
year depending on market price fluctua-
tions. If profit efficiency and unit profits 
are higher for contract farmers, ceteris 
paribus, contract farming, where it is ap-
propriate, could keep small-scale farms 
participating in high-value markets for 
some time to come. From a policy per- 
spective,  it  will  also  be  important  to 
know if the higher profitability of con-
tract farming is due in part to implicit or 
hidden  subsidies  received  by  the  inte-
grating institution.
12      CHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2
Growth, Concentration, and Integration of 
the Livestock Sector in the Study Countries
T
he four country cases chosen—the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Brazil, going from 
east to west—have diverse histories, economies, cultures, and political structures. How- 
ever, they are all fast-changing developing countries where cities, population, urban in- 
comes, and consumption of livestock products have been growing rapidly since the early 
1980s. They have also all seen, at least in the initial stage of livestock industrialization, the rise 
of large periurban livestock operations of one form or another, typically not far from major 
cities. Finally, they also typically have vibrant smallholder livestock sectors producing similar 
products nearby.
Growth and Concentration in the Philippines
The livestock sector provided the strongest source of agricultural growth as the Philippine 
economy emerged from recession in 1998.1 In particular, pork and broiler meat have been at 
the forefront of the livestock production growth, growing at 3.2 and 7.2 percent per year in 
1990 and 2005, respectively. This growth is driven mostly by a surge in demand, an increase 
in imports of breeding stock, the use of vaccines and drugs to control for diseases, and verti-
cal integration in the case of poultry. Expansion of these two industries has been concentrated 
in the Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog regions, located north and south, respectively,   
of  the  capital  city  of  Manila,  the  largest  demand  center  (see  http://www.fao.org/ 
WAIRDOCS/LEAD/X6170E/x6170e0c.htm for the geographic concentration of swine and 
poultry in the Philippines). Both regions have relatively increasing incomes and expanding 
populations and thus are also centers for growth in consumption, in addition to the nearby 
Manila market.
  Chicken farms in the Philippines were initially characterized by the use of native breeds 
(Figure 2.1).2 Native chickens are mostly raised on backyard farms by smallholders,3 and 
broilers (which are imported hybrids raised using free-range practices) were referred to as 
“commercial” chickens by the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics until 1998. Feed consists 
mainly of crop residues and grain spillage along with broken rice and corn. Native breeds con- 
1This section is drawn from Costales et al. (2003), which gives appropriate citations to original sources.
2Native chickens are those that do not include the recently imported hybrid chickens with foreign strains and 
include improved breeds (those that are crosses of local chickens with foreign strains).
3A poultry farm in the Philippines is classified as “backyard” if it has fewer than 100 birds (Philippines, BAS 
1987).
13tinue to be important in the Philippine poul-
try market, and the number of native chick-
ens relative to commercial chickens seems 
to have increased, while commercial growth 
has  remained  pretty  constant  despite  the 
short peak between 1995 and 1998. How-
ever,  Babcock-based  commercial  breeds 
are rapidly displacing them in the growing 
Metro  Manila  market  and  nearby  major 
market areas in Central and Southern Luzon 
(Figure 2.2).
  Although smallholder hog and poultry 
production at all scales has grown nation-
wide,  large-scale  industrialized  livestock 
production has grown even faster, particu-
larly in Central and Southern Luzon. The 
broiler sector has been at the forefront of 
livestock industrialization, from importing 
grandparent stock and medicines and using 
advanced technologies to promote growth 
to developing vertically integrated produc-
tion systems through contract farming. The 
latter span the range from feed ingredient 
importing to retailing processes meat.
  Large integrators control some 80 per-
cent of the broiler market in the Philippines. 
The remainder is in the hands of indepen-
dent  commercial  broiler  producers,  who 
typically  maintain  inventories  of  20,000– 
100,000 birds, and a few smallholders, who 
typically raise 1,000–2,000 birds at a time. 
The  large  integrators  are  banded  together 
into an organization, the Philippine Asso-
ciation of Broiler Integrators, consisting of 
six large firms. The integrators engage in 
breeding and contract growing, processing, 
and  distribution  of  branded  output.  They 
are  also  major  players  in  the  live  broiler 
market, in which the daily reference price 
is set by the group in the form of a “gentle-
men’s  agreement”  (Costales  et  al.  2003). 
The integrators are also the main source of 
day-old chicks for independent commercial 
producers and smallholders.
  With regard to feed supply, while small-
sized feed mills have their own brands of 
mixed feeds, the integrators not only supply 
their  own  feeds  for  internal  use,  but  also 
compete with small-scale mills in the com-
mercial market as suppliers of mixed feeds. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the inte-
grators have relatively easier access to mini-
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Figure 2.1    Native chicken and broiler chicken inventories, Philippines, 1990–2006
Sources: Costales et al. (2003); Philippines, Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS) (2007a).mum access volume guarantee corn imports 
negotiated at 35 percent under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Costales 
et  al.  2003).  They  are  thus  better  able  to 
compete against other popular feed brands 
based on domestic corn prices that reflect 
the prevailing corn tariff of 60 percent. It 
is also possible that being horizontally inte-
grated with grain mills for human food use 
conveys economies of scope in feed grain 
importation and milling.
  The live broiler market is still the main 
output  market  for  smallholders  and  large 
independent commercial broiler producers 
because of the continued preference of con-
sumers for fresh meat. The large integrators 
control  the  market  for  dressed  broilers, 
which they sell through vertically coordi-
nated  retail  meat  shops  and  an  emerging 
urban supermarket sector. In an era of mar-
ket  uncertainties  created  by  international 
trade in meat, independent producers have 
less capacity to cushion their incomes from 
relatively large fluctuations in live broiler 
prices as compared to dressed meat prices.
  In the hog sector, which is less concen-
trated  than  the  broiler  industry,  commer-
cial farm operations have also concentrated 
in  the  two  provinces  surrounding  Metro   
Manila.  Small,  medium-sized,  and  large-
scale producers have relatively equal access 
to  the  major  market,  the  live  market  for 
slaughter  hogs  served  by  small-scale  col-
lectors who truck small butchers of live ani-
mals to slaughter points in Metro Manila.
  The truly larger-scale commercial firms 
in the hog sector are vertically integrated, 
from  breeding  and  contract  production  to 
slaughter and processing of branded meat 
products. These large firms increasingly ac-
cess a higher-value retail market through the 
growing institutional sector in large cities, 
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Figure 2.2    Broilers (imported hybrids) dominate in the Metro Manila area (Regions iii 
and iv-A), 2006
Source: Philippines, Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS) (2007a).which includes supermarkets and up-scale 
restaurants and hotels, than do the medium-
sized  commercial  and  smallholder  farms. 
Through vertical coordination, these large 
firms can meet the food safety certification 
needs  and  consistent  quality  standards  of 
the institutional food sector. However, verti- 
cal integration and contract growing have 
not yet become the norms throughout the 
hog industry. Currently, no one integrator 
has a dominant market share, unlike in the 
chicken industry.
  In  sum,  livestock  production  in  the   
Philippines has grown on both small (back-
yard)  and  large-scale  (commercial)  farms 
and has become highly concentrated around 
major demand centers. In fact, large-scale 
farms  have  overtaken  backyard  farms  in 
proximity to Manila (Region IV-A),4 as in 
the case of hog production (see Figure 2.3). 
Large-scale layer farms have already com-
pletely  displaced  smallholders,  and  large-
scale broiler operations are starting to do 
the same.
Growth and Concentration  
in Thailand
The beginnings of structural change in live-
stock production in Thailand can be traced 
to  the  introduction  of  modern  production 
methods  in  1946  and  the  importation  of 
high-yielding  stock  in  1956  (Poapong- 
sakorn 1985).5 Yet major changes did not 
occur until local and regional markets pro-
vided an incentive for major production in- 
creases with the start of the Livestock Rev- 
olution  in  the  1970s.  At  that  time,  the   
Charoen  Pokphand  Company  (CP)  estab-
lished its chicken-breeding business through 
a joint venture with the U.S.-based Arbor 
Acres Company, bringing improved grand-
parent  stock  into  Thailand.  Subsequently 
CP  went  on  to  become  a  diversified  and 
vertically and horizontally integrated multi- 
national  corporation  rooted  in  the  feed, 
meat, and shrimp trade, with $4 billion U.S. 
dollars in sales revenues and 100,000 em-
ployees by the mid-1990s.
  With extension of the CP model to poul-
try producers, Thai broiler chicken produc-
tion went from 474,000 tons in 1983 to over 
1.2  million  tons  in  2001  (Poapongsakorn   
et al. 2003). Such rapid growth of broiler 
production was possible because of the ex- 
port markets made accessible through unit 
cost-cutting technology and organization put 
in place by the private sector and through 
supportive regulation and trade liberaliza-
tion  by  the  state.  Sharply  lower  chicken 
prices  and  positive  income  growth  were 
also associated with a doubling of domestic 
chicken consumption, from 6.8 kg per per-
son in the early 1980s to over 12 kg in 2001. 
Rapid expansion of Asian regional demand 
and  European  demand  in  the  1990s  pro-
vided a vent for expanding production. The 
Thai broiler market is now dominated by a 
dozen integrators who control the complete 
supply  chain,  ranging  from  grandparent 
stock farms to the food retail business and 
export trade.
  Egg consumption and the layer industry 
have  also  expanded  significantly  since  the 
early 1980s, although not as impressively as 
the growth in broilers; roughly 90 percent of 
eggs produced are for domestic consumption. 
The annual domestic consumption per capita 
jumped from 66 eggs in 1983 to 145 eggs   
in 1995, then dropped slightly, to 139 eggs in 
2001. The supply-side growth of the layer 
industry can also be explained by the similar 
factors  affecting  the  broiler  industry:  the 
adoption  of  modern  technology  and  rapid 
economic  growth  in  the  late  1980s.  New 
technology has enabled the industry to accel-
erate its egg production, from nearly 3.3 bil-
lion eggs in 1983 to almost triple this figure 
(9 billion) in 2001. Although poultry produc-
tion has grown rapidly in Thailand in the last 
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4Region IV-A consists of the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon.
5This section draws on Poapongsakorn et al. (2003), which gives appropriate citations for original sources.several decades, the recent avian influenza 
has brought devastation to the industry.
  Although  modern  swine  breeds  were 
first introduced in the 1960s and programs 
were put in place in the mid-1970s to train 
farmers  in  modern  production  and  farm 
management,  major  changes  in  the  Thai 
swine industry began to take place only in 
the  mid-1980s.  The  introduction  of  exotic 
pig breeds and evaporation shed cooling has 
begun  to  move  Thailand  into  industrial 
swine production. The production of hogs 
increased from 11 million head in 1983 to 
more than 16 million in 2001. Between 1988 
and 2003, the share of Thai swine farms with 
holdings of more than 100 sows went from 
0.3  percent  to  2.0  percent.  Between  1993 
and  2003  alone,  the  share  of  all  pigs  on 
farms with holdings of fewer than 20 sows 
went from 55 percent to 21 percent (Table 
2.1). The pace of expansion has been slowed 
by  disease  problems  that  limit  exports  to 
high-value markets, by the restrictive regu-
lation of slaughterhouses, feed costs, and by 
burgeoning environmental concerns.
  Since the mid-1990s, the Thai govern-
ment has discouraged the creation of new 
large-scale farms in the three largest pig-
producing provinces, Nakorn Pathom in the 
west  and  Chachoengsao  and  Cholburi  in   
the east, because of land constraints and the 
high risk of spreading disease in areas with 
an already high animal density (see http:// 
www.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/LEAD/X6170E/ 
x6170e0c.htm  for  the  geographic  concen-
tration of dairy, poultry, and swine in Thai-
land). In effect, new large-scale pig farms 
expanded into Ratchaburi (in the west) and 
Saraburi and Lopburi (in the east). These 
provinces, particularly the latter two, have 
abundant water resources. Increasing water 
pollution caused by the farms situated near 
the extensive river system in Nakorn Pathom 
and Chachoengsao is becoming a growing 
concern.
  Unlike  the  case  of  poultry  and  swine   
development,  which  has  been  driven  by   
the  private  sector,  the  government  has   
driven  dairy  sector  development  in  Thai-
land, with the goal of developing small-scale 
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Figure 2.3    growth of commercial and backyard inventories on hog farms in southern 
luzon (Region iv-A), 1990–2006

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































gproduction.  The  government  has  directly 
imported  dairy  breeding  stock,  provided 
production  subsidies  and  tariff  and  quota 
protection, and played a coordinating role be-
tween dairy producer cooperatives and dairy 
processing companies. Through the aid of co- 
ordination  and  import  restrictions,  farmer 
cooperatives have been able to sell all their 
raw milk at much higher than world prices.
  During  1993–95,  the  growth  of  the 
dairy industry was stimulated by the gov-
ernment’s project to provide free milk to 
children  in  elementary  schools  for  260 
days a year. Subsidized milk for students 
must come only from domestic milk pro-
duction; it currently accounts for half of 
domestic  milk  consumption.  Domestic 
milk  consumption  in  2001  was  9  kg  of 
milk per person, compared to 1 kg in the 
early 1980s.
  In  sum,  the  Livestock  Revolution  in 
Thailand has occurred only in the last 20 
years, beginning with the export-led broiler 
sector. Although private sector innova- 
tions such as improved breeds, feed tech- 
nology,  housing,  farm  management,  and   
contractual  arrangements  between  inte- 
grators  and  farmers  have  been  the  prime 
sustainers  of  growth,  export  opportunities 
and rapid domestic and regional economic 
growth during 1985–95 were the essential 
catalysts. Swine and dairy development have 
been driven by domestic market demand and 
have been significantly affected by policy 
factors—regulation  of  slaughterhouses  for 
swine,  subsidies  and  protection  for  dairy. 
The livestock industry has grown in close 
proximity to Bangkok, and heavy concen-
trations of animals are causing environmen- 
tal stress. Farm sizes have become signifi- 
cantly  larger,  even  in  the  case  of  dairy 
farms,  as  shown  in  Table  2.1.  However,   
this does not necessarily mean that small- 
holders have experienced increased poverty. 
Today’s large farmer in Thailand may have 
been a smallholder 20 years ago, and many 
in the dynamic central region (where live-
stock production is concentrated) were. Be-
sides, the fact that small farms have exited 
from the sector may mean only that they 
found something more profitable to do in 
the area of either high-value agriculture or 
nonfarm work.
  Available  information  from  secondary 
sources in Thailand indicates that the per-
centage  of  poor  livestock  households  has 
declined proportionately more than the per-
centage  of  poor  agricultural  households 
overall (Table 2.2 and Poapongsakorn et al. 
2003).  Moreover,  the  Gini  coefficient  for 
livestock farmers is also much lower than 
that for agriculture as a whole (Table 2.2 
and Poapongsakorn et al. 2003). This sug-
gests  that  the  present  income  distribution 
among the livestock-keeping households is 
relatively more equitable.6
  Comparison of data from the 1993 Agri-
cultural Census and the Inter-censal Survey 
of Agriculture in 1998, reported in Table 
2.3, shows that the average amount of land 
used  for  growing  crops  and  rearing  live-
stock increased from 1993 to 1998, and it is 
likely that the livestock holdings per farm 
also increased. However, this does not sug-
gest a clear relationship between the amount 
of  land  used  for  growing  crops  and  rear-
ing livestock and income growth over the   
period.  Furthermore,  the  real  income  of 
livestock-producing  households  increased 
between 1993 and 1998, despite the fact that 
1998 was the worst year of the economic 
depression  that  resulted  from  the  Asian 
economic crisis, when the GDP growth rate 
was a negative 8 percent. However, for live-
stock producers, the farms with the greatest 
growth of income in this period were the 
smallest ones in terms of land size; farms 
on less than 1 hectare of land saw their real 
livestock  incomes  grow  at  6  percent  per 
annum in 1994 domestic prices.
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6A Gini coefficient is tantamount to a cumulative average of income inequality by class, where a perfectly equal 
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Table 2.3    Household income from agricultural produce and number of farm holdings, 1993 and 1998  
(current and 1994 baht)
          Average growth
Type of household  1993  1998  1993  1998  rate (percent)
                                                                           Household income by farm area (raisa)
Holders rearing livestock only  204,747  289,345  215,524  227,831  1.1
    Fewer than 6  21,545  39,552  22,679  31,143  6.3
    6–9  31,149  39,601  32,788  31,182  –1.0
    10–39  33,265  47,529  35,016  37,424  1.3
    40–139  51,828  65,329  54,555  51,440  –1.2
    140 or more  66,961  97,334  70,485  76,641  1.7
Holders growing crops and rearing livestock  162,193  225,512  170,729  177,569  0.8
    Fewer than 6  13,542  18,675  14,254  14,704  0.6
    6–9  14,332  20,877  15,086  16,439  1.7
    10–39  20,059  35,634  21,115  28,058  5.7
    40–139  39,035  61,442  41,089  48,380  3.3
    140 or more  75,225  88,884  79,184  69,987  –2.5
Holders rearing livestock only  Number of holdings by annual income (bahtb) 
    Fewer than 5,001  4.7  1.1
    5,001–10,000  9.2  2.8
    10,001–20,000  13.7  8.3
    20,001–50,000  27.1  15.6
    50,001–100,000  24.4  33.0
    100,001 or more  21.0  39.2
    Total  100  100
Holders growing crops and rearing livestock
    Fewer than 5,001  3.6  0.8
    5,001–10,000  9.9  3.7
    10,001–20,000  18.0  10.7
    20,001–50,000  36.5  35.9
    50,001–100,000  21.0  31.3
    100,001 or more  11.0  17.6
    Total  100  100
Source: Poapongsakorn et al. (2003), citing Thailand, National Statistical Office (1993, 1998).
aOne hectare is equal to 6.25 rais.
bIn 1998, US$1 was approximately equal to 36.6 baht; in 1993 it was approximately equal to 25.6 baht.
  Average income  Average income
  at current prices  at 1994 pricesGrowth and Concentration  
in India
Red meat consumption in India is very low, 
primarily for cultural and religious reasons.7 
But  India  has  participated  in  the  global 
Livestock Revolution through extraordinary 
growth in the consumption of milk, eggs, 
and poultry meat. In fact, poultry is one of 
the fastest-growing segments of the agricul- 
tural sector in India today. While the pro-
duction of crops has been rising at a rate of 
1.5–2 percent per annum over the past 20 
years, production of eggs and broilers has 
been  rising  at  a  rate  of  8–10  percent  per 
annum. As a result, India is now the world’s 
5th-largest egg producer and the 18th-largest 
producer of broilers (Mehta et al. 2003).
  A significant feature of India’s poultry 
industry has been its transformation from a 
backyard activity into a major commercial 
activity in four decades. This transformation 
has involved sizeable private sector invest-
ments  in  breeding,  hatching,  rearing,  and 
processing. Farmers in India have moved 
from rearing indigenous breeds to produc- 
ing internationally recognized hybrids. With 
the  exception  of  sterile  egg  powders  ex-
ported to Europe, virtually all Indian poultry 
and egg production is consumed in South 
Asia, most of it in India.
  As  in  Thailand,  India’s  growth  in  the 
poultry industry began with the importation 
in 1974 of grandparent stock from Cobb, a 
dominant  multinational  firm  at  the  time. 
Cobb and Venkateshwara Hatcheries set up 
a joint venture in the 1980s to produce pure- 
line parent stock. Venkateshwara now ex-
ports breeding stock to Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
and Nepal.
  Four southern states—Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka,  Kerala,  and  Tamil  Nadu— 
accounted for about 45 percent of the coun-
try’s egg production, with per capita annual 
consumption  of  57  eggs  and  0.5  kg  of 
broiler meat in 2001. Production is grouped 
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7This section draws on Mehta et al. (2003) and Sharma et al. (2003), which give appropriate citations for original 
sources.
around major urban centers such as Hydera-
bad,  Mumbai,  and  Delhi  (see  http://www 
.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/LEAD/X6170E/x617 
0e0c.htm for the geographic concentration 
of poultry in India). The eastern and central 
regions of India accounted for roughly 20 
percent of egg production; per capita con-
sumption was 18 eggs and 0.13 kg of broiler 
meat nationally in 2001. The northern and 
western regions of the country record much 
higher  per  capita  production  of  eggs  and 
broiler meat.
  The growth of the poultry sector in India 
is marked by an increase in the size of poul- 
try  farms.  In  earlier  years,  broiler  farms 
produced on average a few hundred birds 
(200–500  chicks)  per  cycle.  Today,  units 
with fewer than 5,000 birds are rare, and 
units with 5,000–50,000 birds per cycle are 
common. Similarly, layer farms with a flock 
size of 10,000–50,000 birds have become 
common. Small units are probably finding 
themselves  at  a  disadvantage  because  of 
higher feed and transport costs, more ex-
pensive  vaccines  and  veterinary  care  ser-
vices, and the nonavailability of credit.
  Despite India’s growth in consumption, 
its per capita consumption of these products 
is poor: 37 eggs and 1 kg of poultry meat 
per  capita  per  annum.  There  is  consider- 
able variation in per capita consumption of 
poultry products between rural and urban 
areas and across the region. For instance, 
per capita consumption of eggs is only 7.7 
per  annum  in  rural  areas,  compared  with 
17.8 per annum in urban areas, and in seven 
states, per capita consumption is less than 
3.5 per annum. Similarly, per capita con-
sumption of poultry meat is 0.24 kg in rural 
areas  and  1.08  kg  in  urban  areas  (Mehta   
et al. 2003).
  The  performance  of  the  Indian  dairy 
sector during the past three decades has also 
been impressive. Milk production grew at 
an average annual rate of 4.6 percent during the  1970s,  5.7  percent  during  the  1980s,   
and  4.2  percent  during  the  1990s.  Until 
1991, the Indian dairy industry was highly 
regulated and highly protected. Milk pro-
cessing and dairy product manufacture were 
restricted mainly to small firms and cooper- 
atives. High import duties, nontariff barri-
ers, restrictions on imports and exports, and 
stringent licensing provisions provided in-
centives to Indian-owned small enterprises 
and cooperatives to expand production in   
a protected market. In March 2002, the de- 
lineation of milk-shed supply areas, which 
gave  preferential  access  to  milk  supplies   
to  cooperatives,  was  abolished.  This  re-
sulted in an increase in the private dairy-
processing plants, from 248 in 1991 to 516 
in 2003/4, but the informal sector remains 
dominant in the milk markets (Birthal and 
Taneja 2006).
  Several factors have contributed to in-
creased  milk  production.  First,  milk  and 
dairy products have cultural significance in 
the Indian diet. A large portion of the popu-
lation is lacto-vegetarian, so milk and dairy 
products are an important source of protein 
in the diet. The demand for milk and dairy 
products is income-responsive, and growth 
in per capita income is expected to increase 
the demand for milk and milk products. The 
growth was also achieved through the inter-
vention of the Indian government. Produc-
ing milk in rural areas through smallholder 
producer cooperatives and moving industri-
ally processed milk from these smallholder 
sources  to  urban  demand  centers  became 
the cornerstone of government dairy devel-
opment policy. This policy initiative gave 
a boost to dairy development and initiated 
the process of establishing the much-needed 
linkages between rural producers and urban 
consumers.
  Despite being the largest milk producer 
in the world (producing 84.6 million tons of 
milk in 2001–2), India’s per capita avail-
ability of milk is low by global standards, 
although it is high by developing country 
standards.  The  per  capita  availability  of 
milk, which declined during the 1950s and 
1960s (from 124 grams per day in 1950–51 
to 121 grams in 1973–74) expanded sub-
stantially  during  the  1980s  and  1990s, 
reaching 226 grams per day in 2001–2. Per 
capita consumption of milk and milk prod-
ucts in India is among the highest in Asia 
and  is  still  growing.  It  is  still  below  the 
world average of 285 grams per day, and 
also  the  minimum  nutritional  requirement 
of 280 grams per day as recommended by 
the  Indian  Council  of  Medical  Research 
(Sharma et al. 2003).
  Even though milk production in India 
is widespread throughout the country and 
overwhelmingly carried out by small-scale 
producers, there are still large interregional 
and  interstate  variations  in  milk  produc- 
tion (see http://www.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/ 
LEAD/X6170E/x6170e0c.htm for the geo-
graphic concentration of milk production in 
India). Roughly two-thirds of national milk 
production comes from the states of Uttar 
Pradesh,  Punjab,  Rajasthan,  Madhya  Pra- 
desh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, 
and Haryana. The eastern region is lagging 
behind in terms of dairy development and 
imports milk from surplus-milk-producing 
areas in the west and north.
Growth and Concentration  
in Brazil
Poultry and swine production have become 
major  commercial  activities  over  the  last 
two decades in Brazil, propelled by tech- 
nology and rapid development of the feed 
sector.8 Poultry production used to be pri-
marily located on smaller farms in the south; 
in the mid-1990s, a typical farmer in Santa 
Catarina province would have 6,000–15,000 
broilers. Growth has expanded since then, 
with the new investments in the center-west 
on a much larger scale (more than 10,000 
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8This section draws on Camargo Barros et al. (2003), which gives appropriate citations for original sources.birds per cycle) and more specialized farms 
(see  http://www.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/ 
LEAD/X6170E/x6170e0c.htm for the geo-
graphic concentration of poultry in Brazil). 
Poultry production continued to grow due 
to  gains  in  productivity  from  improved 
breeding stock and firm demand from the 
export  market  as  well  as  the  domestic 
market (Camargo Barros et al. 2003).
  However, in the south the average poul-
try farm may in fact have declined further 
in size over the past 15 years as land and 
environmental pressures have come to bear 
and  as  integrators  have  put  pressure  on 
small-scale  producers  to  increase  the  size 
of their operations to lower their integrator 
costs  in  supplying  inputs,  technical  assis-
tance, and picking up animals for slaughter. 
Farmers who took out loans to expand their 
operations in the south found it difficult to 
withstand the devaluation of the real in the 
1990s, and many of those interviewed who 
did scale up by taking out loans felt others 
(who were not interviewed) went bankrupt 
due to the escalating prices of inputs neces-
sary  to  maintain  the  increased  number  of 
animals they were now raising. Although 
this may have been the rationale in reality, 
one  would  have  thought  that  this  would 
have  been  profit-neutral.  Future  analysis 
should look at the reason for this perception. 
Rapid rises in feed costs since 2001 are also 
contributing to the rapid exit of small- and 
medium-scale producers in the south who 
cannot make the move to the center-west.
  Similar trends have been observed in the 
swine industry. The center-west of Brazil is 
rapidly evolving into one of the lowest-cost 
swine production zones in the world. Produc-
tion of swine, as in the cases of poultry and 
milk, is following feed sources to the exten-
sive farming belt of the center-west (see http:// 
www.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/LEAD/X6170E/ 
x6170e0c.htm  for  the  geographic  concen- 
tration of swine in Brazil). Casual observa-
tion  also  suggests  that  many  small-scale 
swine farms exited in the south after the es- 
tablishment of increased sanitary controls in 
the mid-1990s in connection with the con-
trol of foot-and-mouth (FMD) disease.
  The development of milk production has 
been marked by a shift from nonspecialized 
farms where milk was almost a byproduct 
to specialized and vertically integrated milk 
production. The transition was spurred by 
liberalization  of  pricing  in  1991  after  de-
cades of cooperative dairy marketing under 
tight government regulation of the sector. 
Since  the  mid-1990s,  private  processors 
have  enforced  the  farmers’s  adoption  of 
on-farm chilling and other technologies that 
have made continued participation by pro-
ducers of less than 100 liters of milk per day 
infeasible.  Small  dairy  farming  has  tradi-
tionally been located in the temperate south, 
in states such as Santa Catarina; in 1996, 28 
percent of farms in the south had more than 
70 cows, up from 18 percent in 1985. Yet 
the main growth area has been in center-
west, in settlement areas of states such as 
Goias, home to new and large farms (see 
http://www.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/LEAD/
X6170E/x6170e0c.htm  for  the  geographic 
concentration of milk production in Brazil). 
In 1996, 81 percent of farms in the center-
west had more than 70 cows, up from 69 per-
cent in 1985 (Camargo Barros et al. 2003).
  There  has  been  shrinkage  in  the  total 
number of Brazilian milk producers due to 
greater  competition  with  imported  milk   
and new chilling requirements imposed by 
processors following liberalization of coop-
erative regulation and pricing in the 1990s. 
In 2000, there were 123,000 milk producers 
in Brazil that were producing 6 million liters 
delivered  to  the  15  largest  processors.  In 
2002, the number of producers had shrunk 
to  95,000  that  were  producing  the  same   
total volume of milk (Camargo Barros et al. 
2003).
  It is difficult to separate livestock devel-
opment in Brazil from three major structural 
changes that occurred in the early 1990s: 
liberalized internal markets in combination 
with  a  move  toward  an  outward-looking   
orientation  in  agriculture;  achievement  of 
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Brazil for export without vaccination to the 
countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation  and  Development;  and  the 
phenomenal  growth  of  the  feed-grain  in-
dustry. Of the four countries studied, Brazil 
is the country in which the smallholder is 
probably least likely to be able to survive 
as an independent producer, because Brazil 
has already moved in most cases, with the 
exception  of  dairy,  into  an  industrialized 
production process reaping the benefits of 
scale, sourcing inputs largely from medium 
to large producers to reduce the transaction 
costs associated with the purchasing of in-
puts and marketing of outputs.
  Given the ubiquitous trend of growth of 
production  combined  with  increased  geo-
graphic concentration and larger-scales of 
operation  observed  in  all  the  study  coun-
tries, it is interesting to consider an institu-
tional change that has occurred in all four 
countries that has permitted some smaller-
scale  farms  to  make  a  smoother  transi-
tion. This is contract farming. It explicitly 
reduces  the  transaction  cost  of  selling  or 
procuring a specific volume of output each 
day  due  to  the  improved  communication 
on quality and price information implicit in 
such an arrangement.
Vertical Integration of 
Smallholders through 
Contract Farming
Modern forms of contract farming in milk 
production have existed in Europe since at 
least the mid-19th century; the traditional 
Danish dairy co-op was in fact a form of 
contract farming. The contract is an institu-
tion that reduces the pernicious effects of 
information  and  asset  asymmetries  across 
market  actors,  especially  for  smallholders 
and those who deal with them. It allows all 
parties to reduce the resources they need to 
search, monitor, and control quality when 
selling or buying a perishable product in un-
certain or thin markets, and in this case al-
lows producers to obtain higher prices from 
a buyer who is fairly certain that the farmer 
will deliver clean, fresh milk on time. The 
institution  also  shares  risks  and  captures 
economies of scale through the bulk pur-
chasing  of  inputs.  Dairy  cooperatives  in 
Brazil, India, and Thailand have all taken 
slightly different forms, but they share the 
common advantage of leaving more wealth 
to share between producers and processors 
through  the  reduction  of  transaction  costs 
that are a net loss to producers, processors, 
and consumers combined. While it is clear 
that the cooperative mode will reduce trans-
action  costs  and  that  transaction  costs  are 
especially high for smallholders, it is unclear 
if the latter would remain involved without a 
government subsidy of some form.
  More  recently,  contract  farming  has 
appeared in all the study countries in the 
swine and poultry sectors. Within the latter, 
contracts are more common in the produc-
tion of broilers than of eggs, but they are 
observed in egg production in India in a few 
cases  where  industrial  processors  require 
quality  control  of  inputs  for  specialized 
industrial outputs (Mehta et al. 2003).
  Contracts observed in the country stud-
ies differed somewhat across countries and 
commodities.  Forward  price  contracts  for 
Indian broilers are more informal than those 
in the Philippines, where in turn they are 
more informal than in Brazil, for example. 
A contract growing arrangement in broiler 
and hog production is generally a contract 
between an “integrator,” who supplies the 
intermediate inputs and procures the output, 
and  a  grower,  who  provides  the  primary 
inputs  in  the  production  process.  The  in-
tegrator provides the growing stock (day-
old chicks, fatteners), feeds, and veterinary 
supplies  and  services  and  implements  the 
final marketing of the output. The contract 
grower typically provides the space and fa-
cilities (land and housing), manure and dead 
animal disposal, equipment, utilities, labor 
(family and/or hired), and day-to-day farm 
management and deals with the neighbors 
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mental issues.
  The form of contract across countries, 
regions, and commodities tends to be driven 
by  four  things.  First,  the  changing  needs   
of markets require changing product attri-
butes, and these changing attributes (such 
as food safety) may not be easily observed 
at the time of sale. Contracting may permit 
processors a higher degree of quality control 
under these circumstances than employer- 
employee relationships would do. Second, 
different  commodities  embody  different 
types of transaction cost and thus require 
different  forms  of  institutional  solutions. 
The information asymmetries between mar-
ket participants in milk sales are fundamen-
tally  different  than  those  in  swine  sales, 
for  example.  Third,  contract  farming  is  a 
sharing of risks and benefits between seller 
and buyer. As such, the precise form it takes 
depends greatly on the distribution of power 
(market and political) between buyers and 
sellers,  as  does  enforcement  of  contracts. 
Fourth,  integrators  who  contract  produc-
tion to a large number of smallholders are   
more likely to decrease their risk of being 
held accountable for environmental pollu-
tion than is a single large-scale production 
operation.  The  latter  issue  has  probably 
had more of an effect on contracting in the 
developed countries than in the developing 
ones, but is already becoming an issue in 
Southeast Asia.
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Approach
T
he empirical approach to analysis of the scaling-up of livestock production is to define 
a quantitative measure of relative farm competitiveness in production, then look in a 
structured way at all the factors that differ across farms that might explain higher rela-
tive competitiveness. These factors include technical and allocative efficiency, scale economies 
positively associated with productivity (such as cutting overhead costs), asymmetries in access 
to assets (credit, liquidity, fixed capital, and so on) and information (education, experience, 
and such), externalities (some farmers get away with uncompensated pollution while others do 
not), and policies (some get a better deal from the government than others do).
  The omission of relevant factors leads to biased estimates. Furthermore, inclusion of ex-
planatory factors of relative competitiveness that are themselves functions of relative competi-
tiveness leads to simultaneity bias. For example, relative competitiveness might be enhanced 
by being recognized as a sales leader, but being recognized as a sales leader may depend on 
being more competitive than others. The two-way causality among the variables leads to bias 
in the empirical estimation of the effect of all variables unless appropriate procedures are used.
Defining a Farm-Specific Measure  
of Relative Competitiveness
Relative competitiveness might be thought of as having the ability to produce at a lower unit 
cost of production than one’s competitors. In fact, if large farms can produce livestock at a 
lower unit cost than small ones, they will clearly drive small farms out of the market over 
time. The market price that applies to both large and small farms, by this reasoning, will fall as 
large-scale producers expand production, and the smallholders will be squeezed out. The only 
future for smallholders, then, will be to stay in a few higher-priced niche markets not served 
by larger farms, if these markets exist, and to cut costs by paying less for their own (family) 
labor than what a large farmer pays for hired labor. Even so, it is unlikely that smaller produc-
ers will be able to stay in business long in this situation.
  However, the reverse is not necessarily true. If small farms can produce at lower unit costs 
than large farms, they may still be squeezed out. This is because large-scale farms can remain 
profitable with very thin profit margins; they make up in volume what they lose in per-unit 
profit. Very low per-unit profits coupled with a small sales volume may not provide enough in- 
come for a smallholder to stay in business, at least not by specializing in livestock. Thus, if 
large farms have lower per-unit costs of production when all labor is costed at market wages, 
the next question is whether this finding still holds if smallholders do not cost their family labor. 
If it does, it is not necessary to proceed further; there is little hope for smallholders who wish 
to undertake this activity, except perhaps as a hobby or for minor income supplementation.
27  If, on the other hand, small farms can 
produce at lower per-unit cost in the same 
markets as large farms, perhaps by not cost-
ing their own labor at full market wage rates 
or for some other reason, there is at least 
some hope for them. Thus, having a higher 
per-unit profit, with or without the cost of 
family labor, is a necessary condition for the 
competitiveness of smallholders, but is not 
a sufficient one.
  To get a more satisfactory measure of 
relative  competitiveness  that  gets  around 
the issue that larger farms are able to ex-
pand production while small ones cannot, 
it is useful to appeal to the notion of profit 
efficiency. Small farmers are most likely to 
be  able  to  stay  in  business—and  perhaps 
to gain market share—if they are more ef-
ficient  users  of  farm  resources,  both  in  a 
technical  sense  (being  on  the  production 
possibility frontier, given existing technol-
ogy)  and  in  an  allocative  sense  (being  at 
the right place on the production frontier, 
given prevailing prices). If small farms are 
more  efficient  users  of  farm  resources  to 
secure profits than are large farms, perhaps 
because they put more care into what they 
do or because they value their own time at 
less than the cost of hired labor, they have 
a cost advantage over large-scale producers 
that will be difficult to dislodge.
  This process yields a measurable index 
of  relative  competitiveness:  relative  farm 
efficiency in securing profit. Ceteris paribus, 
farmers that are more efficient users of farm 
resources to secure profits are more likely 
to be able to maintain market share than are 
larger producers who are less efficient in the 
same sense. Over time, the more efficient 
are in a position to invest more into the farm 
enterprise and to grow, whatever their start-
ing size.
  A  standard  way  of  assessing  farm- 
specific relative profit efficiency is to esti-
mate a “profit frontier” across a sample of 
farms, then to measure how far each farm in 
the sample lies below the frontier. Concep-
tually, such a frontier can be thought of as a 
function mapping profit relative to input and 
output  prices  and  quantities  of  nontraded 
factors of production, where each point is 
the maximum profit that a farm can achieve 
given  those  relative  prices  and  access  to 
resources. Given a set of prices, the average 
farm with that level of resources will fall 
below the frontier. Thus, an ordinary least 
squares regression on data from a sample 
of farms of different sizes of profits against 
input and output prices and fixed factors of 
production (land, labor, and so on) will al-
ways lie below the theoretical frontier. The 
frontier itself has to be estimated in some 
fashion, looking at data for farms that per-
form best at each level of resources. Fried, 
Lovell,  and  Schmidt  (1993)  described  a 
variety of approaches.
  The  measurement  of  the  “most  effi-
cient” farms can be improved by estimating 
a  stochastic  profit  frontier,  which  allows 
for measurement error in the econometric 
estimation of the frontier itself and thus for 
the  fact  that  observations  for  some  farms 
will lie above the estimated “best” frontier 
(see Battese 1992; Coelli, Rao, and Battese 
1998; and Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000 for 
surveys illustrating the development of this 
literature). In our case, the dependent vari-
able is profit and the explanatory variables 
are  farm-specific  fixed  resources  (land, 
family  labor,  sunk  capital),  farm-specific 
input  prices  (feed,  medicines,  stock),  and 
farm-specific output prices.
  In  the  developing  country  situations 
studied, farm resources such as land may be 
nontradable inputs and must be accounted 
for in the frontier in terms of the amount 
available, not their price (because prices for 
these nontradable inputs do not vary much 
across farms). The unit prices received for 
output and prices paid for inputs can be ex- 
pected to vary greatly, reflecting both quality 
differences and differential transaction costs 
facing different farm households. Examples 
of the latter are differences in the ability to 
search  for,  bargain  for,  and  enforce  sales 
contracts or to achieve market recognition 
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quality of their output when that quality can-
not easily be observed at the time of sale, as 
is often the case for livestock products.
  The actual performance of each farm in 
terms of profit can then be compared to an 
ideal performance level for that farm, given 
its resources and prevailing input and output 
prices. The difference between the ideal and 
the actual profit for that farm is the farm’s 
relative profit.
  Farm-specific  profit  efficiency  (devia-
tions  below  the  frontier)  are  measured  as 
the ratio of actual profit to the ideal (maxi-
mum) profit. The measure is bounded above 
by one (best, on the frontier) and less than 
one (zero, no profit). The upper bound can 
be achieved if a producer actually adopts 
a profit-maximizing combination of inputs 
and outputs, and the lower bound could be 
below zero because negative actual profit is 
possible (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000).
  If  small  farms  have,  on  average,  sig-
nificantly  higher  profit  efficiency  when 
family labor is not costed, there is at least 
hope,  if  not  reassurance  for  small  farms. 
This is even truer if it holds when family 
labor  is  costed  at  the  market  wage  rate. 
Stochastic  profit  frontier  methodology  al-
lows us to go beyond simply making this 
determination;  it  also  permits  the  investi-
gation of which elements contribute most 
to explaining relative profit efficiency for 
large  and  small  farms.  Individual  farms, 
large or small, may lie well below the profit 
frontier for reasons other than technical or 
allocative  inefficiency.  The  profit  frontier 
itself  assumes  that  identical  technologies 
are  available  to  all  farms.  Technological 
change shifts the frontier up; if some farms 
in fact have a technology edge over others 
that is not accounted for in sample selection, 
it will shift the estimated frontier up for all 
farms, but the ones without that edge will 
be lower relative to the estimated frontier. 
Furthermore, farm-specific transaction cost 
barriers or policy distortions may also influ-
ence their position relative to the frontier.
A Methodology to 
Decompose the 
Determinants of  
Relative Profitability
Building on the Stochastic  
Profit Frontier Literature
This  discussion  leads  us  to  the  principal 
methodological approach, which is to esti-
mate a stochastic profit frontier to derive a 
farm-specific measure of efficiency in se-
curing profit, and then, following the lead of 
Jondrow et al. (1982), Ali and Flinn (1989), 
Battese and Coelli (1995), and Kumbhakar 
(2001), to identify factors that are associ-
ated with the profit efficiency of each farm, 
including the transaction cost barriers and 
farm-specific policy distortions faced by that 
farm.
  The general form of the stochastic profit 
frontier used in this study to estimate profit 
efficiency is defined as
Yi = f(Xi, W i, P i; b)exp(vi – ui),  (1)
where Yi = profit per farm i for a given com-
modity is defined as
Yi = (P iQi – CiQi),  (2)
where PiQi is total revenue from livestock 
activity per farm i in question (manure sales 
included); CiQi is total variable costs, such 
as  costs  of  feeds,  fodder,  day-old  chicks 
(DOCs) or weanlings, hired labor, electric- 
ity, medicines, vaccines, water, depreciation, 
and so on, of securing revenue, excluding 
family labor per farm i; and Qi is the quan-
tity of output of the commodity in ques-
tion  per  farm  i;  Xi  =  the  vector  of  fixed   
factors used to obtain Yi (for example, stock 
of family labor, land, buildings and equip- 
ment,  and  fixed  capital  stock,  to  control 
for differences in farm resources); Wi = the   
vector  of  farm-specific  input  prices;  Pi  =   
the  weighted-average  output  price  (the 
weights  are  the  farm-specific  transaction 
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rameters to be estimated; and v i, ui are ran- 
dom error terms.2
  The error term (v i) is distributed inde-
pendently  and  identically  as  a  two-sided 
normal random variable around the frontier 
with mean zero and variance s2
v to account 
for measurement error on both sides of the 
frontier, and inefficiency (u) is distributed 
independently  as  a  one-sided  (downward) 
random variable relative to the frontier to 
allow for the fact that farms in fact fall below 
the ideal efficiency. Average efficiency can 
easily be estimated by OLS regression of 
profit  per  farm  against  farm-specific  in- 
put  and  output  prices  and  farm-specific 
fixed factors of production. However, the 
frontier, showing ideal profits for any given 
level of farm resources and prevailing price 
level, can be estimated only if specific as-
sumptions are made about the distributions 
of u and v across farms, and then only using 
a  nonlinear  estimation  technique,  such  as 
maximum  likelihood  estimation  (MLE). 
The critical assumption is the distribution of 
the u (inefficiency) term.
  We adopt the approach of Battese and 
Coelli (1995), which allows for systematic 
differences across farms in the distribution 
of u, such that we do not assume away what 
we wish to investigate: viz., that transaction 
cost factors and policy distortions that are 
different for different farms help determine 
their relative profit inefficiency.
  Battese and Coelli (1995) base their ap-
proach on the assumption that the expected 
value of the farm-specific inefficiency ef-
fect for farm i can be modeled as a function 
of  farm-specific  characteristics,  which  of 
course vary across farms, and fixed coeffi- 
cients, which do not. In other words, ui ~ N 
(mi, s2
u), where mi = zikdk is the mean of a 
truncated-normal distribution of ui. The zik 
are  k  explanatory  variables  observed  for 
farm i, associated with technical inefficiency 
effects (ui), and d is a vector of unknown 
coefficients to be estimated simultaneously 
with equation (1). Thus, the technical ineffi- 
ciency effect, ui in equation (1), can then be    l
specified as ui = d0 + S zik dk + ei, where ei   
k=1
is the inefficiency error term, defined by the 
truncation of the normal distribution with 
mean equal to zero and variance s2. The 
truncation of ei occurs at ei ≥ –zikdk (Battese 
and Coelli 1995).3
  Finally,  the  use  of  a  stochastic  profit 
frontier  assumes  that  the  underlying  mar-
kets producing the observed input and out-
put prices are competitive. This is justified 
in the case of markets for feed, stock, and 
output  of  hogs,  chickens,  and  eggs  in  all 
four study countries. There are large num-
bers of producers and consumers of output 
and numerous physical markets and market 
outlets. On the input side, there are multiple 
feed millers/sellers (the principal input to 
monogastric livestock—at least six compet-
ing  firms  in  the  Philippines  study  zones, 
which of those in all four countries were   
the least likely to have a large number of 
choices available due to lower size and in- 
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1This procedure may introduce some endogeneity in the regressors, but any likely bias is judged to be minor 
compared to the error of ignoring major price differences faced by different farms for otherwise apparently simi-
lar inputs and outputs. A further issue is that price differences across farms may reflect a mix of genuine quality 
differences (different commodities) and buyer uncertainties about quality (transaction costs); there is no easy fix 
for this, and we shall return to the significance of this lack of separation in the discussion of results.
2Note that the frontiers are run separately by country and commodity. In most cases sample farms did not engage 
in producing for sale more than one of our chosen commodities. Where they did, possible economies of scope 
from joint production were not taken into account for practical reasons, although the model used could incorpo-
rate multiple outputs in a straightforward if somewhat laborious way (Coelli, Rao, and Battese 1998).
3The log-likelihood function of this model is presented in the appendix of Battese and Coelli (1993). Estimation 
of the likelihood function also requires the specification of a relationship among the variance parameters such 
that g = var(mit)/[var(vi) + var(mit)], where the parameter g has value between 0 and 1.comes). Feeder animal stocks are also avail-
able for a variety of sources, including di-
rectly among farmers in the case of piglets.
  Dairy input markets (heifers and fodder) 
are fully competitive in the three dairy coun- 
try cases studied (Brazil, India, and Thai-
land), as they are in most locations in the 
world. Farmers in these countries can also 
choose  between  several  market  outlets  in 
disposing of raw milk, the form in which 
most milk is consumed in poorer areas. In 
the  richer  areas  (such  as  Brazil),  milk  is   
necessarily sold to processors for pasteuri-
zation, but there is also more competition 
among multiple dairies in the richer areas 
than in the poorer ones. However, there is a 
built-in incentive in the milk business to sell 
through the same outlet in both glut (rainy) 
and lean seasons, because it is often harder 
to find buyers in the glut season in develop-
ing countries. Furthermore, milk sales are so 
subject to issues of market trust and reputa-
tion that spot sales among anonymous actors 
tend to be rare (Staal, Delgado, and Nichol-
son 1997). Nonetheless, despite these caveats, 
there is no systematic reason to suspect un-
competitive markets for inputs and outputs 
for milk, as in the case of monogastrics.
Specification of an  
Estimation Model
A translog profit frontier is used because of 
the flexibility it allows in estimating param-
eters where it is not desirable to build in 
through model specification rigid assump-
tions about substitution relationships among 
inputs and factors. As shown by Kumbhakar 
(2001), it is also important to preserve ho- 
mogeneity  in  going  from  the  underlying 
production relationships to the profit fron-
tier, which the translog specification does. 
The full form of the model is 
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4No effort was made to correct for differences in land quality; for monogastric production using purchased feed, 
this is not an issue, and for dairy production we did not have the information necessary to do this.
5STATA’s command “frontier” with the option of a conditional mean model provides estimators for the parameters 
similar to that of Frontier 4.1 estimates.
  L 
lnY i = lnbo + SbiDil + bilnP i    l
  (dummies)  (output
    prices)
 
 J   K
  + SbijlnW ij + Sqikln Xik    j=1  k=1
  (input prices)  (fixed factors)
  1
  K  J
  + — SSaikjlnXiklnW ij           (3)
 2    k=1  j=1
   (price-factor interactions)
  1
 K
  + — SjiklnXiklnXik   2   k=1
  (factor interactions)
+ v i   –  ui,
  (random  (random technical
  error)  inefficiency effect)
where Y i is the profit of the ith farm defined 
in  equation  (2);  P i  is  the  weighted  output 
price for farm i for the commodity in ques-
tion as defined earlier; W ij is the price of 
input j (j = hired labor, capital, feeds, DOCs/ 
weanlings, medicines, electricity, and other 
inputs used by the ith farm); Xik is the fixed 
factor k used by the ith farm (k = the value 
of breeding stock, value of buildings and 
equipment, total farm labor in hours, land in 
hectares,4 and other fixed capital stock); and 
Dil is a vector of dummy variables for farm   
i (l = production arrangement, gender, scale, 
region/zone, access to credit, access to in- 
formation). The v i, ui are as previously de- 
fined. The akj, jik, qik, and bij are coefficients 
to be estimated by MLE using Frontier 4.1 
software Model 2 (Coelli 1996).5 Frontier 
4.1 estimates all of the parameters in one 
step to overcome the inconsistency in the assumptions  about  the  distribution  of  the 
inefficiencies  by  defining  the  inefficiency 
effects as earlier, but they are then incorpo-
rated directly into the MLE. The predicted 
farm-specific efficiency estimate is retrieved 
from E[exp(–ui) | ei].6
  It can be noted, based on observations, 
that  the  technologies  used  by  large  and 
small  farms  in  the  sample  appear  on  the 
surface  to  be  similar  in  terms  of  animal 
genetics,  purchased  inputs  such  as  feeds, 
and  practices,  and  these  technologies  ap-
pear to be largely divisible (except perhaps 
for poultry). If there are, in fact, economies 
of scale in production, these are likely to 
be  bound  up  with  factors  such  as  family 
labor or technological change that are not 
scale-neutral (Feder 1985). Family labor is 
explicitly included in the frontier.
  In the case of hog production, we need 
to  control  for  the  fact  that  some  farms 
do full-cycle operations (farrow-to-finish), 
while others do wean-to-finish, and still oth-
ers do both. The total revenue and total cost 
figures used to compute total revenue allow 
for mixing different kinds of sales and costs 
for the same commodity (say, pigs), as do 
the average farm-specific output and input 
prices  used  on  the  right-hand  side  (RHS) 
of  the  stochastic  profit  frontier  (SPF).  In 
order to pool full-cycle and wean-to-finish 
producers, we use a binary dummy variable 
for the type of producer on the RHS of the 
SPF to allow for fixed differences in mean 
profits among activities on the same farm.
  Translog and Cobb-Douglas profit fron-
tiers share the use of logarithms in the de- 
pendent  variables  and  thus  do  not  handle 
cases of negative or zero profits. Yet it is not 
unreasonable to suppose—as turned out to 
be the case for some of the sampled farms—
that some farms lose money in some years. 
In fact, there is no perfect fix for this prob-
lem,  and  we  employ  a  lesser-of-the-evils 
approach  that  is  adequate  for  our  present 
purposes, which consists of adding the low-
est constant scalar to all farms in a given 
country-commodity subsample that leads to 
positive  profits  for  all  farms  in  that  sub-
sample.  The  scalar  is  different  for  differ-
ent  subsamples,  but  constant  within  each 
country-commodity grouping.
  The  cases  of  negative  average  farm 
profits are few in most cases (fewer than 5 
percent of the farms sampled in India, the 
Philippines,  and  Thailand;  substantially 
more  in  Brazil,  where  the  medium-sized 
layer farm, for example, just broke even), 
and they are proportionately not very nega-
tive relative to average farm profit (from 
0.4 percent to 6.7 percent of mean profit 
below break-even for those farms report-
ing  negative  profits  in  these  three  coun-
tries,  but  higher  in  Brazil  given  that  the 
sample average profit levels were near zero 
in  the  survey  year).  Thus,  the  resulting 
bias from this nonlinear transformation of 
the data in three of the four countries at 
least is judged to be of minor importance 
compared to the bias that would arise from 
using  a  less  appropriate  functional  form 
or  arbitrarily  dropping  the  least  efficient 
sample members.7
  The  technical  inefficiency  effects  (ui) 
generated  in  equation  (3)  are  estimated 
within the MLE model specified above as
ui = do + d1Z1 + d2Z2 . . . + e1,  (4)
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6See Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998, 190), for a detailed discussion of procedures and issues. The mean farm   
efficiency for a specific subgroup, such as a quintile of the size distribution, is the arithmetic average of farm-
specific measures within the group in question and is expressed as a percentage of the maximum (frontier) ef-
ficiency for farms of that resource level, given the prices faced.
7The problem for Brazil is more troublesome, but, faute de mieux, we have elected to remain consistent across 
the four countries. Conceptually, the impact on the Brazilian results will be to amplify the relative magnitude of 
differences in unit profits across farms, thus probably overstating the estimated numerical impact of regressors 
on relative profit efficiency.where Zi is the ith farm characteristic deter-
mining relative inefficiency and ei is distrib-
uted as earlier.8
  Whether variables belong in the first or 
second  equation,  equation  (3)  or  equation 
(4) of the stochastic profit frontier model, is 
not clear-cut in all cases; the choice depends 
to some extent on where the line is drawn 
between  resource  endowment  and  access 
variables, and also where we wish to focus. 
The first equation defines the context within 
which farms perform and should include the 
price structure faced by all farms and their 
specific endowment of fixed farm resources. 
The latter are limited to land, family labor, 
and physical capital. These variables serve 
together  to  estimate  both  the  frontier  and 
where each farm falls relative to it.
  As discussed earlier, some of these vari-
ables could be interpreted as representing 
the interaction between more than one fac-
tor, and we are not attempting to interpret 
the individual coefficients of equation (3). 
The role of the first equation of the model 
is both to derive a farm-specific measure of 
relative profit efficiency and to control for 
the  usual  price  and  endowment  explana-
tions of relative profit efficiency to allow a 
clear look in the inefficiency term, equation 
(4), at the access-related variables, such as 
experience,  education,  policy  distortions, 
externalities, and so on.
  It could be argued with some justifica-
tion  that  some  variables  in  equation  (4), 
such as human capital, might as well have 
been  included  in  equation  (3).  However, 
this would both cloud the interpretation of 
their individual contributions to explaining 
a given farm’s divergence from the frontier 
and raise the issue of where to stop. If years 
of schooling of the household head are in-
cluded in equation (3), why not the number 
of training courses attended by the spouse 
and so forth?
  The inefficiency term, equation (4), of 
the frontier as estimated here includes all 
the human capital and other variables that 
proxy interhousehold differences in access 
to assets and information. This allows the 
easier  analysis  of  the  separate  effects  of 
transaction  costs  (such  as  the  inability  to 
borrow because lenders cannot be reassured 
that they will be repaid) and externalities 
(such as the fact that small farms may do 
a better job of “paying” for the pollution 
they create than do larger ones) and policy 
distortions  (such  as  whether  large  farms 
receive more subsidies than do small ones).
  Thus, the RHS variables of the ineffi-
ciency term, that is, the Z, includes proxies 
of differential access to credit for capital/ 
feeds, subsidized veterinary medicines, ac-
cess to feed of known quality, subsidies and 
taxes (for differences in policy distortions), 
access to potential and other sources of in-
come, access to markets for output, access 
to information, distance to nearest city or 
residential area, and a measure of the farm-
specific internalization of negative environ-
mental externalities produced by that farm 
(more on this later).
  Three remaining methodological prob-
lems concern the measurement of the farm-
specific data. First, some of the explanatory 
variables that we may wish to include in the 
inefficiency term may not be observable at 
all, or in any event very hard to observe. 
This  is  especially  true  of  transaction  cost 
and externality variables. Second, some of 
the explanatory variables that we may wish 
to include in the inefficiency term may be 
endogenous in the sense discussed earlier: 
the causality goes both ways, introducing   
simultaneity bias in estimation. This is par- 
APPRoACH      33
8We use the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach to the estimation of the efficiency effects (a function of u) as 
specified in the Frontier 4.1 Model 2 software downloaded from Coelli’s webpage and discussed in Coelli, Rao, 
and Battese (1998). Kumbhakar (2001) introduces an elegant improvement to this approach that controls for 
possible endogeneity between technical and allocative efficiency effects. However, the computational effort to 
implement this was felt to exceed the likely gain in terms of the purpose of the present exercise.ticularly a problem for environmental exter-
nalities,  because  farm-specific  differences 
here will help to determine relative profit ef- 
ficiency as we define it, but themselves may 
be a function of the latter in some cases. 
Third, contract farming may be quite preva-
lent in some cases, and this raises the issue 
of  which  output  prices  and  which  input 
prices to use, because these are accounting 





Two problems arise in trying to account for 
the fact that some farms pollute more per 
unit of output than others do. The environ-
mental externalities of livestock production 
are hard to measure, and in many cases are 
determined simultaneously with the level of 
actual profit per unit. An externality is de- 
fined here as a return to an economic agent 
where part of the cost (or benefit) of under- 
taking an activity accrues to another entity 
that  is  not  compensated  (or  charged)  in   
the market. Negative externalities may be 
created in the production process for ani-
mal agriculture through odor, flies, and the 
nutrient-loading effects on soil of manure   
that is either mishandled or supplied in ex- 
cess. Producers capture the benefit of nega-
tive externalities by receiving payment for 
livestock output while not bearing the full 
costs of their enterprise in terms of the im-
pact on surrounding communities of odor, 
flies, poor water quality, and so on. Produc- 
ers  who  do  not  pay  the  full  cost  of  pro- 
duction may show up as “more efficient” 
(in financial terms) than producers who are 
otherwise  similar  but  internalize  some  of 
the externality by cleaning up after the en-
terprise or making compensatory payments 
to surrounding communities.
  The first problem is how to measure the 
value to producers of not paying for pollu-
tion created, particularly if this differs by 
scale of farm, because it will lead to mis-
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leading comparisons of unit profits across 
scale categories. Externalities of the sort in-
volved are exceedingly difficult to measure. 
There is the difficulty of determining from 
which farm the pollution in the river came. 
There is the issue that farmers themselves 
suffer some of their own pollution, and this 
needs  to  be  netted  out  of  the  externality. 
There is the issue that the negative effects 
of pollution carry over into future time peri-
ods. Physical measures of costs in terms of 
decreased sustainability are also very diffi-
cult. Furthermore, the true consequences for 
sustainability of a given amount of manure 
will differ by soil type, temperature, rain-
fall, and so forth.
  In view of these many difficulties, it is 
not practical to attempt to measure actual 
negative externalities in the present study. 
Instead,  we  focus  on  differences  across 
farms in the amount of externality “inter-
nalized” when a farmer invests in pollution 
abatement  through  handling  manure  and 
dead stock in an ecologically sound manner. 
Higher expenditure per unit of output on a 
given farm for abatement of environmental 
externalities, other things equal, should be 
inversely  correlated  with  the  incursion  of 
net negative environmental externalities per 
unit of output under the assumptions stated 
earlier. Thus, a farm that spends more per 
unit of output on environmental abatement 
is  postulated  to  incur  fewer  negative  en-
vironmental  externalities  than  a  farm  that 
spends less on environmental services per 
unit of output.
  The heroic assumption that allows us to 
proxy  environmental  mitigation  using  the 
money value of manure management is that 
a given amount of manure of a given sort is 
equally  polluting  from  whatever  farm  it 
comes, as long as it is not spread on fields 
(one’s  own  or  someone  else’s).  This  as-
sumes  that  spreading  manure  on  crops  is 
uniformly good (despite run-off into water- 
courses in some cases) and ignores the fact 
that farms close to population centers and 
watercourses probably produce more eco-
logical harm per ton of manure than those far  from  people  and  watercourses,  other 
things equal. By the same logic, if we are 
willing  to  assume  that  the  relationship  is 
cardinal as well as ordinal—as in the state-
ment that a US$1 per 100 kg of output in 
abatement on farm A is twice as environ-
mentally friendly as US$0.50 per 100 kg of 
output on a different farm—we have a work- 
able  index  that  differentiates  (inversely) 
across  farms  in  the  amount  of  negative   
environmental  externalities  incurred.  The 
assumptions are not perfect, but the only fea-
sible alternative, ignoring negative extern- 
alities in econometric production work al- 
together, seems worse.
  The components that go into a measure 
of environmental mitigation include all costs 
of disposing of manure, such as the costs of 
water  treatment,  investment  in  lagoons, 
labor  spent  collecting  and  drying  manure 
for sale (evaluated at market rates), rental 
of  machinery  used  for  manure  disposal, 
regulations, taxes paid for abatement, and 
compliance in dealing with environmental 
problems.9 In addition, the spreading of ma- 
nure on crops is considered to transform a 
potential externality (pollution) into a posi- 
tive contribution to soil structure and fertil-
ity. Costing this benefit is hard to do with 
accuracy.
  The simple approach we have adopted is 
to value all manure sold for spreading on the 
fields of others (the reason it is purchased) 
at its sale value at the producing farmgate. 
Manure spread on one’s own fields is val-
ued at what it could have been sold for at 
the farmgate.10 Thus, if manure is spread in   
the field and has any market value (that is,   
people are not just dumping it), the latter 
is  included  in  the  internalization  of  the 
externality. The worst that any farm can do 
under this approach is to have no abatement 
expenditure at all, and this is in fact the case 
for many farms.
  Having a working index of environmen-
tal mitigation creates a new problem and a 
new  opportunity.  The  new  problem  is  that   
this index, measured in local currency units, 
is in many cases determined simultaneously 
with  profits.  Thus,  profit  depends  on  en-
vironmental  mitigation  expenditures,  but 
environmental  mitigation  expenditures  are 
also  influenced by profit. One approach to 
solving  this  problem  is  to  create  an  instru-
mental variable for environmental mitigation 
by  regressing  it  on  a  series  of  exogenous 
determinants of environmental mitigation, but 
the bivariate correlation between profits and 
mitigation was low (suggesting not too much 
of  a  problem),  the  proposed  remedy  was 
onerous, and this was eventually rejected as 
impractical for our present purposes.11
  The measurement of environmental mit-
igation by the procedure described was mo-
tivated by the need to incorporate environ-
mental factors in the empirical analysis of 
efficiency. However, more direct measures 
of environmental impact can be better used 
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 9It might be thought that valuing family labor at market rates in this context is inconsistent with not valuing it 
in the efficiency regressions. The difference is in the purpose: for efficiency, we want to know if family farms 
can compete at any price. For valuing environmental mitigation, we need a cross-farm measure of the differential 
and largely optional efforts to clean up their mess. Both personal effort and hired labor are relevant expenditures 
here.
10Although spreading manure is counted as internalizing a negative externality, it may also boost own-farm 
profitability. It is not practical to net out benefits obtained from “expenditure” on mitigation, however, nor is it 
conceptually necessary, because the effort involved presumably still prevents pollution downstream, and presum-
ably the person downstream does not care whether the farmer benefits as long as the pollution is stopped.
11Using instrumental variables in the present context is also not without problems, because it requires finding 
and testing for suitable instruments, finding procedures for handling zero expenditure cases, and dealing with the 
additional complexity in the error terms of the stochastic frontier. After time-consuming initial trials in the Thai 
case study that did not yield particular improvements, this approach was abandoned in favor of the much simpler 
and probably equally robust procedure of simply using the farm-specific estimate of mitigation expenditure on 
the RHS of the inefficiency term of the stochastic profit frontier model.to look at the impact of livestock production 
on the environment and whether this differs 
across scales of farm. The next section ex-
plores a methodology for directly assessing 
the  interaction  of  animal  density  and  the   
environment.
Mass Balance Calculations
Theory of the Mass Balance 
Calculations Approach
The use and disposal of animal manure and 
dead animals has become a concern, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, as the structure of the 
industry has shifted toward fewer but larger 
operations, the percentage of animals raised 
in  confinement  has  increased,  and  cities 
have  expanded  so  that  people  are  living 
closer to areas where livestock are raised. 
Traditionally,  farmers  applied  manure  to 
agricultural land to promote plant growth, 
thereby  recycling  much  of  the  nutrients. 
With  fewer  but  larger  operations  relying   
on inputs trucked in from the outside, the 
manure has become more concentrated in 
localized areas. When application rates ex-
ceed  the  carrying  capacity  of  the  land  to 
assimilate  nutrients,  repeated  applications 
can lead to a buildup of nutrients in the soil. 
This, in turn, increases the potential for nu-
trients to move from the field through leach-
ing and runoff and to pollute groundwater 
(Kellogg et al. 2000).
  To see whether a farmer has the abil-
ity to use all manure on his own farm, the 
farm’s balance of manure nutrients relative 
to the farm’s potential to use the nutrients 
through crop production is calculated based 
on the household surveys for each country. 
It is estimated that broilers and dairy pro-
duce 80 lbs (36 kg) of manure per day per 
1,000 lbs (454 kg) liveweight animal unit, 
layers produce 60.5 lbs (27 kg) per day per 
animal unit, and swine produce 63.1 lbs (29 
kg) per day per animal unit. This manure 
contains  nitrogen,  phosphorus,  and  potas-
sium that, if not used or disposed of in a 
safe manner, can seep into the water table 
and cause groundwater pollution. Given the 
current  livestock  populations  in  the  study 
countries and their expected growth, there 
may be a problem.
  The  amount  of  chemical  fertilizer  ap-
plied per land unit was also included, when 
available, and we computed the mass bal-
ance of nutrients applied to the land. Crop 
assimilation capacity was estimated to de-
termine whether a crop could assimilate all 
the  nutrients  produced  on-farm,  and  then 
the amount of manure sold off-farm, if any, 
was subtracted.
Animal Unit Calculations
Nutrient  values  from  livestock  were  cal-
culated based on animal units of 1,000 lbs 
(454 kg), the most commonly used metric 
to  calculate  nutrient  levels  in  the  United 
States. Animal unit conversions are used to 
equate excretion across species,12 because 
the amount of manure produced by a cow is 
not equivalent in chemical terms or weight 
to the amount produced by a broiler or a 
hog. Table 3.1 illustrates that one U.S. ani-
mal unit is equivalent to one cow, five pigs, 
or 250 broilers or layers, a calculation based 
on averages used by the U.S. Agricultural 
Extension Service.13
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12A U.S. animal unit is a unit of measure developed to compare differences in the amount of manure produced 
by species. One U.S. animal unit is generally defined as 1,000 pounds of live animal weight, but requirements 
for specific animals differ by species, age, weight, diet, and so on. For instance, while 250 chickens produce 298 
pounds of nitrogen per year and 209 pounds of P2O5, it takes less than one cow to produce the equivalent (Penn-
sylvania State Cooperative Extension Service 1993).
13Different countries have different conversion factors and limits. For instance, the European Community Direc-
tive limits the number of manure-producing animals per hectare of land (for up to 16 weeks) to 2 dairy cows, 4 
ground stock/beef cattle, 16 fattening pigs, 5 sows with piglets, 100 turkeys or ducks, 133 laying hens, or 285 
ground hens. This is equivalent to a limit of 170 kg per ha per year of total nitrogen (including that depositedTotal Nutrient Production
The total nutrient deposition from livestock 
for each household is estimated using these 
parameters,  where  the  total  nutrient  de-
posited by household h is the sum of the   
nutrients produced by animal units of live-
stock type l belonging to household h. Data 
on commercial fertilizer use, if any, were 
added  to  the  calculations  to  derive  total   




nAU lh + CFh
n,  (5)   l
where l = livestock category; n = nutrient 
type; h = household; Tn
h = total nutrient n 
deposited by household; AU lh = animal units 
of livestock type l in household h; CFn
h = 
form of nutrient n applied as commercial 
fertilizer by household h; and an
l = amount 
of nutrient n produced per animal unit of 
livestock type l.
Estimation of Crop Uptake
The capacity of household land to absorb 
nutrients  is  estimated  assuming  that  all 
the  available  land  is  planted  with  a  crop 
that  would  use  the  nutrients  to  determine 
whether a household would have the poten-
tial to use all the nutrients produced given 
its current number of animals.14
  The capacity for each household to use 
the  nutrients  produced  by  its  livestock  is 
computed as the area or cropland available 
to the household multiplied by the nutrient 
uptake by the crops planted on the land. To 
determine this, we calculated the potential 
for either corn (for Brazil) or rice (for India, 
the  Philippines,  and  Thailand)  to  take  up 
these  nutrients  under  the  assumption  that 
all the available cropland was planted with 
either corn (maize) or rice. It is estimated 
by this procedure that 140 kg of nitrogen 
and 56 kg of phosphorus would be removed 
per hectare of corn crop. It should be noted 
that  the  actual  nitrogen  requirements  for 
corn production vary between 68 and 168 
kg  per  hectare  without  irrigation  and  as 
much as 280 kg per hectare with irrigation. 
We  assumed  that  the  nitrogen  uptake  for 
rice production is 100 kg per hectare and 
the phosphorus uptake is 32 kg per hectare 
(Sims and Wolf 1994; Sims 1995).
Mass Balance
In order to determine the nutrient balance 
on the farm, the difference between manure 
nutrient production and consumption of the 
farm is calculated. The mass balance (MB) 
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while grazing) in zones deemed vulnerable to nitrate leaching (Williams 1995). Equivalent conversion factors 
might be lower for some developing countries, because the amount of nitrogen and phosphate excreted in animal 
manure depends on diet, species, and age of animal (Faasen and van Dijk 1987).
14This estimation inevitably overestimates what can be absorbed. Unfortunately, it is necessary to use this esti-
mate because most of the survey data are not detailed enough to distinguish crop acreage from building area.
Table 3.1    Converting animal liveweight to crop nutrients generated
    Amount of nitrogen  Amount of phosphorus 
  Animals per animal   generated per 1,000 lbs.  generated per 1,000 lbs. 
Animal  unit (1,000 lbs. liveweight)  liveweight per year (kg)  liveweight per year (kg)
Layer  250  135.0  95.0
Broiler  250  135.0  95.0
Swine      5  68.0  54.0
Dairy cow      1  7.7  13.3
Source: Pennsylvania State Cooperative Extension Service (1993).for each nutrient of interest (nitrogen and 
phosphorus) is expressed by the following 
equation:
MBn = bn Ah – Mn × aul × N,  (6)
where Ah = area of cropland owned or oper- 
ated by household h; bn = absorptive capac- 
ity for nutrient n per unit of land; Mn = nu- 
trient  n  produced  per  animal  unit;  aul  = 
animal  units  for  specific  livestock  l;  and   
N = number of animals.
  The result indicates a household’s po-
tential capacity to assimilate nutrients based 
on the current number of animals on their 
property. A positive mass balance implies 
that there is sufficient land to assimilate the 
nutrients produced, while a negative mass 
balance suggests that there is not enough 
land to absorb them. The results are also 
interpretable in physical terms. A negative 
mass balance of –10 metric tons for nitro-
gen, for example, implies that the farmer is 
loading nitrogen at the net rate of 10 metric 
tons per hectare per year, creating a surplus 
that will cause problems over time.
Manure Sold Off-Farm
Although manure is a potentially valuable 
fertilizer  and  soil  conditioner,  areas  with 
concentrated livestock production may not 
have  adequate  cropland  for  nutrient  use 
stemming from byproducts of livestock. In 
these cases, exporting nutrients from con-
centrated  areas  to  surrounding  areas  may 
be both environmentally and economically 
beneficial.  Markets  for  manure  seem  to 
exist in all countries, primarily for poultry 
manure  used  on  horticultural  crops,  and 
to some degree for dry swine manure and 
dairy manure in some countries.
  Animal waste tends to be bulky, diffi-
cult to apply, heterogeneous, and relatively 
poor in terms of nutrient content compared 
to the more homogeneous, higher nutrient 
content of commercial chemical fertilizers. 
This often makes it expensive to put animal 
waste into a form that can be transported, 
and the transportation costs tend to be high. 
Further, because manure is often in liquid 
form (and tends to be sold in developing 
countries in dry form and is rarely treated), 
much of the nitrogen in it volatizes into the 
atmosphere prior to use.
  The nitrogen in most fresh poultry ma-
nure is in the form of either ammonia or or-
ganic nitrogen. The concentration of nitro- 
gen in poultry manure is the highest of all 
animal manures. This is due to the birds’ 
common duct for urine and feces elimina-
tion and to the relatively low water content 
of the litter in broiler houses (Sims and Wolf 
1994). Given that most broiler operations 
use bedding material in which the manure is 
dropped,  it  is  relatively  easy  to  bag  and 
transport. Many poultry operators clean out 
facilities after each grow-out cycle, some-
times six times a year; thus the potential for 
facilitating the development of a market for 
poultry  manure  exists  in  many  countries. 
Occasionally, poultry and swine manure is 
used directly as fish feed. Other uses of ma- 
nure reported in the surveys were for floor-
ing in buildings and for mushroom farm-
ing. There were limited markets for liquid 
swine manure, perhaps because there were 
considerable  costs  for  disposing  of  bulky 
liquid manure.
  The  sample  households,  for  the  most 
part, did not collect dairy manure when ani- 
mals  were  raised  in  pastures;  in  areas   
where they were not, such as India, it was 
collected and sold. Though there may be a 
market for manure, the market for unpro-
cessed  manure  may  be  seasonal,  because 
crops need fertilizer only in certain periods 
of their growing cycle during some times 
of the year.
Handling Contract Farming
Two  complications  arise  from  the  inclu-
sion  of  contract  farmers  in  the  empirical 
analysis. First, contract farmers do not pay 
for feed or other inputs, so their input prices 
are zero and their output prices are typically 
fees negotiated in advance. Thus, there are 
both conceptual and data problems in com-
38      CHAPTER 3paring independent and contract farmers in 
the same regression. The solution adopted 
for the price problem posed by contracting 
is to use actual prices paid for inputs (zero) 
and received for outputs (fees) for contract 
farmers.  These  balance  each  other  in  the 
computation  of  profit  for  the  dependent 
variable. On the RHS of the first equation 
of the frontier model, equation (3), the zero 
input prices for contract farmers are handled 
using  slope  dummy  variables  for  coeffi-
cients of the prices of inputs provided free 
to contract farmers, where the slope dummy 
applies if and only if the farmer in question 
is a contract farmer. This allows for the esti-
mation within the same regression of differ-
ent response coefficients to input prices for 
contract and independent farmers. Finally, 
particular attention has to be devoted to the 
fixed  resources  (land,  family  labor,  sunk 
capital) provided by both contract and in-
dependent farmers. It is these variables that 
are central in explaining production levels 
of contract farmers, who are not constrained 
by price in expanding production.
  The second problem is that the decision 
to be a contract farmer is presumably not 
independent from production decisions and 
profit, leading to possible simultaneity bias 
if a dummy variable for contract farming is 
included in the inefficiency term, equation 
(4), to explain why some farms are further 
from  the  frontier  than  others.  The  initial   
solution adopted for the endogeneity prob-
lem  posed  by  contracting  was  to  use  an 
instrumented variable in place of a simple 
dummy variable.15 However, as in the case 
of  environmental  mitigation  and  endoge-
neity,  this  econometric  nicety  introduced 
more  problems  than  it  solved,  because 
the choice of adequate instruments is not 
straightforward and one source of possible 
bias  in  the  error  term  of  the  stochastic 
frontier is replaced by another. Given the 
nature of the fix-up used for the first set   
of  problems  with  contracting  in  the  first 
equation  of  the  frontier  model,  it  was 
judged expedient to simply use the actual 
dummy for contracting in the inefficiency 
term of the frontier model.
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15This was obtained by using a probit estimator on a regression of the decision to contract (one if a contractor, 
zero otherwise) on all exogenous household and farm characteristics available that might explain why a farmer 
chooses to be a contractor, including at least one variable relevant to the decision to be a contractor (such as 
nonfarm income) that is not one of the determinants of relative profitability. Then the predicted contracting status 
(contractor or independent) from the regression for each farm was used in lieu of a dummy variable based on the 
actual status of the farm.CHAPTER 4
Data and Surveys
P
rimary and secondary data were used to answer the hypotheses posed in this study. The 
secondary data used in this study came from data published by government agencies, 
gray literature, and surveys reported in previous research and were used to support de-
scriptions of the livestock sector given in the previous chapters. The primary data used came 
from farm household surveys conducted under the direction of the national team leaders in 
Brazil (Carmargo Barros), India (Mehta and Sharma), the Philippines (Costales), and Thailand 
(Poapongsakorn) in 2002/3. The data collected through the household-level farm surveys from 
each of these countries were used to conduct econometric analysis of factors affecting the   
scaling-up of livestock production, taking into account the impact of technological change and 
environmental externalities.
Sample Locations and Their Characteristics
The location of the farm household surveyed for each country was biased so that the regions 
surveyed in each country included a representative sample for each commodity being studied 
in order to capture the diversification of the scale of livestock operations for that specific com- 
modity. In addition, the farms sampled represented the variety of production activities that took 
place at different stages of production for specific livestock commodities. For example, in the 
case of swine, the types of activities considered were growing piglets, raising fatteners, or a 
combination of both activities. In the case of layers, representative samples for farms growing 
chicks for hens, feeding hens for laying eggs, or a combination of both were well represented.
Sample Selection of Study Sites in Thailand
In Thailand, a cluster of six provinces located less than 250 kilometers from Bangkok were 
chosen representing the largest production density of broilers, eggs, and milk. These six   
provinces were Chachoengsao, Cholburi, and Srakaew in the east, Saraburi and Lopburi in the 
central area, and Korat in the northeast. At the time of the study, Chachoengsao was the largest 
producer of broilers and eggs, and it was the second-largest swine producer after Ratchaburi 
in the west. The provinces of Korat and Saraburi are the main milk-producing provinces. In 
recent years, the number of dairy farms has expanded in Korat (particularly in the eastern   
districts) and farther east to Srakaew and Lopburi. New farms for layers, broilers, and swine 
can now be found in the connecting provinces of Saraburi and Lopburi. Korat tends to be an 
old location for swine farms, but it is where a number of small-scale producers remain. Both 
old and new areas of production were included for comparison purposes to aid in the assess-
ment of the impact of expansion of modern livestock production on the smallholders who use 
traditional methods. Contract farming is prevalent in Thai poultry production, and the ob-
served forms of contractual arrangement were also considered ex post in the sample farms.
40Sample Selection of Study  
Sites in the Philippines
In the Philippines, three regions were se-
lected:  Central  Luzon,  Southern  Tagalog, 
and  Northern  Mindanao.  The  leading  re- 
gion  for  commercial  hog  production  in   
the Philippines is Central Luzon, followed 
by  Southern  Tagalog.  Four  major  hog- 
producing provinces in the Central Luzon 
region were surveyed: Nueva Ecija, Bula-
can,  Pampanga,  and  Tarlac.  Three  major 
hog  producing  provinces  in  Southern  Ta-
galog  were  surveyed:  Batangas,  Laguna, 
and  Rizal.  Northern  Mindanao,  although 
not  particularly  dominant  in  terms  of  its 
livestock output volume, was included be-
cause the World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE) recently certified Bukidnon, a 
main center of operation for integrators and 
large companies in the northern part of Min- 
danao, as free of FMD without vaccination.
  Smallholder  independent  hog  opera-
tions are still present in small numbers in 
these sample regions, but the level of com-
mercial hog production activities is higher. 
Smallholder  contracts  were  not  found  in 
Central Luzon, but were present in South-
ern Tagalog (Luzon), where few feed mills 
engaging in contract production with small-
holders existed. Commercial-sized contract 
production arrangements exist, but there is 
great  difficulty  in  obtaining  production   
and  marketing  information.  Large  inde-
pendent commercial hog production farms   
also exist in all three regions. The type of 
activities  engaged  in  by  hog  producers   
was well represented ex post by the sam-
ples taken—namely, farrow-to-wean (piglet 
production), farrow-to-finish, and grow-to-
finish activities or a combination of farrow-
to-wean  and  farrow-to-finish  operations 
(Costales et al. 2003).
  Central Luzon also has the highest level 
broiler production in the country, followed 
by  Southern  Tagalog.  Although  commer-
cial contract farming with large integrators 
dominates broiler production, there remain 
small-scale contracts with smaller integra-
tors (with 6,000–10,000 birds). Both small-
holder independent broiler production and 
independent  commercial  broiler  operation 
are disappearing.
Sample Selection of  
Study Sites in India
The  India  dairy  team  surveyed  the  three 
leading milk-producing states of the coun-
try: Gujarat in the west region and Punjab 
and  Haryana  in  the  north  region.  These 
states  are  well-developed  milk-producing 
regions in India, reflecting significant dif-
ferences  in  organizational  structure,  with 
the  traditional  cooperative  milk  sheds  in 
the west and newer milk sheds in the north.   
Gujarat  is  dominated  by  milk  coopera- 
tives that were strengthened under a dairy 
development program. Two of the highest-
volume milk-producing districts in Gujarat, 
Mehsana and Kheda, were surveyed. Pun-
jab  and  Haryana,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
dominated  by  the  private  sector,  and  the 
presence of cooperatives is limited to a few 
areas. In the Punjab, two districts with po- 
tential  for  milk  production  growth,  Lud- 
hiana and Moga, were surveyed. The dairy 
cooperative  sector  has  a  strong  presence 
in  Ludhiana  district,  while  milk  from  the 
milk-shed area in the Moga district largely 
goes to Nestlé (a private sector dairy plant).   
Although the dairy sector is well developed 
in  Haryana,  the  cooperative  movement  is 
weak. The districts of Karnal and Jind were 
surveyed in Haryana to get a representative 
sample across this state.
  The  Indian  poultry  surveys  were  con-
ducted in the states of Andhra Pradesh and 
Haryana. Poultry production has grown rap-
idly in these two states during the last three 
decades. These two states cover the national 
spectrum of poultry development and scales 
of activity, and both have considerable po- 
tential for future development. Andhra Pra- 
desh ranks first among Indian states in egg 
and  broiler  production  (5.8  billion  eggs   
and 140 million broilers in 1997–98), while 
Haryana ranked tenth in egg production (637 
million eggs in 1997–98) (Government of 
India 2000). The districts sampled from these 
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low-concentration areas.
Sample Selection of  
Study Sites in Brazil
The  Brazil  team  selected  the  southern, 
southeastern,  and  center-west  regions  to 
study.  The  southern  region  surveys  were 
conducted in the states of Rio Grande de 
Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná. These states 
are the main production areas for meat and 
dairy products produced by both small- and 
medium-sized livestock farms. The south-
eastern region is considered the wealthiest 
and most industrialized region of the coun-
try. In this region, sample households pro-
ducing milk, broilers, and eggs were selected 
in the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, 
Rio de Janeiro, and Espírito Santo. Most of 
the  dairy  samples  came  from  large-scale 
farms located in Minas Gerais.
  The  center-west  region  surveys  were 
conducted  in  the  states  of  Mato  Grosso, 
Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goiás. This is the 
region where both grain production and cat- 
tle ranching predominate, and it is consid-
ered to have considerable potential for the 
expansion of crops and animal production. 
Milk production in this region comes from 
animals producing both milk and beef, which 
were  captured  on  the  farms  surveyed  in 
Goias.
Commodities Selected
The commodities chosen for in-depth anal-
ysis  in  each  country  were  broilers,  eggs, 
swine, and milk. The choice of these com-
modities stemmed from the desire to stick 
with a manageable task but to observe the 
production of those items that had the fol-
lowing characteristics: (1) production was 
growing rapidly at the national level, (2) the 
commodities were important for the country 
concerned,  (3)  small-scale  operators  had 
traditionally and recently been involved in 
producing these commodities, and (4) there 
was at least anecdotal evidence that small-
holders were being displaced from the sec-
tor in the sense that they were losing market 
share  to  larger  operations  or  would  soon   
do so. Based on these criteria, it was de-
cided that swine producers would be sur-
veyed in Brazil, the Philippines, and Thai-
land; broiler operations would be surveyed 
in all four countries; layer operations would 
be surveyed in Brazil, India, and Thailand, 
and milk producers would be surveyed in 
Brazil, India, and Thailand (see column 1 
in Table 4.1).
Rationale for Size Category
Given  the  objective  of  assessing  the  out- 
look for smallholders in a rapidly increas-
ing trend of livestock production, livestock 
farms were stratified ex ante into two broad 
size categories: large-scale and small-scale. 
The  farm  size  classification  was  mainly 
based on the size distributions of farm live- 
stock  holdings  for  the  country  and  com-
modity in question; the subjective judgment 
of the country teams also played a part, be- 
cause comprehensive data on size distribu- 
tions in the survey areas were usually not 
available. In general, small-scale farms were 
defined as those with holdings small enough 
that hired labor is not normally expected to 
be found. For instance, farms that are classi-
fied as large-scale in the Philippines would 
likely be considered relatively small-scale 
in  Brazil.  Scale-related  stratification  was 
finalized ex post to provide the best scale-
related  differentiation  in  each  country  as 
opposed to using a consistent definition of 
scale across countries. Further substratifica-
tion was done ex post to distinguish contract 
from independent farms for countries and 
commodities  where  contract  farming  was 
observed.
  The  Thai  team  classified  their  sample 
farms into three to four categories: small, 
medium-low,  medium-high,  and  large  as   
defined in Table 4.1. For swine, small-scale 
farms had 1–100 head; medium-scale farms 
were divided into medium-low, with 101– 
500 head, and medium-high, with 501–1,000 
head; and large-scale farms had more than 
1,000  head.  Layer  farms  operating  with 
10,000 birds or fewer were categorized as 
42      CHaPter 4small  in  scale;  those  with  10,001–50,000 
birds  were  sorted  out  as  medium-scale; 
and  those  with  more  than  50,000  birds 
were classified as large-scale farms. Broiler   
farms  were  grouped  into  four  farm  sizes: 
small-scale,  with  1–5,000  birds;  medium-
low, with 5,001–10,000 birds; medium-high, 
with 10,000–20,000 birds; and large-scale, 
with more than 20,000 birds. Dairy farms 
keeping 1–20 cows were labeled as small-
scale farms; those keeping 21–50 cows were 
grouped as medium-scale farms, further dis-
aggregated  as  medium-low  (21–30  cows) 
and medium-high (31–50 cows); and farms 
with more than 50 cows were considered 
large-scale farms.
  The India dairy team categorized their 
sample farms into three categories: small-
scale (with 1 to 4 animals), medium-scale 
(with 4 to 10 animals), and large-scale (with 
more than 10 animals). For poultry farms in 
India, those with fewer than 10,000 birds 
were categorized as small-scale farms, while 
those with more than 10,000 birds were cate- 
gorized as large-scale.
  The Brazil sample of swine farms was 
divided  into  small-scale  farms,  with  100 
sows or fewer; medium-scale farms, with 
101–1,000 sows; and large-scale operations, 
with more than 1,000 sows. For broilers and 
layers, small-scale operations were defined 
as  those  keeping  an  inventory  of  10,000 
birds or fewer, and those with more than 
10,000 birds were classified as operating on 
a large scale. Small producers of milk were 
those with 50 cows or fewer, medium-scale 
farms  were  those  with  51–70  cows,  and 
large-scale farms were those keeping more 
than 70 cows.
  In the Philippines, hog raisers operating 
with 100 sows or fewer were categorized as 
smallholders; beyond that, they were clas-
sified  as  large-scale/commercial  raisers. 
Smallholder activities were defined as those 
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table 4.1    size of operations by country and type of livestock farm, 2003
Country/type        Large-scale/ 
of livestock farm  Small-scale (head)  Medium-low  Medium-high  commercial (head)
Thailand
    Swine  1–100  101–500  501–1,000  More than 1,000
    Broiler  1–5,000  5,001–10,000  10,001–20,000  More than 20,000
    Dairy  1–20  21–30  31–50  More than 50
    Layer  1–10,000    10,001–50,000  More than 50,000
Philippines
    Swine  100 or fewer    101–1,000  More than 1,000
    Broiler  10,000 or fewer      More than 10,000
India
    Dairy  4 or fewer    5–10  More than 10
    Broiler  Fewer than 10,000      10,000 or more
    Layer  Fewer than 10,000      10,000 or more
Brazil
    Swine  100 or fewer    101–1,000  More than 1,000
    Broiler  10,000 or fewer      More than 10,000
    Layer  10,000 or fewer      More than 10,000
    Dairy  50 or fewer    51–70  More than 70
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Mehta et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn 
et al. (2003); Sharma et al. (2003).
  Medium-scale (head)that mainly use household resources (labor 
and land). The size of holdings was rela-
tively small, so hired labor was not normally 
required  or  expected.  The  commercial 
sample,  however,  was  disaggregated  into 
two  categories:  medium-scale  commercial   
raisers (101 to 1,000 head) and large-scale 
commercial (more than 1,000 head). Large-
scale  commercial  raisers  may  differ  from 
small-scale to medium commercial raisers 
in terms of the existence of economies of 
scale in feed mixing, breeding, and process-
ing of output (integration to processing).
  Broiler  production  in  the  Philippines 
has become largely commercial, with con-
tract production the dominant arrangement. 
Minimum  contract  sizes  have  been  set  at 
about. Hence, farms that raised 10,000 birds   
or  fewer  were  considered  smallholders, 
while  farms  categorized  as  large-scale  or 
commercial were those growing more than 
10,000 birds.
Sample Size and 
Composition
A feasible sample size for each type of live- 
stock farm (scale, species) was selected by 
balancing the number of farms of various 
populations in the survey areas, the design 
purpose  of  comparing  statistically  across 
scales,  and  the  budget  constraint  for  data 
collection  of  qualitative  and  quantitative 
information from each farm household sur-
veyed. Table 4.2 shows the final size and 
composition of the household survey sam-
ples for each country after attrition. On av-
erage, close to 20 percent of the respondents 
in the Philippines and Thailand are replace-
ments  of  the  original  sample  households 
because of nonresponsiveness or hesitation 
to give away information related to profits 
and  income.  The  samples  were  stratified 
according to scale of operation (small-scale, 
medium-scale, and large-scale or commer-
cial)  and  type  of  production  arrangement 
(independent and contract).
  The India dairy team randomly sampled 
a total of 520 households consisting of 200 
smallholders, 148 medium-scale farms, 108 
large-scale  farms,  and  64  commercial  or 
periurban dairy farms from Gujarat, Punjab, 
and  Haryana.  All  sample  farms  operate 
through cooperatives.
  The  selection  of  a  sample  was  quite 
difficult for the India poultry team, because 
information  on  the  populations  of  poul-
try farms was limited. The team obtained 
information  from  different  sources,  such 
as the state directory of poultry farms in 
Haryana and Andhra Pradesh, the integra-
tors’ list, and the National Egg Coordina-
tion Council. To capture characteristics of 
poultry  units,  such  as  nearness  to  urban/ 
rural  areas  and  nearness  to  a  main  road, 
the team sampled 159 broiler farms, 110 
of which were small-scale and 49 of which 
were large-scale. Of the 159 farm house-
holds, 136 were independents and 23 were 
under  contract  arrangement  with  the  in-
tegrator. A total of 160 layer farms were 
sampled, consisting of 63 small-scale and 
98  large-scale  farms,  all  of  which  were 
operating independently.
  For the Philippines, a total of 207 hog 
farms (110 smallholder farms and 97 large-
scale/commercial  farms)  were  surveyed 
from  Central  Luzon,  Southern  Tagalog, 
and Bukidnon. Of the 110 smallholders, 87 
were independents and 23 contract farms; of 
the 97 large-scale/commercial farms, 67 were 
independents and 30 contract farms. Surveys 
also covered 116 broiler farms, constituting 
62 smallholders and 54 large-scale farms. 
The sample broiler farms were further dis-
aggregated as independent or contract farms, 
of which 54 were classified as independents 
and 62 as contract farms.
  The Brazil broiler survey consisted of 
235 farms, of which 201 were operating on 
a large scale, and only six farmers out of the 
total were producing as independents. The 
sample size of the egg producers (layers) 
was 89 distributed among states according 
to the methodology defined by the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). 
Of the 89 sample farms, only 6 were small 
in scale, and 83 were large-scale farms. As 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































data and surveys      45for  the  swine  survey,  a  sample  of  193 
farms was taken, stratified according to the 
number of parents, following the methodol-
ogy defined by the IBGE. There were 161 
large-scale farms sampled and 31 medium-
scale farms. The sample farms were further 
divided into three groups: integrated under 
contract  by  companies  (99  samples),  in-
tegrated  as  members  of  cooperatives  (37 
samples),  and  independent  (57  samples). 
The sample of dairy farmers included 160 
producers, which were taken from selected 
states representing 76 percent of the milk 
production  in  Brazil.  Small-scale  dairy 
farmers are expressive in Rio Grande do Sul 
and Santa Catarina, while larger farms dom-
inate in Paraná, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, 
and Goiás.
  A total of 92 dairy farm households in 
Thailand were sampled, of which 35 were 
smallholders, 38 medium-scale farms, and 
19  large-scale  farms.  The  most  common 
production  arrangement  in  dairy  produc- 
tion is contract farming with a cooperative. 
For swine-producing households, a total of 
174  households  were  surveyed,  of  which   
20 were classified as small-scale, 112 were 
medium-low-scale  and  medium-high-scale 
farms,  and  42  were  large-scale  farms.  Of 
the total sample, 125 farms were indepen- 
dent farms and the rest were contract farms 
divided into fee or wage-contract farms (30 
samples)  and  forward-price-guaranteed 
farms (19 samples).
  The  sample  for  layer  farms  in  Thai- 
land was composed of 41 smallholders, 32 
medium-scale  farms,  and  23  large-scale 
farms. Of these 96 farms, 88 were grouped 
as  independents;  the  rest  were  subcon- 
tract  farms.  The  broiler  samples  totaled 
170, of which 74 were small-scale farms, 
51 medium-low, 27 medium-high, and 18 
large-scale farms. Almost the entire group 
of  broiler  farms  (99  percent)  were  sub- 
contractors  (except  for  one  independent 
and one integrator), either under forward-
price  contract  or  per-chick  (fee)  contract 
arrangements.
Types of Contracts for 
Poultry and Hogs Observed 
in the Study Countries
There are two main types of contracts for 
poultry  and  hogs  that  are  proliferating  in   
the study countries: fee (or wage) contracts 
(by animal or by weight) and forward-price 
contracts  (guaranteed  and/or  with  profit-
sharing). They differ mainly in the mode of 
grower compensation, in the accounting for 
and shouldering of the growing stock and 
feeds,  in  the  need  to  monitor  production 
activities, and in the need for enforcement 
of  actual  deliveries.  They  also  differ  ac-
cordingly in incentives, penalties, risks, and 
provisions for defaults.
Fee or Wage Contracts
These  contracts  are  mostly  issued  by  the 
large multinational or national integrators; 
the scale of these contracts is generally ap-
proximately that of a “commercial” scale of 
operations (10,000 or more birds for broil-
ers, 200 or more head of fatteners for hogs). 
However, there are fee contracts that cover 
as few as 6,000 birds in the Philippines and 
4,000 in southern India.
  In fee contracts, the integrator typically 
fully bears the costs of growing stock, feeds, 
and veterinary supplies and services. Thus, 
the prices of stock and feed are zero from 
the viewpoint of the grower, possibly lead-
ing to a temptation to resell them clandes-
tinely or use inputs on private stock. The 
integrator bears all market risk and shares 
production risk with the grower. However, 
the grower typically does not share in the 
benefits of increasing output prices (or share 
in the losses due to falling output prices). 
An  integrator  needs  to  monitor  produc-
tion fairly closely to prevent avoidance of 
critical quality control interventions and to 
promote good animal husbandry practices 
by the grower and to avoid diversion by the 
grower of the integrator’s inputs, such as 
feed, to noncontract uses.
  The grower receives a guaranteed fixed 
fee for each live animal (in cash per bird 
46      CHaPter 4or slaughtered hog or, in some cases, per 
kilogram  liveweight)  that  is  successfully 
harvested in a condition that is acceptable 
to  the  integrator  for  the  purposes  of  live 
sale  or  slaughter.  Under  some  contracts, 
payments by kilogram rather than per head 
are designed to give the grower a stake in 
feeding  performance.  To  ensure  effort  by 
the grower, fee contracts also typically have 
built-in incentive and penalty clauses tied 
to the grower’s ability to meet the integra-
tor’s set of specified minimum performance 
standards.  These  standards  typically  refer 
to feed conversion ratios, harvest recovery 
(percentage of live animals harvested), and 
average liveweight (for broilers) or average 
daily gain (for hogs). Compensation in ad-
dition to the fixed fee is given to the grower 
for meeting or surpassing each of the per-
formance standards. For growers who fall 
below  the  set  standards,  corresponding 
amounts per bird or hog are subtracted from 
the fee.
  While  fee  contracts  may  be  attractive 
to  growers,  they  have  two  disadvantages 
that limit their widespread use with small- 
holders.  First,  the  onus  on  integrators  to 
closely monitor production makes this an 
uninviting  option  for  all  but  the  most  lo-
cally based integrators. Second, to be able 
to participate in fixed-fee contracts, a po-
tential contract grower must typically post 
a bond per bird or head of animal with the 
integrator prior to engaging in the contract. 
The most common form of bond is a cash 
bond, verifiable as a deposit in a bank, or 
another  financial  instrument.  The  average 
cost of the bond per bird or head of hog is 
very close to the cost of one day-old-chick 
in broiler contracts and to the cost of one 
fattener (weanling) as delivered to the con-
tract grower. If the grower defaults on the 
contract, the integrator keeps the bond.
Forward-Price and  
Profit-Sharing Contracts
In price contracts, while the integrator ad-
vances the cost of growing stock, feeds, and 
veterinary supplies and services, these are 
later charged in full to the contract grower at 
the time of harvest and sale of output, when 
all costs are accounted for, before compen-
sation  is  paid.  In  essence,  growing  stock 
and feeds are provided by the integrator on 
credit. The stock used and feeds consumed 
are, in fact, evaluated at prevailing market 
prices, with a mark-up imposed for relevant 
charges (transport to the farm, cost of money 
for stock or feeds credit). Price contracts are 
more suitable when close supervision is not 
possible, because they reduce the incentives 
to  divert  integrator  inputs  to  other  uses. 
Four-fifths  of  Thailand’s  broiler  contracts 
are  now  under  a  price  guarantee  system 
(Poapongsakorn et al. 2003). As in the case 
of wage contracts, market risk is born by 
the  integrator.  However,  production  risk 
(such as mortality or avian influenza cull-
ing) is now fully born by the grower. The 
integrator, however, now has to find ways 
to deal with the grower’s incentive to pre-
vent default when output market prices rise. 
In general, the integrator has the exclusive 
right to choose when and to whom to sell 
the harvest, as in fee contracts.
  Solutions for getting around the problem 
of grower default when prices rise include   
a  bonus  for  weight  gain,  as  in  Thailand, 
and profit sharing (50–50), as in the Philip-
pines and India. Possibly greater ability to 
enforce  contracts  in  Thailand  and  India   
may  explain  the  popularity  of  price  con-
tracts in those countries. In the Philippines, 
price  contracts  are  mostly  undertaken  by 
relatively small local feed millers with con-
tract growers that they know well, with the 
scale of contracts generally approximately 
that of a “smallholder” scale of operations 
(in the Philippines for example, fewer than 
10,000  birds  for  broilers,  fewer  than  100 
head of fatteners for hogs).
  One important difference for smallhold-
ers between price and fee contracts is that 
there  typically  are  no  prior  bond  require-
ments for engaging in price contracts, un-
like in the case of fee contracts. The main 
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grower in price contracts is that the costs 
of stock and feed are to be charged to the 
grower  at  the  end  of  the  cycle,  whether   
the activity makes a profit or not. It is in the 
interest of both parties that the activity itself 
generate positive profit.
Timing and Extent of Survey
The household surveys were conducted in 
each  country  between  October  2002  and 
January 2003. Questionnaires for each type 
of livestock producer (milk, swine, broiler, 
and egg) were pretested and administered to 
the household head or decisionmaker of the 
farm. The sets of information collected from 
the  four  countries  were  relatively  similar 
(such as household characteristics, costs of 
production of livestock commodities [vari-
able and fixed costs], sales of livestock com- 
modities, farm management activities, and 
environmental  management  practices)  for 
cross-country comparisons.
  For Thailand, farm locations were ob-
tained  from  the  Department  of  Livestock 
Development  and  other  local  authorities, 
the  milk  and  egg  producer  cooperatives, 
producer associations, university professors 
who served as consultants to farmers, and 
agribusiness companies (CP, Betagro, Panus 
Pokaphand, and Bangkok Feed Mill).
  For India, the dairy survey variables in- 
cluded household demographic characteris- 
tics,  land  ownership,  cropping  patterns, 
agricultural production for rabi and kharif 
seasons  in  2001–2,1  livestock  ownership, 
asset ownership, milk production and mar-
keting, labor employment in dairying, feed 
and fodder use, animal health and breeding 
services,  credit,  and  environment  issues. 
Return visits to respondents were required 
to validate incomplete questionnaires or in- 
formation, wherever possible. Relevant sec-
ondary information was also collected from 
published and unpublished sources, based 
on discussions with key stakeholders in the 
study area, to supplement the primary data 
collected from the sample households. Some 
local administration offices, State Milk Mar-
keting  Federations,  and  dairy  plants  were 
visited to obtain information to supplement 
the sample surveys.
  The field survey for Indian poultry was 
carried out from October to December 2002. 
The data originating from the survey were 
checked and cross-examined for consistency, 
and wherever gaps or inconsistencies were 
noticed,  return  visits  to  concerned  farm 
households were likewise made to fill these 
gaps.
  For  production  patterns  in  the  Philip-
pines involving defined cycles, such as for 
broilers, the last or most recent production 
cycle was considered. For production pat-
terns with no defined cycles (for example, 
overlapping batches of farrow-to-finish op-
erations) for hogs, input-output performance 
was observed in the month of October 2002.
  The Brazil team conducted their survey 
for broilers, hogs, milk, and egg-producing 
households from October 2002 to January 
2003.  The  last  production  cycle  was  ob-
served for defined production patterns, and 
for cases with no defined production cycles, 
the input-output performance in the month 
of October was also investigated (as in the 
Philippines).
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1Rabi season crops are sown at the beginning of winter season (October–November) and harvested in March– 
April. Kharif season crops are sown at the beginning of the monsoon season in June–July and harvested at the 
end of monsoon season during September–October.CHAPTER 5
A Profile of the Survey Samples
T
his chapter discusses findings from descriptive statistics of the farm household surveys 
for broiler, swine, egg, and milk production undertaken in Brazil, India, the Philippines, 
and Thailand that lend support to the various hypotheses laid out in Chapter 1. For 
instance, the descriptive analysis in this chapter allows for the investigation of Hypothesis 1: 
Small-scale producers have higher or equal profits per unit of output than do large producers. 
The descriptive statistics also provides a glimpse of apparent differences between small and 
large-scale farms and between independent and contract farms. The significance of these dif-
ferences will be formally investigated in Chapter 8.
Scale-Related Differences in Prices of Inputs  
and Outputs across Scale of Farms
Differences in Input Prices
Differences in prices received and paid by farmers could indicate differences in transaction 
costs across farms. The inputs considered to compare differences in prices paid by farmers are 
feeds, growing stock, and labor. Feed costs comprise 65–70 percent of total production costs. 
Differences in unit price may be attributable to observed differences or believed differences in 
quality, differences in size or package, differences in market infrastructure, the ability to bar-
gain for and enforce sales contracts or to achieve market recognition, and knowledge about the 
specific item being traded. The latter two are major contributors to the creation of transaction 
costs.
  It can be argued that the difference in feed price across farm sizes could be due to differ-
ences in quality in addition to differences in the average quantity of individual purchases and 
the location of sources of feeds, but it is difficult to establish such hypotheses because the 
quality of feeds used by the sample farmers was not directly investigated in this study. In the 
case of milk production, medium- and large-scale farmers in Thailand paid considerably lower 
prices for concentrate feeds, an average of 4.6 baht per kg and 4.9 baht per kg, respectively, 
than small-scale farmers paid, which was 5.4 baht per kg, on average (Poapongsakorn et al. 
2003). As for broilers, small-scale producers in Thailand paid a higher price for feeds, 9.1 baht 
per kg, than large-scale producers, 6.7 baht per kg (Poapongsakorn et al. 2003). Small-scale 
broiler growers in Brazil also paid a slightly higher price for feeds, 0.47 real per kg on aver- 
age, than did large-scale growers, 0.46 real per kg (Camargo Barros et al. 2003). Similarly, 
in the case of swine, large-scale swine producers in the Philippines paid a lower weighted 
(weights are the farm-specific quantities of various feed used) average price for feeds, 13 
pesos per kg, than small-scale producers paid, 17 pesos per kg (Costales et al. 2003).
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farms  had  a  lower  feed  conversion  ratio 
(FCR) than did small-scale farms. For ex-
ample, in Brazil, large-scale broiler produc-
ers performed better in terms of feed use per 
kilogram of output, with an FCR of 1.88, 
compared to small-scale producers, with an 
FCR of 1.94 (Camargo Barros et al. 2003). 
This finding is not surprising because large-
scale farms use more intensive technology 
and  have  better  access  to  inputs  than  do 
small-scale farms; thus, the former have an 
advantage in minimizing production costs.
  There  are  cases  in  which  input  prices 
per unit paid are not different by scale or 
by production arrangement. For example, in 
Brazil, the prices paid by swine farms, in- 
cluding  contract  farms,  did  not  vary  be-
tween  small-scale  and  large-scale  produc-
ers. In terms of feed efficiency, large-scale 
producers  obtained  a  slightly  higher  FCR 
(2.3)  than  small-scale  producers  (2.2),  but 
the mean difference is not statistically sig-
nificant (with standard error [s.e.] = 0.09). 
Among swine producers, independents were 
less feed-efficient, with an FCR of 2.5, com-
pared  to  cooperatives  and  contract  farms, 
with FCRs of 2.3 and 2.2, respectively (Ca-
margo Barros et al. 2003). This difference 
could be attributed to the rigidity of the con- 
tract farming system concerning feed quality, 
technical assistance, and genetic engineering.
  Differences  in  concentrate  feed  prices 
across countries, such as broiler farm house-
holds  in  the  Philippines  that  paid  higher 
prices for feed, an average of 14.3 pesos per 
kg (US$0.28 per kg), than did those in Thai-
land, 9.1 baht per kg (US$0.21 per kg on av-
erage), or Brazil, 0.21 real per kg (US$0.16 
per kg), may possibly reflect differences in 
import tariffs on corn (the in-quota tariff for 
corn is 35 percent in the Philippines and 20 
percent in Thailand).
  Another  important  input  in  livestock 
production is growing stock, such as day-
old  chicks  (DOCs)  and  weanlings,  which 
account  for  about  20  percent  of  the  total 
production costs. In the case of the Philip-
pines,  smallholders  paid  relatively  higher 
prices  for  DOCs  (15.3  pesos  per  bird  on 
average) than large-scale raisers, who could 
purchase the chicks for an average of 13.4 
pesos each, the difference of which could be 
attributed to bulk purchasing (Costales et al. 
2003). Interestingly, small contract growers 
paid  much  higher  prices  for  DOCs  com-
pared to smallholders and large-scale grow-
ers, 16.9 pesos per bird, which was set by 
their small integrators. This may be because 
buyers believe such DOCs are more likely 
to be free from diseases. Another possible 
explanation is the margin added by small   
integrators who purchase DOCs from large 
integrators  for  resale.  In  Thailand,  small-
scale broiler producers paid a higher price 
for  DOCs,  7.6  baht  per  chick,  than  did 
large-scale  growers,  6.3  baht  per  chick 
(Poapongsakorn et al. 2003).
  In the case of weanlings, hog contract 
growers  in  the  Philippines,  regardless  of 
scale, paid higher prices for weanlings than 
did independent producers (Costales et al. 
2003). On the other hand, the genetic char-
acteristics of weanlings purchased by con-
tract growers, and thus the predicted quality 
of  output,  were  much  more  uniform  and 
generally of higher quality from the stand-
point of lower back fat. Comparing contract 
growers by farm size, larger-scale produc-
ers paid slightly less for weanlings than did 
small-scale contract growers.
  As for other inputs, such as labor, small-
scale producers are at an advantage because 
they employ mostly family labor. Camargo 
Barros et al. (2003) reported that large-scale 
broiler farms paid higher prices for inputs 
than did small-scale farms with hired labor. 
Large-scale farms paid higher wages, 652– 
742 reals per month, compared to small-scale 
farms,  400  reals  per  month.  Large  farms 
usually hire labor on a permanent basis for 
a year or for a cycle, while small farms hire 
on a casual, daily basis.
  In most country and commodity cases, 
smallholders  paid  a  higher  price  per  unit 
of input, particularly for feeds and growing 
stock, than did large-scale farmers. Over-
all, large-scale farms (particularly contract 
50      CHAPTER 5farms) are more feed-efficient than small-
scale ones because of better access to inputs 
(such  as  feeds  of  known  quality),  better 
management,  and  access  to  intensive  and 
modern technology, particularly in terms of 
improved breeding stock.
Differences in Output Prices
As in the case of inputs, differences in out-
put prices per unit often stem from actual 
differences in (observable) quality and the 
degree  of  the  buyers’  belief  in  that  qual-
ity. Smallholder independents typically rely 
only on their buyers and other smallholders 
for  price  and  market  information,  while 
contract farmers get such information from 
their integrators or cooperatives, aside from 
their peers. Dairy farmers in India, for ex-
ample, sell a large proportion of their milk 
to cooperatives on a regular basis, with the 
assurance of timely payment. The coopera-
tives are then responsible for the sale and 
distribution  of  milk,  normally  to  private 
buyers such as wholesalers and retailers.
Prices  of  Milk  across  Farms.    In  Brazil, 
large-scale dairy farmers received a higher 
price for milk, 0.4 real per liter, than did 
smallholders, 0.3 real per liter (Table 5.1). 
This seems to suggest that large-scale farm-
ers have better bargaining power than do 
smallholders. Other possible reasons for this 
price difference are a better quality of milk 
as recognized by buyers and lower transport 
costs  due  to  larger  volumes  transported   
by large-scale farmers compared to small- 
holders (Camargo Barros et al. 2003).
  In Thailand, large-scale dairy farms re-
ceived a slightly higher price, 12 baht per liter 
of milk, than the medium-sized farms, 11.4 
baht  per  liter,  and  the  small-scale  farms, 
11.7 baht per liter. The price variation can 
be  attributed  to  differences  in  sale  prices 
offered by the cooperatives. Although the 
output  price  is  derived  from  the  national 
guaranteed  price  of  13  baht  per  liter,  it 
may  vary  depending  on  the  services  that 
cooperatives provide, such as free artificial 
insemination and veterinary services.
  Buffalo  milk  in  India  commanded  a 
higher price than cow’s milk because of its 
high fat content (6 percent versus 4 percent, 
on  average).  The  average  price  received 
by  Indian  dairy  farm  households  for  buf-
falo milk was about 11.6 rupees per liter   
in  both  regions,  while  the  price  received   
for cow’s milk was 8.3 rupees per liter in   
the northern region and 7.5 rupees per liter   
in the western region. As shown in Table   
5.1, price variation across farm sizes (small   
to  commercial  farms)  can  be  oberved  in   
the northern region, but is not evident in the 
western  region.  This  price  impartiality  is 
probably due to the strong presence and net-
working of dairy cooperatives in the western 
region, where cooperatives deal with small 
and  large  producers  equally  and  procure 
milk at a price based on fat and solid-non-
fat content, irrespective of the quantity of 
milk sold. In the northern region, the pres-
ence of an organized or cooperative sector 
is very limited, and producers depend on 
informal sector milk vendors, who purchase 
their output at the farmgate.
Prices of Live Broilers across Farms.    In 
Thailand, the price of broilers per kilogram 
received  by  large-scale  contract  growers 
was higher than the price per kilogram re- 
ceived  by  small-scale  contract  growers 
(Table 5.2). In Brazil, large-scale producers 
received higher prices, 0.08 real per kg, than 
small-scale producers, 0.07 real per kg of 
output, possibly because of homogeneity of 
output and lower transport costs. But in the 
Philippines,  smallholder  independent  pro-
ducers  received  higher  prices,  47.6  pesos 
per kg, compared to 44.7 pesos per kg re- 
ceived by large-scale independent produc-
ers (Table 5.2). Smallholder contract pro-
ducers received slightly higher prices than 
commercial producers.
Prices of Hogs/Piglets across Farms.    In 
Thailand, small-scale farms received lower 
prices  for  fattened  hogs,  32  baht  per  kg 
liveweight, than did large-scale farms, 34 
baht per kg liveweight, and the mean differ-
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(with s.e. = 1.09) (Table 5.3). Interestingly, 
Costales et al. (2007), examining the Soro- 
soro  Ibaba  development  cooperative  in 
Southern Luzon (different from the current 
sample), found that large independent farms 
received higher liveweight prices for hogs 
than did smallholders, but that smallholder 
contract farmers selling on the open market 
through the feed mill integrator received the 
same prices as large farms. In the case of the 
current sample, smallholder contract farms 
received even higher prices (about 8 percent 
higher) than large farms.
  In the case of piglets, large-scale farms 
received higher prices from sold piglets, 69 
baht per kg liveweight, than did small-scale 
and  medium-scale  farms.  Price-guarantee 
farms enjoyed higher prices of pigs and pig- 
lets  than  did  independent  farms  (Poapon- 
gsakorn et al. 2003).
  In the Philippines, the prices received 
for piglets sold by large-scale producers are 
higher, 97.5 to 112.4 pesos per kg, than the 
price received by independent smallholders, 
92.5 pesos per kg (Table 5.3). Among in-
dependent producers, large-scale operators   
received higher prices, 112.4 pesos per kg, 
than  do  their  medium-scale  counterparts, 
but the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant (with s.e. = 12.5). Except for the small 
contract  growers,  who  received  relatively 
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Table 5.1    output price of milk across farm sizes by country, 2002
    Farm size (number of cows)
  Small  Medium  Large
Variable  (1–20 cows)  (21–50 cows)  (more than 50 cows)    All
Thailand 
    Output price (baht/liter)  11.7  11.4  12.0    11.6
    Output price (US$/liter)  0.27  0.26  0.28    0.27
  Small  Medium  Large  Commerciala
  (4 or fewer head)  (5–10 head)  (more than 10 head)  (more than 10 head)
India
North
  Buffalo milk (rupees/liter)  11.3  11.2  11.9  13.2  11.6
    Buffalo milk (US$/liter)  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.27  0.24
    Cow milk (rupees/liter)  7.5  8.3  8.6  8.6  8.3
    Cow milk (US$/liter)  0.15  0.17  0.18  0.18  0.17
West
    Buffalo milk (rupees/liter)  11.3  11.2  11.6  12.9  11.6
    Buffalo milk (US$/liter)  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.27  0.24
    Cow milk (rupees/liter)  7.4  7.5  7.5  7.7  7.5
    Cow milk (US$/liter)  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.16  0.15
  Small    Large
  (50 or fewer head)    (more than 70 head)
Brazil
    Output price (reals/liter)  0.3    0.4
    Output price (US$/liter)  0.10    0.14
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003); Sharma et al. (2003).
Notes: The currency conversion rates used are based on 2002 foreign exchange rates: for Thailand, US$1 = 42.96 baht; for India, US$1 = 48.61 
rupees; for Brazil, US$1 = 2.92 reals.
aCommercial farms in the case of India are defined as those dairy farms that are close to the cities and have more than 10 head.A PRofilE of THE suRvEy sAmPlEs      53
higher prices, all producers received, on av-
erage, similar prices for fattened hogs, 52.2 
to 52.6 pesos per kg.
  In  Brazil,  small-scale  and  large-scale 
producers received the same price for fat-
tened hogs, 1.1 real per kg liveweight, on 
average (Table 5.3). In some states such as 
in Mato Grosso do Sul (center-west), small-
holders received a slightly higher price per 
kilogram liveweight of fattened hogs than 
did large-scale producers.
  In sum, it was observed that large farms 
received  higher  prices  for  output  per  unit 
than did small farms, with the exception of 
independent broiler farms in India and the 
Philippines, where small farms have better 
offers than large ones. These price differen-
tials can be attributed to different types of 
market outlets (including those organized by 
cooperatives  and  integrators),  transaction 
costs associated with selling the output, and 
the quality of output as perceived by buyers.
Table 5.2    output price of live broilers across farm sizes by country, 2002
    Farm size (number of birds)
        Commercial
  Small  Medium  Large  (more than
Variable  (1–5,000 birds)  (5,001–10,000 birds)  (10,001–20,000 birds)  20,000 birds)  All
Thailand
    Forward contract price (baht/kg)  25.3  25.7  26.0  26.3  25.6
    Forward contract price (US$/kg)  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6
    Per-bird contract fee (baht/kg)  3.3  3.7  4.7  7.0  3.9
    Per-bird contract fee (US$/kg)  0.08  0.09  0.11  0.16  0.09
  Small  Large
  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (more than 10,000 birds)
  Independent  Contract  Independent  Contract
Philippines
    From regular buyers (pesos/kg)  47.6    44.7
    From regular buyers (US$/kg)  0.9    0.9
    Integrators (pesos/kg)    6.3    6.1
    Integrators (US$/kg)    0.12    0.12
  Small  Large
  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (more than 10,000 birds)
India
    From regular buyers (rupees/kg)  61.18    59.77
    Integrators (US$/kg)  1.26    1.23
    From regular buyers (rupees/kg)    3.80    4.38
    Integrators (US$/kg)    0.08    0.09
  Small  Large
  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (more than 10,000 birds)
Brazil
    Contract fee (real/kg)    0.07  0.08
    Contract fee (US$/kg)  0.02  0.03
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003).
Note: The currency conversion rates used are based on 2002 foreign exchange rates: for Thailand, US$1 = 42.96 baht; for the Philippines, US$1 
= 51.60 pesos; for India, US$1 = 48.61 rupees; for Brazil, US$1 = 2.92 reals.Scale-Related Differences  
in Access to Information, 
Markets, and Services
Differences in Access  
to Information
Differences across farm households in ac-
cess to information and assets lead to differ-
ences in their cost structure for conducting 
exchange when buying inputs and selling 
outputs. We use the household head’s age, 
education, experience, and participation in 
professional  training  related  to  livestock 
production as proxies to compare household 
differences in access to information.
  The main findings of the four country 
studies  showed  that  household  heads  of 
large-scale farms are older than household 
heads of small-scale farms (in most cases, 
except for large-scale dairy farmers in India 
and  a  few  large-scale  swine  producers  in 
Brazil, where smallholders are older than 
large-scale farmers). The data showed that 
heads of large-scale farm households who 
are older have eventually gained more years 
of experience in raising livestock compared 
to heads of small-scale farm households. It 
was also evident that heads of large-scale 
households typically attained higher levels 
of formal education compared to heads of 
small-scale households, except in the case 
of heads of small-scale broiler households 
in India.
  On  one  hand,  the  low  level  of  formal 
education of small-scale farmers could af-
fect  the  cost  of  searching  for  information 
as well as the time spent to process and act 
on information received. On the other hand, 
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Table 5.3    output price of pigs and piglets across farm sizes by country, 2002
  Farm size (number of head)
  Small  Medium-low  Medium-high  Large
Type of animal  (100 or fewer head)  (101–500 head)  (501–1,000 head)  (more than 1,000 head)
Thailand
    Fattening (baht/kg)  31.8  34.4  34.5  34.1
    Fattening (US$/kg)  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8
    Piglets (baht/kg)  66.4  54.9  60.4  69.1
    Piglets (US$/kg)  1.6  1.3  1.4  1.6
    Large (more than 100 head)
      Medium  Large
      independent  independent
  Independent  Contract  (101–1,000 head)  (more than 1,000 head)  Contract
Philippines
    Piglets (pesos/kg)  92.5    97.5  112.4
    Piglets (US$/kg)  1.8    1.9  2.2
    Slaughter hogs (pesos/kg)  52.6  56.6  52.4  52.2  52.5
    Slaughter hogs (US$/kg)  1.0  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.0
  Small (100 or fewer head)  Large (more than 1,000 head)
Brazil
    Output price (reals/kg)  1.1  1.1
    Output price (US$/kg)  0.38  0.38
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003).
Note: The currency conversion rates used are based on 2002 foreign exchange rates: for Thailand, US$1 = 42.96 baht; for the Philippines, 
US$1 = 51.60 pesos; for Brazil, US$1 = 2.92 reals.
Small (100 or fewer head)years of schooling may be compensated with 
better farming skills, which could stem from 
work experience or from attendance in train-
ing courses such as new or improved dairy 
or  poultry  farming  techniques.  However, 
results from surveys showed that large-scale 
producers also tend to have more access to 
training than do small-scale producers.
  In  sum,  it  seems  plausible  that  large-
scale  farm  households  bear  lower  trans-
action  costs  in  buying  inputs  and  selling 
outputs due to lower costs of searching for 
information. If so, it raises the question of 
whether,  in  the  presence  of  higher  trans-
action  costs,  smallholders  will  be  able  to 
compete with large-scale farmers, as will be 
investigated more formally in Chapter 8.
Differences in Remoteness of 
Farms by Scale of Operations
In this study, the general observation was 
that  large-scale  farms  are  usually  located 
farther  away  from  towns  or  communities 
and from public waterways than are small-
scale  farms.  For  example,  in  the  case  of 
Brazil, broiler and dairy farms are located as 
far as 31 km from the city. However, in this 
case location has no direct effect on prices 
of outputs and inputs. In fact, there were 
no  price  differences  in  the  case  of  broil-
ers, even if large-scale farms were located 
farther from town than small-scale farms. 
This result may be associated with the fact 
that most of the farms are contract farms, 
so contractors determine the price of output 
and supply feeds and medicines. Large- and 
small-scale  farms  were  located  at  similar 
distances from towns and communities, and 
their  prices  of  milk  and  feeds  were  rela-
tively identical regardless of scale.
  In  the  case  of  India,  especially  in  the 
western region, most dairy farms are less 
than 1 km away from paved roads and have 
easy access to milk collection centers, due 
mainly to the good network of dairy cooper-
atives, which partly explains why the price 
of milk in this region is lower than in the 
north if we control for differences between 
cow and buffalo milk.
  In the case of Thailand, sample small-
holder broiler and dairy farms are located 
close  to  the  nearest  community  (about  3 
km) and about 1 km from public waterways. 
Even  though  small-scale  farms  are  typi-
cally closer to towns, ceteris paribus, prices 
of inputs that they receive are higher than 
those  received  by  large-scale  farms  (this 
is true for broiler farms and also for dairy 
farms but by a very small margin), which 
confirms the earlier assertion that price dif-
ferentials between sizes of farms could be 
explained by bulk purchasing.
Differences in Access  
to Market Outlets
Livestock  producers  sell  their  products  to 
different  market  outlets,  such  as  coopera-
tives,  processors,  contractors,  middlemen, 
wholesalers,  retailers,  traders/intermediar-
ies, government extension services, and end 
consumers. In particular, independent farm 
producers sell most of their livestock prod-
ucts to private buyers such as wholesalers 
(merchants,  supermarkets),  retailers  (ven-
dors), and restaurants and fast-food chains.
  In  choosing  a  market  outlet,  livestock 
producers take into consideration factors that 
they perceive to be important, such as regu-
larity in procuring sales, reasonable price of-
fers, and sensible terms of payment. Prices of 
output received by producers could be lower 
or higher than the prevailing market prices, 
depending on their bargaining power, the type 
of  market  outlet,  and,  to  some  extent,  the 
quality of their output for sale.
  The sample small-scale farms were lo-
cated  closer  to  market  outlets  than  were 
the sample large-scale farms. In the Philip-
pines,  for  example,  small-scale  and  small 
independent broiler and hog farms sell their 
output at a market 4–15 km away from the 
production site. Contract and independent 
large-scale broiler farms, on the other hand, 
have a main output market more than 30 km 
away  from  the  closest  town,  on  average. 
Large independent growers mostly rely on 
wholesalers/traders  who  also  pick  up  the 
output; hence, they receive a lower output 
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independent  smallholders,  whose  regular 
buyers are meat dealers/retailers located in 
nearby towns.
  In  Brazil,  market  outlets  for  slaughter 
hogs depend on animal weight. For instance, 
for lightweight pigs (<110 kg liveweight), 
the  common  market  outlet  is  the  fresh   
meat  market  shop.  For  heavyweight  pigs 
(>110 kg liveweight), the market outlet is 
the meat-processing plant. Some large-scale 
producers, such as the large-scale egg pro-
ducers in Brazil, sell their output directly to 
supermarkets, which give them a better deal 
on price (Camargo Barros et al. 2003).
  In  the  case  of  India,  especially  in  the 
western region, most dairy farms are less 
than 1 km away from paved roads and have 
easy access to milk collection centers, due 
mainly  to  the  good  network  of  dairy  co-
operatives, which partly explains why the 
price of cow’s milk in this region is lower 
than in the north. Being near market outlets 
is  an  advantage,  especially  for  perishable 
products such as milk. There is also a high 
proportion  of  dairy  farmers  in  India  who 
sell  milk  to  unorganized  sectors  such  as 
private  buyers,  subcontractors,  and  local 
vendors. Private buyers such as these are 
likewise present in Thailand. They buy milk 
at the guaranteed price just as the coopera-
tives do, but do not provide other services 
that cooperatives provide, such as the ones 
discussed in the following subsection.
Differential Access to Credit  
and Veterinary Services
Large-scale  and  small-scale  farms,  both 
contract and independent, clearly have dis-
tinct  and  differential  access  to  credit  and 
veterinary  services.  Large-scale  contract 
growers have automatic access to credit for 
capital and breeding stock and for variable 
inputs such as DOCs and weanlings, feeds, 
and medicines because the integrators usu-
ally finance or supply these inputs. Although 
not  all  integrators  can  provide  credit  for 
capital and breeding stock to their contract 
growers, capital investments can be financed 
through bank loans. In addition, large-scale 
farmers can easily gain approval for loans in 
public or private banks. One possible reason 
is that large-scale farmers own bigger land-
holdings  than  smallholders  that  could  be 
used as physical collateral for formal loans. 
This  is  supported  in  the  Philippine  case, 
where data show that a higher proportion 
of large-scale farms take out formal sector 
loans than is the case for small farms, as 
might be expected (Costales et al. 2003). 
Moreover, the rigid mechanism for obtain-
ing loans, such as establishing a credit line 
and repayment scheme and the high interest 
rates, are not compatible with the capacity 
and resources of small-scale farmers.
  For all sample farms, whether large- or 
small-scale,  the  most  common  sources  of 
credit are cooperatives, integrators, public 
banks, private banks, and relatives. On the 
other  hand,  smallholders,  specifically  the 
independents, are at a disadvantage in terms 
of  access  to  credit  and  other  production 
services because they have difficulty in es-
tablishing a credit history or providing other 
proof of creditworthiness.
  Contract growers enjoy better access to 
other production support services than do 
independent  growers.  Veterinary  services 
are an example; veterinary services are typi-
cally mandatory for contract farms and are 
supplied by integrators as stipulated in the 
contract agreements; independents, on the 
other hand, have to pay on a fee-for-service 
basis to avail themselves of these services.
  In the case of India, the central govern-
ment subsidizes livestock services for dairy 
farms.  There  are  government  veterinary 
hospitals/polyclinics,  mobile  and  station-
ary veterinary dispensaries, and veterinary 
first aid centers in the country that provide   
animal health care and breeding facilities. 
These services are supplemented by those 
specific to cooperatives, private sector firms, 
and nongovernment organizations.
  From the findings reported earlier, it can 
be deduced that small-scale producers are 
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fewer years of experience in livestock pro-
duction, more moderate use of inputs per 
unit of output, more limited access to input 
and  output  markets,  higher  input  prices, 
lower output prices, relatively smaller land-
holdings, and more limited access to credit 
for capital than are large-scale producers. 
Will smallholders be able to maintain prof-
its per unit of output comparable to those   
received  by  large-scale  producers  under 
these conditions, and if so, why? The fol-
lowing  discussion  provides  insights  that 




This  section  directly  investigates  Hypoth- 
esis  1,  allowing  us  to  determine  whether 
small-scale producers have higher or equal 
profits per unit of output than do large-scale 
producers.  This  hypothesis  is  investigated 
using  calculations  of  average  profits  per   
unit of output by scale category for each   
type  of  livestock  commodity  operation 
(dairy products, swine, layers, and broilers) 
and then by contractors versus independents. 
Profit  (gross  revenue  per  unit  less  vari- 
able cost per unit), as defined in Chapter 3, 
was computed directly from the farm sur-
vey data for each farm and then averaged, 
and  the  result  was  used  in  the  financial 
(nominal) sense rather than with regard to 
social prices. Profit was calculated without 
costing family labor. As explained in Chap-
ter 3, if small farms can produce at lower 
cost per unit than large farms by not costing 
family labor, there is at least a chance for 
them to stay in the market. For comparison, 
an imputed cost of family labor (the prevail-
ing agricultural market wage rate) was used 
selectively  for  cases  in  which  suitable  data 
were available to investigate the difference in 
results when family labor is and is not costed.
Milk
In the case of milk production, small-scale 
dairy farms in India had higher profits on 
average, 2.45 rupees per liter, without cost-
ing  family  labor,  than  large-scale  farms, 
0.52  rupees  per  liter  (Table  5.4).  Similar 
results at a lower magnitude held if fam-
ily  labor  was  costed  at  market  rates.  In 
Thailand, medium-scale dairy farms made 
about 20 percent more profit, 6.25 baht per 
liter, than either small- or large-scale dairy 
farms  (Table  5.4).  This  profit  difference 
can  partly  be  explained  by  farmers’  abil-
ity to use the right mixture of concentrate 
feeds and roughage. Medium-sized farms, 
for instance, gained the highest profit per 
kilogram of milk because they had the low-
est feed cost per kilogram.1 In Brazil, the 
profit per unit of output between small and 
medium dairy farms was the same on aver-
age, 0.04 reals per liter, while large dairy 
farms earned 0.05 reals per liter of positive 
profit (Table 5.4).
  Among the countries listed in Table 5.4, 
dairy farmers from Thailand gained a much 
higher  average  unit  profit  in  U.S.  dollars 
per liter of milk at all scales of production 
than did those from India and Brazil. This is 
probably because of the much higher level 
of protection of dairy farmers in Thailand. 
Thai dairy farmers who contract with coop-
eratives (88 percent of the total sample) are 
fairly independent from the cooperatives in 
managing their farms. The role of their co-
operatives is to provide them with services 
A PRofilE of THE suRvEy sAmPlEs      57
1When feed was produced by the farm household, the price of feed was estimated by calculating the weighted   
average of market prices paid by the farmers for various types of concentrates and other feed supplements fed 
to the animal (weights are the farm-specific quantities of feed used). Likewise, the price of fodder was derived 
by taking the weighted average of market prices paid by the farmers for different kinds of green fodder and dry 
fodder fed to cows and/or buffaloes (weights are the farm-specific quantities of fodder used).such  as  loans,  technical  consultation,  and 
buyers who could offer guaranteed prices.
Broilers and Eggs
As  in  the  case  of  broilers,  independent 
small-scale producers in India made more 
profits per unit than did large-scale indepen-
dents (without costing family labor), 13.1 
versus  10.9  rupees  per  bird,  respectively 
(Table 5.5). But small-scale contractors did 
much worse, 1 rupee per bird, compare to 
large-scale contractors, 3.2 rupees per bird 
(Table 5.5).
  Similarly,  in  the  Philippines,  indepen-
dent smallholders also had significantly (at 
the  5  percent  level  of  significance,  with   
s.e. = 1.5) higher profits per kilogram than 
did large-scale independents, 1.6 pesos per 
kg versus 1.1 pesos (Table 5.5). Contrary to 
the situation in India, small contract broiler 
farms in the Philippines had higher profits 
per unit than did large contract farms, 4.1 
pesos versus 4.0 pesos per bird, respectively 
(Table 5.5), and it is not surprising that the 
mean  difference  between  unit  profits  of 
small and large contractors was not signifi-
cant (with s.e. = 0.68).
  In  Thailand,  large  independent  broiler 
farms made higher profits, 2.5 baht per kg 
on average, than medium-sized independent 
farms, 1.6 baht per kg (Table 5.5). If family 
labor is not costed, fee-contract farmers in 
the  Thai  broiler  farm  sample  had  similar 
profits per unit for large- and small-scale 
farms, 1.6 versus 1.5 baht per kg, respec-
tively, but the medium-scale contractors had 
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Table 5.4    Average profit per liter of milk across farm sizes by country, 2002
  Farm size (number of liters of milk per day)
    
    (fewer 
    than  (10–20   (21–40   (41–80   (81–150   (more than
Profit  Region  10 liters)  liters)  liters)  liters)  liters)   150 liters)  All
India
Average profit without   North (rupees/liter)  2.21  1.53  1.10  0.88  0.63  0.38  1.47 
    family labor cost    West (rupees/liter)  3.09  1.72  1.09  0.71  0.48  0.33  1.27
  Pooled (rupees/liter)  2.45  1.62  1.09  0.71  0.48  0.38  1.37
  Pooled (US$/liter)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)
Average profit with   North (rupees/liter)  0.46  0.50  0.49  0.39  0.13  0.25  0.44 
    family labor cost    West (rupees/liter)  1.45  0.37  0.69  0.62  0.47  0.38  0.66
  Pooled (rupees/liter)  0.52  0.42  0.53  0.49  0.40  0.29  0.43
  Farm size (number of head)
  (1–20 head)  (21–50 head)  (more than 50 head)  All
Thailand
Average profit (baht/liter)    5.10  6.25  5.35  5.63
Average profit (US$/liter)    (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.13)
  (50 or fewer head)  (51–70 head)  (more than 70 head)
Brazil
Average profit (reals/liter)    0.04  0.04  0.05
Average profit (US$/liter)    (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003); Sharma et al. (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are average profit in US$ per liter. The currency conversion rates used are based on 2002 foreign exchange 
rates: for Thailand, US$1 = 42.96 baht; for India, US$1 = 48.61 rupees; for Brazil, US$1 = 2.92 reals.
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Table 5.5    Average profit per unit of output of liveweight broilers across farm sizes by 
country and production arrangement, 2002
  Farm size (number of birds)
  Small  Large/commercial
  (fewer than 10,000 birds)  (10,000 or more birds)
Profit  Unit  Independent  Contract  Independent  Contract
India
Average profit without   (rupees/bird)  13.13  1.03  10.93  3.16
    family labor cost  (US$/kg)a  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.03)
  (rupees/bird)    11.36      9.98
  (US$/kg)a    (0.10)      (0.09)
Average profit with   (rupees/bird)  12.40  0.04  10.80  3.01
    family labor cost  (US$/kg)  (0.11)  (0.003)  (0.09)  (0.03)
  (rupees/bird)    10.59      9.85
  (US$/kg)    (0.09)      (0.08)
  Farm size (number of birds)
  Small  Large
  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (more than 10,000 birds)
  Independent  Contract  Independent  Contract
Philippines
Average profit without   (pesos/kg)  1.59  4.05  1.07  3.96
    family labor cost  (US$/kg)  (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.08)
Average profit with   (pesos/kg)  1.34  3.98  1.06  3.95
    family labor cost  (US$/kg)  (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.08)
Brazil
Average profit  (reals/kg liveweight)    0.05      0.06
  (US$/kg liveweight)    (0.02)      (0.02)
  Small/medium-low  Medium-high/large
  Forward  Per-bird   Forward  Per-bird
  contract and   wage  contract and  wage
  independent  contract  independent  contract
Thailand
Average profit  (baht/kg liveweight)  0.71  1.35  2.48  1.51
  (US$/kg liveweight)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.04)
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Mehta et al. (2003); Poapon- 
gsakorn et al. (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are average profit in US$ per unit of output. The currency conversion rates used 
are based on 2002 foreign exchange rates: for Thailand, US$1 = 42.96 baht; for India, US$1 = 48.61 rupees; for 
Brazil, US$1 = 2.92 reals; for the Philippines, US$1 = 51.60 pesos.
aAssuming one bird weighs 2.4 kg liveweight.only 1.1 baht per kg profit (Table 5.5). The 
medium-scale farmers had to employ labor, 
which cut their unit profits relative to small-
holders, but they were not in the same cost 
structure as the larger farmers.
  In Brazil, small and large broiler farms 
had surprisingly similar average profits per 
unit, 0.05 real per kg versus 0.06 real (Table 
5.5); this may reflect the facts that almost all 
broiler production in Brazil is vertically inte-
grated, with the integrators supplying all the 
main inputs into production, giving produc-
ers access to better inputs and modern tech-
nology, and that integrators passed on some 
of their cost savings in dealing with larger 
producers to them. Smallholders maintained 
their unit profits close to the rates of large 
farmers by not costing family labor.
  In  Thailand,  smallholder  layer  farms 
had higher profits per egg than did large-
scale farms, although the mean difference 
was  not  statistically  significant  (with  s.e. 
=  0.03)  (Table  5.6).  Among  Indian  layer 
farmers,  smallholders  had  higher  profits 
per unit than larger farms if family labor is 
not costed, 0.23 rupees per egg versus 0.17 
rupees (Table 5.6). If family labor is costed 
at market rates, smallholders had net losses 
per egg, while large-scale farmers contin-
ued to have positive profits. In Brazil, both 
large and small layer farms had net losses 
in the survey year, although the large farms 
almost covered their costs at a net loss of 
0.01 real per egg, compared to a net loss 
for smallholders of 0.04 real per egg, not 
costing family labor (Table 5.6). One pos-
sible  explanation  for  this  outcome  is  the 
devaluation of the Brazilian real, which led 
to increases in prices of inputs that eventu-
ally affected farm profits (Camargo Barros 
et al. 2003).
Swine
It should be noted that profits were com- 
puted on the basis of what farmers had re-
ported at the time of the survey in 2002/3, 
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Table 5.6    Average profit per egg across farm sizes by country, 2002
  Farm size (number of birds)
  Small  Large
Profit  Unit  (fewer than 10,000 birds)  (10,000 or more birds)
India
Average profit without  (rupees per egg)  0.23  0.17
    family labor cost  (US$ per egg)  (0.005)  (0.003)
Average profit with   (rupees per egg)  –0.07  0.03
    family labor cost  (US$ per egg)  (–0.001)  (0.001) 
  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (more than 50,000 birds)
Thailand
Average profit  (baht per egg)  0.22  0.21
  (US$ per egg)  (0.005)  (0.005)
  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (more than 10,000 birds)
Brazil
Average profit  (reals per box)a  –1.32  –0.33
  (US$ per egg)  (–0.013)  (–0.003)
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Mehta et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are average profit in US$ per unit of output. The currency conversion rates used 
are based on 2002 foreign exchange rates: for India, US$1 = 48.61 rupees; for Thailand, US$1 = 42.96 baht; for 
Brazil, US$1 = 2.92 reals.
aOne box contains 360 eggs.when  some  farms  experienced  negative 
profits in a very tough price and cost envi-
ronment for poultry and swine producers, 
at  world  prices,  and  contracting  probably 
looked  relatively  good  from  the  farmers’ 
perspective. For example, in the case of Bra-
zil, large-scale swine farms (independents 
and contractors) lost an average of 0.15 real 
per kg of swine, while smallholders lost an 
average of 0.25 real per kg of swine (Table 
5.7). Camargo Barros et al. (2003) pointed 
out that the profit per kilogram of output 
was higher for integrated/cooperative pro-
ducers, 0.04 real per kg of output, than for 
independent producers, –0.40 real per kg of 
output. In fact, it was the integrated farms 
that  actually  made  positive  profits,  while 
independent farms and farms under coop-
eratives incurred losses, –0.20 real per kg of 
output for the latter.
  In  the  Philippines,  independent  small-
holder  swine  farmers  had  higher  profits 
per kilogram than large-scale independents, 
26.6 pesos per  kg  liveweight versus 19.8 
pesos (Table 5.7). Imputing the opportunity 
cost of family labor shows that large-scale 
farms had essentially similar profit rates per 
kilogram vis-à-vis when family labor was 
not costed. Adjusting for the cost of family 
labor affected smallholder farms’ profit per 
unit of output much more than that of large-
scale farms, as was expected, because the 
value of family labor input is by definition 
less the greater the output of the family.
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Table 5.7    Profit per kilogram liveweight of output of swine across farm sizes by country and production 
arrangement, 2002
  Farm size (number of head)
  Small  Medium/large
  (100 or fewer head)  (more than 100 head)
      Medium  Large   
      independent  independent
      (101–1,000  (more than 
Profit  Unit  Independent  Contract  head)  1,000 head)  Contract
Philippines
Average profit without   (pesos/kg)  26.60  2.08  19.61  19.83  2.33
    family labor cost  (US$/kg)  (0.52)  (0.04)  (0.38)  (0.38)  (0.05) 
Average profit with   (pesos/kg)  26.45  2.05  19.58  19.82  2.33
    family labor cost  (US$/kg)  (0.51)  (0.04)  (0.38)  (0.38)  (0.05)
  Small/medium-low  Medium-high/large
  (500 or fewer head)  (more than 500 head)
  Independent  Contract  Independent  Contract
Thailand
Average profit  (baht/kg)  11.9  11.5  15.4  1.7
  (US$/kg)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.36)  (0.04)
  Small/medium  Large
  (1,000 or fewer head)  (more than 1,000 head)
Brazil
Average profit  (reals/kg)  –0.25  –0.15
  (US$/kg)  (–0.09)  (–0.05)
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are average profit in US$ per unit of output. The currency conversion rates used are based on 2002 foreign   
exchange rates: for Thailand, US$1 = 42.96 baht; for Brazil, US$1 = 2.92 reals; for the Philippines, US$1 = 51.60 pesos.
Small
(100 or fewer head)  In  Thailand,  small-scale  independent 
swine farms had average profits of 11.5 baht 
per kg compared to 20.0 baht for medium-
sized  farms  and  15.4  baht  for  the  largest 
farms (Table 5.7). On the other hand, large 
contract swine producers in Thailand gener-
ated the lowest farm profits per kilogram   
of output. A relatively large scale of opera-




From the findings just reviewed, it can be 
concluded that smallholders typically have 
higher  profits  per  unit  of  output  than  do 
large-scale producers. This result was seen 
in the Philippines and India cases, where in-
dependent smallholders did better in terms 
of profits per kilogram of output than did 
large-scale  farmers;  also,  profits  per  unit 
made by smallholder contract farmers are 
higher than those made by large-scale con-
tract farms in the case of swine in Thailand 
and broilers in the Philippines. Therefore, 
smallholders will at least have a chance to 
compete  with  larger-scale  producers  be-
cause they have the ability to produce at a 
lower cost per unit of production or at least 
to achieve profits per unit of output similar 
to those of large-scale farmers, with or with- 
out costing family labor. This is a neces-
sary condition for smallholders to survive, 
because  it  means  that  large-scale  farms 
cannot easily drive smallholders out of the 
market by driving their returns below lev-
els that they can live on, given their small 
production  volume.  However,  it  is  not  a 
sufficient  condition  for  smallholders’  sur-
vival, because if large-scale producers are 
more efficient on average, they will be able 
to  eventually  drive  their  costs  down  and 
survive  on  smaller  unit  profits  but  larger 
volumes  of  sales.  Thus,  the  key  issue  is 
whether smallholders have the ability to use 
their farm resources more efficiently than 
large-scale producers. This comparison of 
relative profit efficiency is discussed in the 
econometric estimates of Chapter 7.
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The Impact of Scaling-Up of Livestock 
Production on the Environment
A 
major problem associated with increased livestock production is that it also results in 
an increased amount of manure and dead animals during the grow-out period, which 
may result in environmental problems if these byproducts of the production process 
are improperly used or disposed of.
  As a fertilizer, manure is a valuable source of nitrogen, phosphorus, and organic mate-
rial, and it improves soil structure and water retention on leached tropical soils. It can be a 
source of positive externalities in some cases. However, too much of a good thing can have 
a negative effect as the amount of manure applied increases. Furthermore, some soils benefit 
less than others. Nutrients from animal byproducts are harmful when the excess nitrogen and/ 
or phosphorus in them is not taken up by plants and leaches into the groundwater or con-
taminates surface water, and it can also lead to bacterial contamination of surface water and 
groundwater.
  Water pollution may occur if nutrients from manure enter the water table because they are 
improperly applied to fields or disposed of, or it may be associated with improper disposition 
of dead animals that consequently release nutrients into the groundwater as they decompose. 
Air pollution may result as the nitrogen in manure is converted to ammonium or through the 
incineration of dead animals. Land degradation may occur if the carrying capacity of animals 
is too high, leading to overgrazing in the case of ruminants, or if the application of nutrients 
over a number of years causes buildup of nitrogen, phosphorus, and salt, resulting in reduced 
crop yields.
  Disposal of dead animals is also a common environmental issue for monogastric live-
stock production. Normal mortality for broilers is 5 percent over the production cycle; under 
extreme conditions, such as great heat or an epidemic, it can be as high as 25 percent a day. 
Mortality rates per cycle for sows under developing country conditions are 5 percent, for pre-
weaning piglets 19 percent, for layers 8 percent, and for dairy cows 4 percent. In the countries 
studied, these dead animals are buried, incinerated, or rendered or go into a secondary food 
consumption market. The incineration process itself can result in air pollution, and the burial 
process results in the same problems and/or benefits as manure.
  The problems just outlined are not necessarily scale-specific. In theory, they arise from the 
concentration of animals in one place, regardless of how many ownership units are involved. 
It is possible that 1,000 animals belonging to 100 smallholders could create the same physical 
problems as the same number of animals belonging to one owner.
  Environmental problems may occur in livestock production if producers follow at least 
one of the following practices: (1) directly dump manure, slurry, or processing water from 
livestock production into waterways; (2) stockpile undesirable byproducts in such a way that, 
63as the nutrients go through nutrient cycles, 
components volatize into the air;1 (3) fail 
to  credit  the  nutrient  content  in  this  or-
ganic source and thus overapply it as a soil 
amendment  in  conjunction  with  chemical 
fertilizers;2 (4) apply manure at the wrong 
time of the growing season; (5) apply ma-
nure in areas where the hydrogeomorphic 
profile is such that it is difficult to prevent 
run-off (areas with high water tables, sandy 
soils, or sloping terrain); (6) base land ap-
plications  solely  on  the  nitrogen  require-
ments  of  the  crop,  which  may  result  in 
overapplication of phosphorus (also found 
in manures); (7) use inadequate technology 
or  otherwise  fail  to  address  hazards  until 
problems arise due to storms and run-off; or 
(8) choose inappropriate methods of dispos-
ing of the carcasses of dead animals.
Environmental Externalities 
and the Rationale for 
Government Intervention
As  discussed  in  Chapter  1,  externalities 
occur when an economic agent reaps a ben-
efit from an activity whose cost is born in 
part by others, but they are not compensated 
for  this.  Agents  “capture”  benefits  from 
negative externalities if they receive a ben-
efit (for instance, livestock sales) but some-
one else bears part of the cost of securing 
that benefit (in the form of odors, flies, pol-
luted water, and so on) and is not compen-
sated for that cost. Agents “internalize” at 
least some of these negative externalities to 
the extent that they themselves suffer from 
these ills, and also if they incur expenses to 
compensate those who bear the cost or to 
prevent the bad side effects. If farms of dif-
ferent sizes capture benefits from negative 
externalities  that  differ  per  unit  of  output 
across farms, those with larger capture per 
unit of output gain a cost advantage relative 
to  those  who  do  not.  If  such  differences 
vary systematically by scale, environmental 
externalities  could  provide  an  incentive 
for  scale-up,  or  might  in  fact  slow  down 
scaling-up, depending on how they go.
  There are four potential sources of neg- 
ative  environmental  externalities  in  live-
stock  production  and  processing  that  will 
cause  problems  over  time  in  the  absence 
of effective polices and institutions to deal 
with them. The first source of externalities 
has to do with manure. In the study coun-
tries, manure is traditionally spread directly 
on farmland as a nutrient source and soil   
enhancer, used as fish food, or used as a 
source of fuel. Currently, none of the stud-
ied  countries  has  regulations  requiring  or 
otherwise  regulating  the  application  of   
manures,  but  Brazil,  the  Philippines,  and 
Thailand do require swine operations (par-
ticularly large-scale operations) to have pro- 
duction  permits.  Extension  agents  in  the 
survey  areas  of  these  three  countries  re-
ported nutrient loading.
  The second source of externalities con-
cerns  the  disposal  of  dead  animals.  Cur-
rently,  none  of  the  study  countries  has 
regulations regarding dead animal disposal 
practices. A third source of externalities is 
embedded in the release of ammonia, which 
in zones of high animal density can be a 
source of air pollution, producing acid rain 
and/or odor problems. Both the Thai and 
Brazilian  country  studies  report  that  farm 
neighbors have complained about odors; in 
Thailand,  producers  were  forced  to  com-
pensate  neighbors  for  the  smell  (Poapon- 
gsakorn et al. 2003).
  A fourth externality has to do with the 
discharge  of  wastewater  from  processing 
plants.  Brazil,  the  Philippines,  and  Thai- 
land have regulations concerning disposal 
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1For instance, some of the nitrogen in uncovered manure would volatize into the air as it went through the ni-
trogen cycle.
2In all the countries covered in this study, the animal manures are considered “organic,” thus safe, and are applied 
to crops on top of chemical fertilizers, particularly in areas where the nutrients are not credited.of this sludge, which in effect attempt to   
force companies to internalize this negative 
externality.
  In principle, governments will improve 
the social good by intervening when there 
are externalities or imperfect information to 
better equate social costs and benefits. In-
tervention requires a clear definition of the 
property rights associated with the market 
failure being corrected. The economic ra-
tionale behind policy intervention would be 
to get private individuals to incorporate the 
full  costs  (including  environmental  costs) 
of  production  back  into  their  decision- 
making process. Brazil, the Philippines, and 
Thailand have implemented environmental 
regulations,  which  will  be  discussed  later 
in  this  chapter  concerning  livestock,  but 
enforcement remains the problem.
  Nevertheless, there are a variety of rea-
sons why a government may have difficulty 
intervening  or  controlling  livestock  pollu-
tion.  First,  economic  reasons  may  not  be 
paramount in policymaking.3 If this is the 
case, it could mean either that powerful large 
firms get away with more than small ones   
or, conversely, that it is more appealing to 
the government to go after one or two large 
farms  while  leaving  problems  created  by 
tens of thousands of small ones untouched.
  Second, government regulators also have 
to deal with information and attribution is-
sues. There is always the non-point-source 
problem: regulators may not be able to de- 
termine  who  caused  a  specific  problem. 
Furthermore,  although  a  given  livestock 
farm  may  be  the  source  of  the  nutrients 
involved in pollution, regulators may have 
limited  control  over  what  happens  once 
the manure leaves the farm, say, for sale to 
another farmer. All four of the country stud-
ies indicate that there is an active market 
for poultry manure. Yet none of the four 
countries  has  regulations  concerning  the 
spreading of manures on land.
  Government  failure  to  intervene  may 
also have to do with the changing structure 
of the livestock industry and the fact that 
production systems are increasingly becom-
ing integrated across farms. Specifically, as 
there has been a move toward specialized 
farms in both crop and animal production, 
there have also been changes in the nutri-
ent balances of agricultural regions, soils, 
and individual farms. Specialization across 
crops on the one hand, and across livestock 
on the other, concentrates soil nutrients and 
increases  feed  and  transportation  costs.  It 
also leads to high ratios of livestock per unit 
of land in certain areas, causing nutrients   
coming from animal waste to be applied at 
higher rates than required by crops. Stoyke 
and  Waibel  (1994)  suggest  that  growth 
of  this  type  of  specialized  farm  in  many 
countries  was  facilitated  by  the  absence 
of regulation with regard to the number of 
animals per unit of farm area, rather liberal 
animal protection laws, and the availability 
of low-price imported feed stuffs.
  The splitting of the custody of animals 
from ownership, as in the case of contract 
farming,  complicates  the  issue  of  finding 
one party responsible for pollution. Brazil-
ian swine integrators, who have contracts 
with a large number of small producers, are 
starting to recognize the potential legal lia- 
bility. They have written demands for inter- 
nalizing  potential  negative  environmental   
externalities into their contracts with grow-
ers. These contracts include stipulations as   
to the adequate handling of animal waste. 
All the integrated farmers have to go through 
an  environmental  authorization  process   
led by the integrator. The costs involved in 
this process are discounted from the pay-
ments to growers. Thus, growers bear the 
costs,  but  integrators  make  the  decisions 
while potentially limiting their own liability 
for pollution created in the production of the 
animals they market. This opens scope for 
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3Because of the nonpoint nature of pollution created by poor animal waste management, the cost of monitoring 
can be excessive if the government implements specific control measures for each farm.new externalities that benefit integrators at 
the expense of growers. In contract farming, 
integrators tend to be the ones that provide 
the inputs into production to the growers, 
and  they  are  interested  only  in  removing 
the live animal. Manure and dead animals 
tend to be left for the producer to dispose of 
(properly or not). The nutrients from these 
products can be viewed as either a positive 
(that  is,  as  compost  for  the  contractor’s 
farm) or a negative externality, depending 
on how they are disposed of. In countries 
where  the  responsibility  for  these  outputs 
is being questioned due to increased envi-
ronmental  regulations,  integrators  are  be-
ginning to write that responsibility into the 
contracts of their growers.
  Increasingly,  it  is  being  recognized 
that  there  are  economies  of  scale  associ- 
ated  with  control  options.  Schwart,  Holt,  and 
Outlaw  (1995)  have  noted  that  there  are 
economies  of  size  not  only  in  production 
technologies, but also in manure manage-
ment,  which  reinforces  the  trend  toward 
large production units. There are high start- 
up  costs  to  build  some  types  of  manure 
storage systems and dead animal disposal 
systems. The marginal cost for extra pol- 
lution control is lower as producers increase 
in  size.  Thus,  in  theory,  large  producers 
have an advantage over smallholders in im-
plementing animal waste control measures 
due to the number of animals they raise.
  Moreover,  the  costs  of  improved  ma-
nure  management  may  fall  disproportion-
ately on broiler and dairy producers, who 
tend  to  concentrate  in  areas  classified  as   
environmentally vulnerable (Westenbarger 
and  Letson  1995).4  Producers  in  concen-
trated  areas  tend  to  have  limited  land  on 
which to dispose of the waste, because often 
the land has become saturated with nitrogen 
and phosphorus over the years, while in less 
concentrated areas, the land is not saturated. 
Producers are often located in concentrated 
areas  close  to  the  urban  demand  centers. 
Urban areas are already the source of many 
nonagricultural  forms  of  pollution.  Thus, 
production sites near urban areas have often 
become environmentally fragile over time. 
Further, integrators often prefer their con-
tract growers to be concentrated to save on 
logistic costs, which further places a burden 
on some of these already environmentally 
fragile areas.
Policies and Institutional 




Countries that appear to be having problems 
have implemented policies such as (1) li-
censing policies that restrict locations where 
certain  amounts  of  pollution  may  be  dis-
charged, (2) clean water and air legislation, 
(3) regulations on disposal of poultry by- 
products, (4) limits on the number of ani-
mals  per  area,  and  (5)  policies  on  the   
improvement of markets for poultry waste. 
Although  many  are  just  beginning  to  be 
implemented, it seems likely that most of 
them  will  retard  overall  growth  in  output 
as production becomes more expensive. If 
enforcement differs by scale of farm, it will 
also affect the size distribution of farms. If 
enforcement differs by locality, it will also 
shift production among locations.
  To prevent water quality problems from 
rapidly growing livestock production, many 
countries have developed regulations con-
66      CHAPTER 6
4Fallert, Weimar, and Crawford (1993) have shown that in the United States there are economies of size in 
waste management. According to estimates done by Outlaw et al. (1993), the cost to comply with waste man-
agement rules would be $400 per cow from a 50-head farm, compared to $288 per cow from a 175-head farm. 
Furthermore, the results from the study indicated that there could be a restructuring of the industry in response 
to proposed standards for confined feeding operations developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Regional Office 6. The study also noted that although larger dairies would be able to assume the extra capital 
costs, smaller producers would require several years to recover their investments.cerning  the  application  of  either  nitrogen 
or  phosphorus.  The  premise  behind  this 
trend is that the rate of animal waste applied 
should  not  provide  more  plant-available   
nitrogen  than  is  required  by  the  crop  in 
question in order to avoid the contamination 
of  groundwater  by  nitrates  (NO3).  Studies 
have indicated that nitrate and phosphorus 
contamination in groundwater in areas with 
high animal densities is due to the unfavor-
able  ratios  of  nitrogen  to  phosphorus  in 
animal wastes relative to the uptake of these 
nutrients by crops. This imbalance results   
in  the  excessive  phosphorus  in  the  soil.   
An  environmental  problem  will  develop   
if there is a transport process that redistrib-
utes  phosphorus  that  originated  in  animal 
waste to a surface water body sensitive to 
eutrophication.
  Various rules and regulations have been 
developed in the different study countries to 
limit potential environmental problems from 
livestock. Brazil, the Philippines, and Thai-
land  have  the  most  comprehensive  set  of 
rules of the four countries (discussed in the 
following  subsections).  India  has  minimal 
environmental rules regarding livestock.
Thailand
In  Thailand,  the  National  Environment 
Quality Act (NEQA) was first enacted in 
1969 as a comprehensive package for insti-
tutionalization of environmental policy and 
planning. The act was amended in 1992 as 
the Enhancement and Conservation of Na-
tional Environmental Quality Act. Follow-
ing passage of the NEQA, the Thai cabinet 
made a resolution in 1996 to adopt the “Pol-
icy  and  Plan  for  National  Environmental 
Quality Preservation and Promotion (1997– 
2016)” (PEQP). Under PEQP, the line min-
istries  and  every  province  have  to  come 
up with their own respective action plans. 
PEQP has produced yet another action plan 
called the Environmental Quality Manage-
ment Action Plan, which treated water pol-
lution as its top priority. Specifically, water 
quality standards were set for two periods, 
2001 and 2006, for the Chao Phraya River 
and the Tha Chin River. Regulations were 
announced in February 2001 with respect 
to the dumping of waste into watercourses, 
including effluent standards for pig farms. 
The  new  standards  became  effective  on 
February 24, 2002. Thus far, the standards 
have been monitored and enforced only on 
large- and medium-sized farms.
Brazil
A series of strict laws at both the federal 
and state levels have been passed in Brazil 
since 1965 to aid in the general protection 
of the environment, and they all have rami-
fications for the livestock sector, especially 
large-scale enterprises (Camargo Barros et 
al. 2003). The original and most significant 
is Law 4771 on forest management, passed 
in 1965 and amended in 1989 and 1996. It 
protects areas around rivers, lakes, springs, 
and dams as well as any area surrounding 
watercourses.
  A series of other measures on water use 
and protection have also been passed. As 
of this writing, environmental legislation is 
being discussed in the Brazilian congress. 
The River Basins Committee, whose mem-
bers  are  municipalities,  nongovernmental 
organizations, industries, farmers, and pub-
lic offices, is an instrument created by the 
federal government (now being adopted by 
state governments) that gives small produc-
ers access to environmental discussions. Its 
function is to discuss and make decisions 
about subjects related to the management of 
water resources in one or more river basins. 
Financial  institutions  have  also  become 
involved  in  environmental  issues  through 
the implementation of credit and financing 
policies for the agricultural and urban zones. 
The Environment Conservation and Control 
Financing  Program—“FNE  Green,”  im-
plemented  through  state-run  development 
banks for the benefit of rural industry and 
agroindustries  (persons  and  companies),   
cooperatives, and associations—has the ob-
jective  of  promoting  the  development  of 
productive environmental activities and the 
financing of conservation measures.
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Environmental  regulations  issued  periodi-
cally from 1976 to 2001 to control pollu- 
tion are quite stringent in the Philippines. A 
1978 law is in fact patterned after the U.S. 
Environmental  Impact  Statement  System 
(Costales et al. 2003). Environmental laws 
on  pollution  in  the  Philippines  originally 
targeted  the  regulation  of  pollution  from 
heavy and light manufacturing and assem- 
bly  industries.  These  standards  were  ini-
tially applied only to commercial livestock 
farms with more than 1,000 animals in their 
inventory (Catelo 2002). However, because 
smallholders constitute close to 80 percent 
of  hog  inventories  and  because  backyard 
production in the major producing towns, 
provinces, and regions is also densely con-
figured,  the  issue  of  pollution  from  these 
operations has since been raised. The ratio-
nale is that these farms must create as much 
potential pollution per animal as commer-
cial farms, and they are now concentrated 
in commercial densities in periurban areas. 
If  this  is  so,  the  thinking  goes,  they  too 
must be regulated. The question of whether 
large-scale farms pollute more than small-
scale farms is a pressing policy issue for the 
Philippines  that  has  yet  to  be  empirically 
resolved.
Enforcement Problems  
and Differential Impacts  
of Enforcement on the  
Scale of Production
There was a lack of information on enforce-
ment issues from India at the time of the 
study;  hence,  only  enforcement  problems 
from Brazil, Thailand, and the Philippines 
are discussed here.
Thailand
In  Thailand,  most  attention  has  been  paid  to 
large swine farms, in terms of both regula-
tion and enforcement. All pig farms with 
more than 500 sows have invested in water 
treatment, while nearly 13 percent of small-
scale farms have no sewage treatment sys-
tem at all (Poapongsakorn et al. 2003). In 
terms  of  treatment  techniques  employed 
by farms of different sizes, all of the large-
scale farms (with 5,000 pigs or more) use 
a pond system or a solid-liquid system to 
treat their sewage. Medium-scale and small-
scale farms tend to use a single reception 
pond; this is not very effective in treating 
the sewage, because the water that is spilled 
over to the drainage channel is still much 
polluted. Mainly small and medium farms 
use  biogas  digesters.  It  is  probable  that 
many large farms do not find this technique 
cost-effective, because many are new farms 
settled in land-ample areas where they can 
make do with pond systems.
  Although a number of rules and regu-
lations  on  wastewater  management  have 
been developed in Thailand and some in-
centives are offered to livestock farms for 
investing  in  waste  treatment  technology, 
there has been a lack of enforcement. The 
Department of Livestock and Development 
(DLD) is one of the inspection offices and 
is expected to be a key institution to enforce 
the  environmental  protection  law.  Ironi-
cally, DLD’s main job is extension, and it 
serves as a support unit for livestock farm-
ers. Its acting as an inspection office might 
cause conflicts between the department and 
farmers; this would lead to difficulties in 
working with farm owners. Consequently, 
DLD may not be able to act efficiently as 
an inspection agency. Thus, more effective 
enforcement and implementation of exist-
ing laws are needed to achieve responsible 
environmental management.
Brazil
While applicable laws exist in Brazil, there 
are problems with the enforcement of these 
laws  due  to  the  limited  number  of  personnel 
relative to the number of farms and the lack 
of  agreement  from  farmers  with  govern-
ment policies in this area. In a 2001 survey 
of 3,505 agricultural producers, 76 percent 
considered environmental issues a problem 
that must be managed with the application   
of  technical  regulations,  scientific  knowl-
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nized the importance of promoting environ-
mental  conservation,  observing,  however, 
that the procedures must be based on tech-
nical knowledge. Yet only 5 percent of the 
producers approved the government’s cur-
rent environmental plan.
  As  the  livestock  sector  has  become 
more  industrialized,  livestock  farms  have 
tended  not  only  to  be  larger  in  size,  but 
also to be run more as big businesses. As 
such, they tend to be under closer scrutiny 
by national, state, and local authorities than 
are  farms  owned  by  smallholders.  More-
over, there may be a policy bias in terms 
of enforcing regulations against large firms 
first, in contrast with the standard “political 
economy” view that the rich get away with 
more than the poor.
The Philippines
The  Philippines  has  begun  to  recognize 
the  growing  problem  of  pollution  from 
smallholder livestock. Regulatory agencies 
that have cracked down on large farms in 
the past have begun contemplating issuing 
regulations on pig waste disposal by small 
farms. One such agency in Southern Luzon 
is the Laguna Lake Development Authority 
(LLDA) in the high-density Metro Manila 
livestock zone. In addition to spearheading 
the management of the water resources of 
the Laguna de Bay, the largest freshwater 
lake in the country, the LLDA also func-
tions as a special environmental authority. 
As  such,  it  has  regulatory  and  juridical 
functions  in  the  enforcement  of  environ-
mental laws and the issuance of penalties 
on firms violating environmental standards 
for the lake. Very recently the LLDA issued 
Resolution 169 approving policy guidelines 
governing the operation of backyard/small-
scale hog farms in the Laguna Lake region.
Capture of Environmental 
Externalities
Though  the  information  already  given  is 
of interest, it tells of little difference across 
size of farms in their ability to internalize 
the  environmental  externality  associated 
with  manure  and  dead  animal  disposal. 
Thus, it does little to aid us in testing Hy-
pothesis 3, Small farmers expend a greater 
amount  of  effort/investment  in  abatement 
of negative environmental externalities per 
unit of output than do large farmers, and in 
understanding why this may be the case.
  To look at this issue in detail, two mea-
sures are used: (1) the ability of different-
sized  farms  to  assimilate  all  the  nutrients 
produced on-farm in terms of the estimated 
mass balance of nutrients produced from the 
manure based on the number of animals and 
the acreage across different-sized farms and 
(2) expenditure differences across different-
sized  farms  to  mitigated  negative  envi-
ronmental  effects  from  manure  and  dead 
animal disposal. Calculations are made of 
the relative contributions of large and small 
farms  to  excess  nutrient  balances  in  the 
study countries. Large and small farms are 
also compared with respect to the estimated 
money  value  of  their  efforts  to  mitigate 
negative environmental externalities using 
the approach laid out in Chapter 3. These 
two methods provide both a direct and an 
indirect approach to the question of which 
pollute more per unit of livestock output in 
the study countries: large or small farms.
Evidence on the Impact of 
Increasingly More Concentrated 
Livestock Production on Excess 
Mass Balances of Nutrients
As illustrated in Chapter 2, most livestock 
production in the study countries is concen-
trated in and around major cities or areas 
otherwise  favored  by  infrastructure.  This 
concentration can lead to massive surpluses 
of nutrients (nitrogen, phosphate, and potas-
sium) in these areas, causing pollution and 
eutrophication of surface water and ground-
water (see http://www.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/ 
LEAD/X6170E/x6170e16.htm for an illus- 
tration  of  nitrogen  and  phosphorus  loads   
in Asia in 2002). The emission of green-
house  (methane,  nitrous  oxide)  and  other 
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of pollution.
  Disposal practices for manure and dead 
animals directly affect nutrient balances and 
also vary across scales of operation. Tradi-
tionally,  byproducts  of  livestock  produc-
tion in the four countries studied, as found 
through  the  surveys,  have  been  disposed 
of by (1) applying them to land to improve   
the physical properties of the soil for plants, 
(2)  using  them  as  animal  feed  (for  other   
animals,  including  fish  and  oysters),  (3) 
using them to create energy (directly burn-
ing them for heat or the creation of methane 
gas),  (4)  using  them  as  a  cement  lining   
for floors, (6) dumped them into rivers, (7) 
burying  them,  (8)  incinerating  them,  and   
(9) using them for brick-making. Though   
all approaches are used, the most common 
are land application, energy production, and 
dumping.
  Swine production is probably the least 
environmentally  friendly  form  of  live- 
stock production of the types of production 
looked at in this study. As a result, countries 
such as Brazil, the Philippines, and Thai-
land have set regulations to control sewage 
from these operations. Brazil and Thailand 
are also providing funds to aid farmers in 
protecting the environment. For poultry, in-
dustrialization is less obviously an environ-
mental problem. This is partly because, in 
all the study countries, chicken manure can 
be sold. Therefore, the increased volumes 
of manure produced by the large farms have 
not created the same absorption problem as 
in swine production.
  In  Thailand,  manure  coming  from 
poultry  farms  goes  into  a  holding  pond, 
cesspool, or biodigester or is dried. It may 
then either be sold to a middleman or  used 
on  a  farm  as  a  fertilizer  or  as  fish  food. 
Dead animals are used either on-farm or sold 
to a secondary market for food or human 
consumption.
  In India, broiler manure tends to be re-
moved from animal housing by either fam-
ily or hired labor. It is then piled in either an 
open or a closed shed or used immediately. 
If it is used on-farm, it is used primarily 
for organic fertilizer. If it is not used on-
farm, most likely it will be sold for organic 
fertilizer, brick-making, fuel, or mushroom   
substrate,  or  it  may  be  dumped.  Similar 
practices exist in other study countries, but 
usually in these countries broiler manure is 
valued as fertilizer.
  In  Brazil,  layer  manure  is  either  used 
on-farm or sold to manure trades. Dead ani-
mals are put into a cess pool, composted, or 
buried. In the Philippines, manure cleaned 
out of the houses may go into an open pit or 
be laid on the ground. After that, it will be 
either used on-farm or sold to the market. 
Dead piglets tend to be buried. Other coun-
tries may have lagoons for their manure, use 
biodigesters, or feed it to fish.
  Under these disposal practices, the value 
of  manure  can  vary  from  a  net  financial 
cost to the farm when the material is hauled 
away and destroyed to a valuable product 
of the farm when it is sold for use on fruits 
and vegetables. Various entrepreneurs have 
developed ways to add value and improve 
manure  use,  such  as  marketing  it  as  an 
enhanced fertilizer, an animal feed, or fuel. 
The success of the marketing options de-
pends on the types of crops using the ma-
nure, the distance from the farm that needs 
it, and the willingness of the buyer to use 
the manure as a product.
  The potential buyers of manure are other 
farmers (for fruit, vegetable, and field crops, 
particularly for organic farming), commer-
cial  nurseries,  home  and  garden  centers, 
greenhouses, and even homeowners. In most 
cases, the market for manure is very local 
because of the cost of transportation. Un- 
desirable  characteristics  associated  with   
raw manure are being too wet, lacking uni- 
formity,  containing  too  many  feathers,   
possibly containing toxic chemicals, often 
being lumpy, containing weed seeds, yield-
ing an unpredictable response, often having 
the wrong balance of nutrients, not always 
being available when needed, providing a 
good  breeding  ground  for  flies,  possibly 
burning the crops, and being smelly.
70      CHAPTER 6  Because ruminants are able to use the 
nonprotein  nitrogen  in  poultry  and  swine 
wastes,  the  latter  can  also  be  used  as  a 
supplement feed for certain animals. Fur-
thermore, both Thailand and India reported 
the use of some manures as fish feed. The 
acceptability  of  the  use  of  manure  and 
dead animals as feed additives is dwindling 
worldwide because of concern about bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or “mad 
cow”  disease.  Although  Brazil  previously 
used meat and bone meal as feed additives, 
it  has  stopped  doing  this  since  both  the   
E.U. and the United States have banned im-
ports  from  countries  permitting  ruminant-
to-ruminant  feed  practices.  Even  use  in 
feeds for nonruminants has ceased because 
of the danger that Brazil will be decertified 
as an exporter.
  Another  potential  market  for  manure 
is  the  production  of  methane  through  an-
aerobic digestion. It can be derived directly 
through a biological process such as com-
bustion or indirectly through generation of 
biogas, which is a mixture of methane and 
carbon dioxide. Most methane produced has 
been burned for heat or used as a fuel for in-
ternal combustion engines. The equipment 
used for producing methane is not simple 
and is fairly expensive, posing a problem 
for the economic feasibility of biogas pro-
duction. The major factors in the high costs 
of these methane-producing structures are 
the  high  cost  of  properly  designed  struc-
tures,  mixing  equipment,  and  gas-control 
devices; the precautions necessary to avoid 
explosions; and the need to store methane 
and the digested liquid manure.
  The generation of biogas has multiple 
benefits besides the production of a com-
bustible fuel. For instance, byproducts from 
sludge of a digester that uses manure can be 
used as a feed supplement, while the liquid 
effluent can support fish growth and make 
aquaculture possible. The economic feasi-
bility  of  methane  production  is  increased 
when the options for use of the residues are 
also taken into account. The problem with 
this is that after methane has been gener-
ated, one still has to get rid of the excess 
nitrogen and phosphorus.
  Because of the expense of biogas gener- 
ation,  Thailand  has  started  programs  that 
provide partial funding for construction of 
waste treatment systems such as biogas di-
gesters and multilevel ponds. The amounts 
provided  by  the  Thai  government  for  in-
stalling wastewater treatment systems range 
from 20,000 to more than 150,000 baht per 
farm, approximately 40–60 percent of the 
total  installation  cost.5  The  Thai  govern- 
ment intends to subsidize up to 38 percent 
of the construction cost, provide low-cost   
loans, and facilitate loan approval for farms.
  Farms with insufficient land for spread-
ing manure or facilities for otherwise reduc- 
ing it can still improve mass nutrient bal-
ances  through  sales  of  manure  to  others. 
Presumably  there  is  a  market  for  manure 
only because of its value as a fertilizer or 
fuel, so manure sales and transport off the 
farm are generally good signs for manage-
ment of mass balances.
Current Pathways for Use  
of Nutrients from Manure  
and Dead Animals
Figures 6.1–6.3 summarize the various path- 
ways for nutrient management for poultry, 
swine, and dairy operations currently used 
by the sample farmers in the four countries. 
Poultry operations tend to use the manure   
for either crops or fish feed, and dead ani- 
mals  tend  to  be  buried,  incinerated,  con-
sumed,  or  used  as  fish  feed.  After  it  is 
cleaned out of bird enclosures, poultry ma- 
nure in most of the study countries tends to 
be dried and sold to be used on crops or as 
fish feed in the Asian countries. If it is not 
sold, it remains on the livestock farm and 
is used for the same purposes. The use of 
swine manure differs according to whether 
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figure 6.1    Pathways for disposal of poultry manure and dead birds





























figure 6.2    Pathways for disposal of swine manure and dead piglets
Source: Poapongsakorn et al. (2003).
72      CHAPTER 6it is in wet or dry form. Wet manure may 
be used to create household and farm en-
ergy, such as biogas for cooking or power 
for farm use, as in Thailand. Dry manure 
is either applied to fields as a fertilizer or 
used as a feed in fish farming in the Asian 
countries studied. In Brazil, though the use 
of manure as fish food has been reported in 
the past, it currently is not used due to the 
impression  that  it  results  in  a  lower  feed 
conversion  than  palletized  feed.  The  ma-
nure and wastewater created on dairy farms 
will typically be left on the grass where it 
falls, given to employees, or dried. If dried, 
it  may  be  sold  to  a  neighbor,  put  on  the 
farmers’ own land, or burned for fuel.
  Dead animals of all types of livestock in 
India, the Philippines, and Thailand may be 
sold to a secondary market for either human 
or animal consumption, given away, buried, 
or incinerated. The use of dead animals is 
not  reported  in  Brazil,  which  has  banned 
their use for fear of BSE and potentially lost 
markets in countries that prohibit the use of 
rendered products.
Manure Disposal for  
Survey Households
Tables 6.1–6.4 summarize how households 
in the study countries chose to dispose of 
the manure generated from their livestock 
operations.  For  broiler  manure,  the  majority   
of  the  households  chose  to  get  rid  of  it 
through the market. A slightly lower per-
centage of small-scale producers across the 
households  surveyed  in  all  the  countries 
sold the broiler and layer manure, mainly 
because it appears that they were using it on 
their own farms. This is not unexpected, be-
cause many small-scale farmers are mixed-
product farmers and can readily use the ma- 
nure as an organic fertilizer.
  In India, 79 percent of the small-scale 
broiler  producers  and  95  percent  of  the 
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figure 6.3    Pathways for disposal of dairy manure and dead animals
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Table 6.2    distribution of farmers by manure disposal methods, egg production,  
2003 (percent)
    Large (more than 10,000 birds)
  Thailandb
            10,001–  More than
Disposal method  Brazil  Indiaa  Thailandb  Brazil  Indiaa  20,000  20,000
On farm    10      10  9  91
   Fish farm      41
    Crops      20
    Other      29
Off farm
    Sold  67  90  37  72  90  63  4
    Gifted
    Disposed
    Dumped
Used both on farm and off  33    7  28    28  13
Total  100  100  134  100  100  100  108
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Mehta et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn 
et al. (2003); Sharma et al. (2003).
aFor India, the definition of the small (large) category is fewer than 10,000 birds (10,000 birds or more).
bThai farms have multiple responses, so percentages exceed 100 percent.
  Small
  (10,000 or fewer birds)
large-scale  producers  sold  manure  in  the 
marketplace. Most of the manure was piled 
in either open sheds or closed sheds. When 
used on-farm, poultry manure was used pri- 
marily as an organic fertilizer. When used 
off-farm, poultry manure was used as a fer- 
tilizer or for making building bricks, fuel 
bricks, or mushroom substrate.
  In  the  Philippines,  the  most  common 
scenario  among  the  farms  surveyed  was 
disposal of manure by selling it to chicken 
manure traders, spreading it on their own 
farms, or some combination of both. Other 
observed means of disposing of waste were 
containing the manure in closed pits, throw-
ing it into a river or canal, or just leaving 
this  byproduct  in  piles  on  the  ground  to   
decompose. In the Philippines, a larger per-
centage of the contract farming smallhold-
ers sold the manure than did the indepen-
dents (Table 6.5). This may reflect that they 
tend to have less land per animal than do 
independents, and they are also less likely to 
be cropping. If they did, they might not be 
selling the manure but might be using it as a 
source of nutrients for growing feed.
  In Thailand, a high percentage of larger-
size egg producers sold their manure than 
did smaller operators. This probably reflects 
the fact that the larger farms have grown 
quite large relative to the limited land they 
have for disposal of the manure. For instance, 
91 percent of the large-scale layer opera-
tions in Thailand sold manure, compared to 
only around 30 percent of the small-scale 
producers.
  In Brazil, a lower share of manure was 
sold off-farm than in the Asian cases, and 
the price of manure differed by state. Table 
6.6 shows that in the south, an area with 
highly concentrated poultry and swine oper-
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Table 6.4    distribution of farmers by manure disposal methods, milk production, 2003 (percent)
                
              More  More  More
  50 or            than  than  than
  fewer  1–4  1–20  51–70  5–10  21–30  70  10  50 
Disposal method  Brazil  India  Thailand  Brazil  India  Thailand  Brazil  India  Thailand  India
On farm
    Fertilize crops      13      7      16
    Fertilize grasslands      13      31      37
    Used as fertilizer for both  100    3  100    2  100    5
Off farm
    Sold      29      24      5
    Gifted      3      2      5
    Sold and gifted            2
Used both on farm and off      31      27      32
    Used as fertilizer for both    30      55      68    84
    Used as fuel    70      45      32    16
Noneconomic use
No response      8      5
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003); Sharma et al. (2003).






Table 6.5    manure sales from broiler production in the Philippines, 2003
  Smallholder  Commercial
  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (more than 10,000 birds)
  Independent  Contract  Independent  Contract
Variable  (N = 13)  (N = 21)  (N = 17)  (N = 30)
Manure sales (percent)  41.0  67.7  73.9  96.7
Volume of manure (bags)  83  289  38.1  4.24
Value of manure
    Pesos/batch  1,293  4,362  3,538  4,657
    Pesos/100 kg output  86  23  9  14
Source: Costales et al. (2003).abundance.  In  the  center-west  and  Minas 
Gerais, the value of manure is almost 10 
times the price in Rio Grande do Sul, an 
area with heavy concentrations of poultry 
and swine. For the most part, over 50 per-
cent of broiler manure was sold off-farm. 
The  exception  was  among  smallholders, 
whose use on-farm and off-farm was about 
evenly  divided.  Most  of  the  manure  was 
sold directly to other farmers, but a small 
percentage was sold to wholesale traders, 
with the share going to wholesale trader in-
creasing from 5 percent for the small farms 
to 19 percent for the large.
Dead Animal Disposal  
by Survey Households
Tables 6.7–6.9 summarize the percentage of 
households across countries and sizes of op-
erations using specific disposal methods for 
dead animals. The specific method differed 
by  country  and  size  of  operation.  Ninety 
percent  of  the  small  independent  swine   
producers  in  the  Philippines  buried  dead 
piglets. The majority of large-scale produc-
ers,  on  the  other  hand,  disposed  of  dead 
animals through incineration or some other 
method. Close to 90 percent of the broiler 
farms  surveyed  disposed  of  dead  animals 
within the farm premises. The animals were 
buried, burned, thrown into pits, or fed to 
other animals. In Thailand, dead swine often 
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Table 6.6    Average price of manure by 
Brazilian state, 2003 (reals/ton)
State  Price of manure
Paraná  14.37
Santa Catarina  12.04
Rio Grande de Sul  6.42
Mato Grosso do Sul  29.29
Mato Grosso  34.38
Goiás  45.29
Minas Gerais  61.08
Mean  28.98
Source: Camargo Barros et al. (2003).
were given away as gifts, sold to the market, 
or sold back to the contractor. These prac-
tices were fairly uniform across sizes of op-
erations. The Philippines is the only country 
to  report  that  a  small  percentage  of  the 
households (1 percent) dump the dead pig- 
lets into a river. This may be due to a re-
quirement of the integrator to ensure that 
the pig died of natural causes.
  Similar  results  were  found  for  broil-
ers  and  layers.  As  with  swine,  most  of 
the households surveyed disposed of dead 
animals on-farm. The most common means 
of disposal of dead broilers (Table 6.7) for 
smallholders  in  India  was  burial  (70  per-
cent), followed by sale to a secondary mar-
ket (27 percent). A much smaller percentage 
of  the  large  households  in  India  reported 
this practice, but there were too many “no” 
responses in this category to verify that as-
sumption. In the Philippines, around 30–35 
percent  of  all  producers  dispose  of  birds 
through incineration, and 10 percent of these 
are small independent producers. In Thai-
land, incineration and burial were reported 
together, and these practices appear to be 
the  most  popular  among  the  households   
surveyed.
  For  layers  (Table  6.8),  the  preferred 
place to dispose of dead animals is on-farm 
for small-scale producers in both India and 
Thailand. More than half of India’s small-
scale producers chose burial over incinera-
tion. This may be due to the higher capital 
cost associated with incineration opposed to 
burial. A relatively large percentage reported 
disposal in the “other” category. When the 
enumerators  were  doing  the  survey,  they 
found  refrigerators  at  the  back  of  many 
farm houses used to store dead animals, and 
it appears that these animals are often sold 
at a reduced price on a secondary market. 
This practice was also reported in Thailand. 
Fifty-eight percent of the large egg produc-
ers surveyed in Thailand dispatch their dead 
animals to retailers.
  In India, there was similar mortality in 
the grow-out phase for small-scale produc-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)mortality  for  both).  Most  dead  animals 
were buried or sold to a secondary market 
as a source of food. Close to 70 percent of 
both small-and large-scale broiler produc-
ers buried their dead animals. Selling fro-
zen dead birds to a secondary market was   
also practiced by small-scale producers (26   
percent)  and  large-scale  producers  (19 
percent).  Incineration  was  practiced  more   
by  large-scale  producers  (9  percent)  than  by 
small-scale producers (3 percent). This may 
be  due  to  the  capital  cost  involved.  Al-
though feeding dead animals to fish is re-
ported to be practiced in India, none of the 
households surveyed disposed of their dead 
birds in this manner.
Mass Balance Calculations
Figures 6.4–6.7 illustrate the percentage of 
farmers,  by  size  category,  within  a  given 
range  of  nitrogen  nutrient  balance.  With   
reference to the discussion in Chapter 4, a 
range of –20 to –30, for example, indicates 
that farmers are creating an annual excess 
of  20  to  30  metric  tons  of  nitrogen  (for 
example) per hectare. The mass balance cal-
culations performed here are used as rough 
estimates of actual nutrient balances. They 
indicate households with potential problem 
areas, as well as where further research and 
technology transfer may be more produc-
tive for households of a certain size. They 
also  indicate  why  some  households  have 
active involvement with manure markets.
  The mass balance for swine production 
showed a similar range of excess nitrogen 
and  phosphorus  across  countries.  Figure 
6.4 shows nitrogen mass balances (that is, 
land  deficits,  indicating  nutrient  loading) 
for swine production in Thailand (for mass 
balance results in Brazil and the Philippines, 
see Camargo Barros et al. 2003 and Costales 
et al. 2003). For each of these countries in 
which the swine-producing population was 
sampled, larger producers for the most part 
showed larger deficits, indicating a greater 
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Table 6.8    distribution of farmers by dead animal disposal methods, egg production, 
2003 (percent)
    Large (more than 10,000 birds)
  Thailand
            10,001–  More than
Disposal method  Brazil  Indiaa  Thailand  Brazil  Indiaa  50,000  50,000
On farm
    Buried    68  29  30  67  14  4
    Incinerated  67  5  46  25  15  52  38
    Placed in closed (cess) pit        44
    Composted  33      1
    Other    27      18
Off farm
    Sold to retailers      25      33  58
Total  100  100  100  100  100  99  100
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Mehta et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn 
et al. (2003); Sharma et al. (2003).
Note: Total percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to a rounding error.
aFor India, the definition of the small (large) category is fewer than 10,000 birds (10,000 birds or more).
  Small




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































�10 to 0 Greater
than 0
figure 6.4    nitrogen mass balances (in metric tons) for swine farms surveyed in 
Thailand, 2002

























�10 to 0 Greater
than 0
figure 6.5    nitrogen mass balances (in metric tons) for broiler farms surveyed in 
Thailand, 2002




















�10 to 0 Greater
than 0
figure 6.6    nitrogen mass balances (in metric tons) for broiler farms surveyed in  
India, 2002
Source: Mehta et al. (2003).
82      CHAPTER 6degree of nutrient loading and thus greater 
need to find adequate disposal methods for 
manure. Each country has some households 
with  sufficient  land  to  assimilate  the  ni-
trogen  produced.  Smaller  producers  more 
often than larger producers had positive bal-
ances, indicating that further application of 
plant nutrients would be desirable. Brazil, 
with its larger amount of land availability, 
has  households  with  positive  balances  in 
every size category. However, most of its 
large-scale producers did not have enough 
land to dispose of the manure based on the 
analysis here. Conversely, Thailand’s large 
and medium-high producers all have large 
negative  nutrient  balances,  suggesting  a 
serious pollution problem.
  Land nutrient balances for broiler pro-
ducers show wide variation between coun-
tries  (Figure  6.5;  for  mass  balance  results   
in  Brazil,  India,  and  the  Philippines,  see   
Camargo Barros et al. 2003; Costales et al. 
2003; and Mehta et al. 2003). Large produc-
ers are likely to have large nutrient absorp-
tion  deficits,  while  smaller  producers  are 
more  likely  to  have  small  deficits.  Small 
producers in Thailand (Figure 6.5) have the 
largest number of households with positive 
mass balances. Around 5 percent of Brazil’s 
small and medium producers could absorb 
manure in their own land. Both India (Figure 
6.6) and the Philippines (see Costales et al. 
2003) show no households with a positive 
balance. This underlines the high proportion 
of households producing on relatively small 
plots of land. All of the sample Philippine 
broiler producers had an excess of nitrogen 
nutrients from manure, so they had to worry 
about disposal of manure off site.
  In sum, for smaller producers with lower 
excess nutrient balances, informal mecha-
nisms  to  dispose  of  manure  may  be  suf-
ficient as long as they meet environmental   
requirements. In all the countries surveyed, 
there  appears  to  be  an  active  market  for 
poultry manure to aid them in this. Large 
producers, on the other hand, typically re-
quire systems that guarantee that excess ma-
nure is disposed of in a controlled manner.
  Relative to other livestock production, 
the mass balances for dairy production are 
comparatively in balance. Dairy production, 
by its nature, requires land. Thus, producers 
may have sufficient land to properly dispose 
of  manure  or  may  have  access  to  nearby 
land. It is possible that small-scale produc-
ers in places like India (Figure 6.7) or Thai-
land (see Poapongsakorn et al. 2003) may 
not warrant sophisticated manure disposal 
mechanisms if they have adequate land.
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figure 6.7    nitrogen mass balances (in metric tons) for dairy farms surveyed in  
india, 2002
Source: Sharma et al. (2003), Annex IV.  Similar to the case of broiler production, 
the mass balances for egg production show 
wide  variation  between  countries  (Figure 
6.7;  for  mass  balance  results  in  Brazil   
and India, see Camargo Barros et al. 2003 
and  Mehta  et  al.  2003).  Large  producers 
are likely to have large nutrient absorption 
deficits, while smaller producers are more 
likely to have small deficits. No households 
in Thailand (Figure 6.8) or India (see Mehta 
et al. 2003) have a positive balance. How-
ever, the excess of small producers in both 
countries is relatively small. Smaller egg-
producing  households  with  lower  excess 
nutrient  balances  have  informal  mecha-
nisms, such as an active market for poultry 
manure, to dispose of waste, and these may 
be sufficient, as in the case of small broiler 
farms. Large producers of eggs, as in the 
case of broilers, may require specific sys-
tems that guarantee that excess manure is 
disposed of in a controlled manner.
Average of Farm-Specific  
Measures of Environmental 
Mitigation Efforts by Farm Size
One of the key questions addressed in this 
study is the relationship between the size and 
internalization  of  environmental  externali-
ties per unit of output. Following the meth-
odology set out in Chapter 4, each country 
study  estimated  a  farm-specific  index  of 
the money value per unit of output of spe-
cific  efforts  to  mitigate  negative  environ-
mental externalities from manure and dead 
animal disposal. As outlined in Chapter 4, 
an  aggregate  figure  per  farm  per  com-
modity  was  first  calculated,  and  this  was   
divided by the total farm output of that com-
modity to get each farm-specific figure, and 
these figures were averaged across farms in 
each class. Only positive additions to mitiga-
tion were counted (failure to act assumes, de 
facto, that an externality is being created). 
Additions came from actual expenditures on 
compensating  neighbors  or  collecting  ma-
nure, building facilities to store it (suitably 
amortized),  and  disposal  of  manure  at  the 
sale price if actually sold or at the prevailing 
market price if spread on one’s own fields. 
If no manure market existed, it is presumed 
that the manure supply is in excess and that 
applications to fields are not mitigating.
  Table 6.10 shows environmental expen-
ditures per kilogram of output for poultry. 
For broilers, smaller producers “pay” (inter-
nalize) more per kilogram of output in each 
country. The difference in internalization by 
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figure 6.8    nitrogen mass balances (in metric tons) for layer farms surveyed in  
Thailand, 2002
Source: Poapongsakorn et al. (2003).farm size is striking. In each country except 
Brazil, smaller producers internalize, on av-
erage,  over  five  times  more  per  kilogram 
in  environmentally  related  cost.  In  Brazil, 
the difference is a factor of two. For layers, 
the relative difference is less. For Brazil and 
Thailand,  internalized  environmental  costs 
for egg-producing households are higher on 
average  than  for  broiler-producing  house-
holds.  In  India,  the  opposite  holds.  In  the 
Philippines, small contract producers inter-
nalize less per kilogram than independents, 
but larger contact producers pay more than 
large independents. The Brazilian layer costs 
seem much lower relative to the broiler costs. 
The reason needs to be further explored.
  The  internalized  environmental  costs 
per kilogram of output for swine are shown 
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Table 6.10    Environmental expenditures per kilogram output of liveweight broiler or eggs from poultry 
production, 2003
  Farm size/type
  Small (10,000 or fewer birds)  Large (more than 10,000 birds)
Poultry product  Independent  Contract  Independent  Contract  Total
Philippines
Broiler (pesos/kg)  1.236  0.313  0.128  0.223  0.500
    Number of samples  31  31  23  31  116
  Small (fewer than 10,000 birds)  Large (10,000 or more birds)
India
Broiler (rupees/kg)  2.548  0.397  1.880
    Number of samples  92  43  135
Layer (rupees/egg)  0.0004  0.0002  0.0003
    Number of samples  63  98  161
Brazil
Broiler (reals/kg)  0.014  0.006
    Number of samples  34  201
Layer (reals/kg of eggs)  0.100  0.040
    Number of samples  6  83
  1–5,000  5,001–10,000  10,001–20,000  More than
  birds  birds  birds  20,000 birds
Thailand
Broiler (baht/kg)  0.008  0.005  0.001  0.02  0.007
    Number of samples  74  51  27  18  170
  10,000 or    10,001–50,000  More than
  fewer birds    birds  50,000 birds
Layer (baht/egg)  0.06    0.05  0.03  0.05
    Number of samples  41    32  23  96
    Total variable cost (TVC)  1.19    1.14  1.14  1.17
    Percentage share to TVC  5.0    4.4  2.6  4.3
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Mehta et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003); Sharma et al. 
(2003).Table 6.11    Environmental expenditures per kilogram output from swine production, 2003
  Farm size/type
  Small  Medium  Large
Variable  (100 or fewer head)  (101–1,000 head)  (more than 1,000 head)  Total
Brazil
Expenditure (reals/kg)  0.034    0.028  0.03
    Number of samples  31    161  192
  101–500  501–1,000
  head  head
Thailand
Expenditure (baht/kg)  1.20  1.02  0.76  0.46  0.840
    Number of samples  20  70  41  43  174
    Total variable cost (TVC) (baht/kg)  39.53  27.54  24.99  21.07  26.72
    Percentage share to TVC  3.0  3.7  3.0  2.2  3.1
  Independent  Contract  Independent  Contract  Independent
Philippines
Expenditure (pesos/kg)  0.57  0.04  0.17  0.27  0.04  0.29
    Number of samples  87  23  50  30  17  207
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Mehta et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003); Sharma et al. (2003).
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Table 6.12    Environmental expenditures per unit output from milk production, 2003
  Farm size/type
        Commercial/
  Small  Medium  Large  periurban 
      More than  More than
Variable  1–3 head  5–10 head  10 head  10 head  Total
India
North zone expenditure (rupees/liter)  0.465  0.423  0.339  0.238  0.339
    Number of samples  100  68  58  34  260
West zone expenditure (rupees/liter)  0.525  0.469  0.399  0.396  0.462
    Number of samples  100  80  50  30  260
      More than
  1–20 head  21–50 head  50 head 
Thailand
Expenditure (baht/kg)  0.017  0.563  0.104    0.290
    Number of samples  35  38  19    92
      More than
  50 or fewer head  51–70 head  70 head
Brazil
Expenditure (reals/liter)  0.009  0.0095  0.008
    Number of samples  64  31  65    160
Sources: Compiled from Camargo Barros et al. (2003); Costales et al. (2003); Mehta et al. (2003); Poapongsakorn et al. (2003); Sharma et al. (2003).
 
  Small  Mediumin  Table  6.11.  Small-scale  producers  in-
ternalize  more  per  kilogram  than  larger 
producers, except in the Philippines, where 
larger independent producers expend more 
per kilogram than medium independent pro-
ducers but less than small producers. Larger 
producers in Thailand expend considerably 
less per kilogram than smaller producers.
  Table  6.12  shows  the  environmental 
costs  associated  with  dairy  production.  In 
India, the internalization costs per kilogram 
decline with increasing size. They are rela-
tively  constant  in  Brazil.  Small  producers 
spend very little on environmentally related 
costs  in  Thailand,  but  medium  producers 
spend five times more than large producers.
Why Some Farms Spend  
More per Unit of Output on 
Environmental Mitigation
The results just reported showed that sys-
tematic  differences  in  practices  between 
large and small farms have led to persistent 
differences  across  the  size  distribution  of 
farms  in  the  internalization  of  negative 
environmental  externalities  per  kilogram 
of  livestock  output.  Across  countries  and 
commodities, small-scale farms, including 
contract farms, have higher environmental 
mitigation “expenditures” per unit of output 
than large-scale farms. The four exceptions 
are for poultry farmers in Thailand, where 
large-scale operations in the densely settled 
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Table 6.13    determinants of farm expenditure on mitigation of environmental externalities from swine 
production, Thailand, 2002–03
Dependent variable: encovm (cost of environment  
abatement including manure sale)  Coefficient (N = 174)  Standard error  t-value
herd (number of total pigs in farm)  8.01  1.78  4.49***
agehh (age of farm owner in years)  –198.63  279.22  –0.71
female (1 if female farm owner)  –5,702.81  5,467.05  –1.04
yearedu (education of farm owner in years)  –641.59  700.07  –0.92
socstat (1 if social farm owner has status in a community, for example, holds  
    a position in a local administration office)  5,745.73  6,126.14  0.94
distvil (distance to nearest village in km)  389.84  869.53  0.45
distriv (distance to nearest river in km)  627.36  265.53  2.36**
density (pig density in a radius of 1 km)  0.78  0.45  1.72*
flies (1 if farm owner is making an effort to reduce the number of flies)  9,562.00  5,270.01  1.81*
yearfarm (years of farm-breeding swine)  –79.63  313.95  –0.25
ltcredit (share of long-term credit to total borrowing)  11.28  52.38  0.22
crop (1 if farm owner receives income from crops)  563.47  7,852.58  0.07
fish (1 if farm owner receives income from fish)  2,476.70  10,250.09  0.24
nonfarm (1 if farm owner receives nonfarm income)  1,798.92  7,480.18  0.24
subs (environmental subsidy)  9,639.17  5,194.61  1.86*
chachern (1 if Chachernsoa Province)  273.80  5,545.07  0.05
cons (a constant)  –1,899.47  17,775.78  –0.11
Log likelihood = –1717.24
Likelihood ratio c2(16) = 52.08
Source of basic data: TDRI–FAO/LEAD (2002).
Notes: Costs of environmental abatement include variable cost (labor and others) and fixed cost (amortized value). Fixed inputs are water tanks, 
water treatment ponds, biogas ponds, water pipes. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.export-certified zone spend more per unit 
than smaller farms; dairy farmers in Thai-
land, where the larger farms had more crop 
land than the smaller farms in the sample; 
and broiler and swine large-scale contract 
farmers  in  the  Philippines,  where  manure 
and  dead  animal  disposal  practices  were 
stipulated in the contract and where chicken 
manure is salable as fertilizer.
  The next step is to determine factors as-
sociated with farms having to expend money 
to mitigate environmental externalities. To 
investigate  this  issue,  we  regress  environ-
mental mitigation expenditures on a series 
of exogenous household and farm charac-
teristics. The regressions show that higher 
“expenditures” on the mitigation of environ-
mental externalities are typically positively 
associated with raising a larger number of 
animals (except for broiler farms in India), 
being a mixed livestock-crop farmer (as op- 
posed to a farmer operating a specialized live- 
stock enterprise), being relatively far from 
the  nearest  population  cluster  (except  for 
independent and large broiler farms in the 
Philippines), being in a zone where there is 
active market demand for manure for use on 
crops (no surprise), and being more highly 
educated  (Thai  dairy  farms  only)  (Tables 
6.13–6.16;  for  the  other  nine  regressions   
explaining  determinants  of  environmental 
mitigation costs not presented here, see Ca-
margo Barros et al. 2003; Mehta et al. 2003; 
Poapongsakorn et al. 2003; and Sharma et 
al. 2003). Greater concentrations of animals 
per  farm  area  were  negatively  associated 
with  environmental  mitigation  efforts  in 
both Thailand (except for swine) and Brazil, 
where  intensive  operations  are  prevalent 
within the sample areas for this study.
  Smaller farms are more likely to engage 
in mixed livestock-crop farming that is less 
specialized in livestock production than on 
large-scale commercial livestock farms. Not 
surprisingly, they tend to make a proportion-
ately greater effort than large-scale operators 
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Table 6.14    determinants of farm expenditure on mitigation of environmental externalities from broiler 
production, Thailand, 2003
Dependent variable: expenditure on environment  
cost (baht)  Coefficient (N = 132)  Standard error  t-value
Farm size (number of chickens per year)  0.259  0.055  4.73***
Female dummy  519.798  1,514.605  0.34
Log of age  –2,573.813  3,041.19  –0.85
Maximum years of education (operator or spouse)  –69.183  202.835  –0.34
Operator’s years of experience  –480.574  264.285  –1.82*
Dummy if farm had been in family before the operator took charge  474.187  1,950.239  0.24
Distance to village  238.756  148.009  1.61
Distance to river  –220.79  278.199  –0.79
Broiler density in 1 km radius  –0.019  0.004  –4.78***
Dummy if farm has fish pond  615.142  1,550.058  0.40
Dummy if farm also has crops  34.267  1,857.096  0.02
Dummy if operator has nonfarm fish pond  3,561.87  1,695.88  2.10**
Constant  2,807.308  11,116.37  0.25
F-test (degrees of freedom = 12)  8.84***
Source of basic data: TDRI–FAO/LEAD (2002).
Note: ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.THE imPACT of sCAling-uP of livEsToCk PRoduCTion on THE EnviRonmEnT      89
Table 6.15    determinants of farm expenditure on mitigation of environmental externalities from broiler 
production, Philippines, 2002–03
  Pooled sample  All contracts  All independents  All large farms  All small farms
Explanatory variable  (N = 116)  (N = 62)  (N = 54)  (N = 54)  (N = 62)
Education of household head (yrs)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
Age of household head (yrs)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
Able to sell manure in last   9,493.83  9,026.60  7,993.52  11,336.28  6,778.49
    2 months (dummy)  (1,865.97)  (3,016.00)  (2,000.51)  (3,845.92)  (1,967.98)
Class of land is agricultural   n.s.  n.s.  –3,439.24  n.s.  n.s.
    (dummy)      (1,898.37)
Land includes cropland   4,079.71  n.s.  6,538.81  n.s.  4,280.35
    (dummy)  (1,427.42)    (1,827.28)    (1,800.05)
Land is within the Laguna Lake   n.s.  n.s.  3,888.58  5,852.79  n.s. 
    Development Authority region 
    (dummy)      (1,745.68)  (2,649.06)
Wage rate (pesos/hour)  n.s.  n.s.  –418.02  n.s.  305.57
Wage rate (pesos/hour)      (189.59)    (160.68)
Number of mortalities in last batch  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  14.84
          (6.92)
Distance to nearest residential   n.s.  n.s.  –1,786.47  –1,545.43
    community (km)      (900.90)  (888.16)
Number of day-old chicks loaded   0.26  n.s.  0.38  0.24  n.s. 
    in previous batch  (0.07)    (0.06)  (0.09)
Constant  –10,538.54  n.s.  –1,3061.17  n.s.  –7,810.60
  (4,327.64)    (4,947.11)    (4,298.54)
Log pseudo-likelihood  –953.77  –561.40  –378.05  –501.31  –438.84
Likelihood ratio c2(10)  74.06  26.46  69.09  37.03  44.65
s  6,337.27  6,217.27  4,455.08  6,446.93  4,684.86
Source of basic data: UPLB-IFPRI (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.
to spread manure as fertilizer so as to reduce 
their  input  costs  on  crop  activities  requir-
ing nutrients. The ratio of animals kept on 
smallholder farms to the area of crops cul-
tivated is smaller than on large farms, and 
the marginal utility of income from manure 
sales is undoubtedly higher. For example, 
Costales et al. (2003), Mehta et al. (2003), 
and Poapongsakorn et al. (2003) showed that 
having access to cropland for spreading ma-
nure distinguishes environmental mitigation 
behavior  among  sample  farms  belonging 
to the small farm substratum, but does not 
explain  differences  in  mitigation  behavior 
among  large  farms.  Clearly,  these  results 
are  also  consistent  with  the  mass  balance 
calculations, which emphasize the more sus-
tainable behavior of farmers who are mixed 
crop-livestock farmers.
  Costales et al. (2003) also suggested an 
interesting scale difference with respect to 
location: large broiler farms closer to com-
munities with large populations make less 
of an effort toward environmental mitiga-
tion. This is probably due to the fact that 
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Table 6.16    determinants of farm expenditure on mitigation of environmental externalities from swine 
production, Philippines, 2002–03
Explanatory  Pooled sample  All independents  All contracts  All large farms  All small farms
variable  (N = 203)  (N = 152)  (N = 51)  (N = 95)  (N = 108)
Education of household head (yrs)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
Age of household head (yrs)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
Able to sell manure in last 2 months  n.s.  n.s.  3,565.39  n.s.  2,037.97
    (dummy)      (1,187.08)    (496.73)
Class of land is agricultural   1,881.44  n.s.  1,146.74  n.s.  367.99 
    (dummy)  (1,084.49)    (608.56)    (193.68)
Land includes cropland (dummy)  857.10  1,082.47  n.s.  n.s.  347.40
  (400.86)  (501.10)      (124.59)
Land is within Laguna Lake   2,455.16  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
        Development Authority 
        region (dummy)  (1,167.16)
Wage rate (pesos/hour)  n.s.  n.s.  249.86  n.s.  n.s.
      (106.36)
Number of mortalities in last cycle  n.s.  n.s.  18.44  23.25  n.s.
      (5.45)  (13.33)  n.s.
Distance to nearest residential  
    community (km)  25.17  n.s.  10.99  n.s.  3.01
  (12.89)    (4.59)    (1.69)
Land has connection to piped water    n.s.  1,675.25  n.s.  404.60
      (581.65)    (245.16)
Number of swine in inventory  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  10.23
          (5.69)
Region dummy (Bukidnon = 1)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
Constant  –15,116.67  n.s.  –6,569.59  –20,075.05  n.s.
  (8,576.57)    (2,254.38)  (11,954.5)
Log pseudo-likelihood  –1,633.52  –1,240.36  –332.44  –934.84  –567.53
Likelihood ratio c2(12)  37.74  47.36  45.12  19.96  30.98
s  9,323.48  9,803.05  1,572.84  11,891.07  903.69
Source of basic data: UPLB-IFPRI (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.
that are concentrated in periurban areas have 
the potential for spreading manure on their 
own farms.
  Another  determinant  of  environmental 
mitigation that seems to matter is contract 
farming. In the case of broiler farms in India, 
scale differences in environmental mitiga-
tion  behavior  tend  to  disappear,  because 
both large and small contractors tend to have 
higher  levels  of  measured  environmental 
mitigation than independent farmers and not 
very different internalization across differ-
ent sizes of contract farms. As mentioned 
earlier, the conditions for disposal of ma-
nure and dead animals were stipulated in the 
contract, adding some uniformity to proce-




he present chapter synthesizes the key results of econometric models that were estimated 
separately for each commodity in each country. This involves 13 separate models:   
Indian broilers, eggs, and milk; Philippine swine and broilers; and broilers, eggs, milk, 
and swine in both Brazil and Thailand. Then separate runs were done in some cases for large 
and small farms within commodity/country categories and for contract farmers.
  Separation of estimation by country and commodity is necessary because the farm-specific 
relative efficiencies computed by the Battese-Coelli (1995) model are computed relative to 
a frontier defined by the data in a given regression. While such farm-specific measures are 
comparable to each other within a given regression, they cannot be compared across separate 
regressions.1 However, because the individual farm-specific measures are by construction 
independently and identically distributed random variables within a given run, the means of 
these farm-specific regressions of equal weight within a given regression are comparable to 
each other statistically.2 For example, we can compare the mean relative efficiency of the bot-
tom tercile of farms with respect to income to that of the top tercile in a given regression.
Comparison of Average Profit  
Efficiency across Farm Classes
Chapter 5 showed that small-scale farmers across the country studies typically earned higher 
profits per unit than large-scale farmers if family labor was not costed, which suggests that 
they at least have a chance to survive. It was also clear that costing family labor at market rates 
reduced this profit advantage for the smaller farmers, frequently eliminating it. If smallholders 
are not able to sustain a rate of productivity growth equal or greater than that of large farms 
under these conditions, they are likely to disappear.
  The previous chapters and the first section of this chapter yield the data and methodology 
necessary to formally test Hypotheses 2 and 6 from Chapter 1, respectively: Small-scale pro- 
ducers are more efficient users of farm resources to secure profits than are large-scale producers, 
other things equal and contract farmers are more profit-efficient than independent farmers at 
comparable scales of operation.
1Battese, Rao, and O’Donnell (2004) illustrate a metafrontier approach that in theory could handle estimation of 
all cases simultaneously, or at least within commodity categories, thus permitting efficiency comparisons across 
countries. However, this ambitious task is left to future work.
2By equal weight we mean the same number of observations underlying each mean of a subsample group, as in, 
say, terciles. For example, we can compare the mean relative efficiency of the bottom tercile of farms with respect 
to income to the top tercile in a given regression.
91  Methodology and models are discussed 
in Chapter 3; the farm-specific results on 
relative efficiency in this section are esti-
mates of a combination of technical and al- 
locative efficiency, referred to here as “rela-
tive profit efficiency,” measured on a scale 
of 0 (lowest) to 100 percent (highest, at the 
frontier). Farm-specific scores from a given 
regression are averaged over farms in the 
class in question to obtain an estimate of rel- 
ative profit efficiency for that class of farm.3
  An  overall  summary  of  results  is  dis-
cussed at the end of this chapter and shown 
in Table 7.15, but individual results will be 
discussed  first.  Table  7.1  shows  a  diver-
sity  of  results  for  broilers,  and  Table  7.2 
shows  the  case  for  layers.  In  the  Philip-
pines, larger broiler contract farmers have 
a slightly higher mean profit efficiency (73 
percent)  than  smallholder  contract  farm-
ers (56 percent), and the difference in the 
means is statistically significant (with s.e. 
= 0.03). But both large and small contract 
farmers  have  much  higher  average  profit 
efficiency than either large or small inde-
pendents.  Larger  independents  (including 
independent forward-price contractors who 
are otherwise comparable to independents 
except for having a steady forward outlet) 
have greater relative profit efficiency on av-
erage than smallholders, and this difference 
is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level (with s.e. = 0.04).
  A graphical representation of the distri-
bution of farm-specific relative efficiencies 
for broilers in the Philippines is displayed 
through kernel density plots in Figure 7.1a 
and b. It appears that large farms are more 
concentrated at higher levels of efficiency 
than  are  small  farms.  Similarly,  contract 
farms are more concentrated at higher levels 
of  efficiency  than  are  independent  farms, 
and the efficiency scores across farms do 
not  have  the  same  distribution  functions 
(at a 1 percent level of significance).4 This 
is consistent with the view that contracting 
improves the profit efficiency of both large 
and small farms.
  Virtually  all  sampled  broiler  farmers 
in Thailand were contract farmers of some 
sort, with both forward-price contracts and 
fee contracts, with a degree of harmoniza-
tion of genetics and feed use in both cases. 
The  pooled  (price  contract / fee  contract /   
independent)  results  for  Thai  broilers  are 
reported in ascending order of size of flock 
in Table 7.1. The largest farms are the most 
profit-efficient  (87  percent  of  maximum) 
compared  to  the  smallest  (48  percent  of 
maximum). The bump in the medium-sized 
production  level  (5,000–20,000  birds)  is 
probably due to the prevalence of fee con-
tract farmers in this size of operation, which 
is likely to increase technical and allocative 
profit efficiency (if not profits) over price 
contracts at the same scale.
  Similarly, in the case of Indian broilers, 
large  independent  farms  are  more  profit- 
efficient than small independent farms. This 
result is further supported by the kernel den-
sity plot of the individual farm efficiency 
scores (shown in Figure 7.2), where large 
farms  are  more  concentrated  at  higher 
levels  of efficiency than are small farms, 
generating  significantly  different  distribu-
tion functions (at the 1 percent level of sig-
nificance  using  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test for equality of distribution).
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3Family labor is treated as a farm-specific physical input to specific activities and is not otherwise costed in any 
of the runs in this chapter, unlike in Chapter 5, where the sensitivity of unit profit levels to this assumption is 
specifically tested for the Philippines and India cases. Logically, the approach in the present chapter makes little 
or no difference within farms of similar size, but, ceteris paribus, will make smaller farms tend to look more 
profit-efficient than larger ones. Intuitively, the willingness of small farmers to work hard for low returns makes 
them relatively more profit-efficient users of other resources, ceteris paribus, compared to corporations employ-
ing formal sector labor.
4Based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions (StataCorp. 2006).Table 7.1    Mean relative profit efficiency of broiler farms across farm sizes by  
country, 2002
  Farm size (number of birds)
  Small  Large/commercial
  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (more than 10,000 birds)
Country  Independent  Contract  Independent  Contract
Philippines  N = 30  N = 34  N = 31  N = 14
  35  56  45  73
    45    64
Brazil    N = 34    N = 195
    76    86
  Fewer than  10,000 or 
  10,000 birds  more birds
India  N = 93    N = 42
  45    85
  Contract  Contract  Contract  Contract
  (5,000 or   (5,001–10,000  (10,001–20,000  (more than
  fewer birds)  birds)  birds)  20,000 birds)
Thailand  N = 74  N = 51  N = 27  N = 18
  49  71  88  87
Sources: Authors’ estimation using data from CEPEA-ESALQ/USP-FAO/LEAD (2002); IIM-IFPRI (2003); 
RISDC-IFPRI (2003); TDRI-FAO/LEAD (2002); UPLB-IFPRI (2003).
Note: Mean relative profit efficiency is reflected by the percentage of maximum profit efficiency for the country 
and commodity in question unless otherwise indicated.
Table 7.2    Mean relative profit efficiency of layer farms across farm sizes by  
country, 2002
  Farm size (number of birds)
  Small  Large/commercial
Country  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (more than 10,000 birds)
Brazil  N = 6  N = 83
  58  72
  Small  Medium  Large
  (10,000 or fewer birds)  (10,001–50,000 birds)  (more than 50,000 birds)
Thailand  N = 47  N = 31  N = 18
  52  55  61
  Small  Medium  Large
  (fewer than 10,000 birds)  (10,000–50,000 birds)  (more than 50,000 birds)
Indiaa  N = 81  N = 63  N = 14
  39  36  62
Sources: Authors’ estimation using data from CEPEA-ESALQ/USP-FAO/LEAD (2002); IIM-IFPRI (2003); 
RISDC-IFPRI (2003); TDRI-FAO/LEAD (2002).
Note: Mean relative profit efficiency is reflected by the percentage of maximum profit efficiency for the country 
and commodity in question unless otherwise indicated.
aFarm size in India was grouped into terciles based on the annualized volume of output (in 100 eggs).
EMPiRiCAl REsulTs      93  In  Brazil  (Tables  7.1  and  7.2),  profit- 
efficiency levels are substantially higher for 
larger farms than for smaller ones for both 
broilers and layers; all broiler farms sampled 
in Brazil (in Table 7.1) are contract farms, 
while all layer farms sampled (in Table 7.2) 
are  independent.  The  Indian  layer  farms 
in Table 7.2 are all independent. Here, the 
trend  across  increasing  scales  holds  true 
between small and large farms, but in the 
case of small and medium farms, profit effi-
ciency significantly decreases to the 15,000– 
50,000 egg per annum production level (at 
the 1 percent level of significance, with s.e. 
= 0.04; also shown by the distribution of 
mean efficiency scores in Figure 7.3).
  Insights  about  the  relative  profit  effi- 
ciency  of  swine  production  are  found  in 
Table  7.3.  In  the  Philippines,  the  mean   
efficiency of independent small-scale pro-
ducers (77 percent) is higher than that of 
independent large-scale producers (67 per-
cent). For contract farms, mean efficiency 
increases  with  size  (Table  7.3).  In  Brazil 
(Table  7.3),  medium  and  large  producers 
are  seen  to  be  more  efficient  (71  percent 
and 72 percent of maximum profit, respec-
tively) than small producers (61 percent of 
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Figure 7.1     Distribution of mean profit efficiency scores for broiler farms in  
the Philippines
Source: Authors’ calculations using UPLB-IFPRI (2003).
(a) small farms versus large farms
(b) Contract farms versus independent farmsmaximum), but the difference across farms 
is not significant (s.e. = 0.08). In addition, 
the mean efficiency scores between small 
and large swine farms have the same distri-
bution functions (Figure 7.4). In Thailand 
(Table 7.3), mean profit efficiency in swine 
finishing increases marginally in going from 
backyard to small-scale commercial opera-
tions, then levels off with further increases 
in  scale.  For  weaners,  profit  efficiency 
increases sharply in going from backyard to 
small-scale commercial operations, then to 
the very large-scale level, which is hardly 
surprising.
  Unlike broiler, egg, and swine produc-
tion, milk production is not usually thought 
to be subject to large technical economies 
of scale in production in developing country 
settings.  Results  from  the  three  countries 
where  milk  production  was  studied  are 
found in Table 7.4. Different patterns are 
observed  in  western  India  (Gujarat)  and 
northern  India  (Haryana)  (Table  7.4).  In   
Gujarat, where the cooperative movement is 
very active and has done much to increase 
the profit efficiency of smallholders (rather 
as contract farming has for broiler produc-
ers in the Philippines), mean efficiency in- 
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Figure 7.2     Distribution of mean profit efficiency scores for broiler farms in india
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Figure 7.3     Distribution of mean profit efficiency scores for layer farms in india
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Figure 7.4    Distribution of mean profit efficiency scores for swine farms in Brazil
Source: Authors’ calculations using CEPEA-ESALQ/USP-FAO/LEAD (2002).
creases  with  increasing  farm  production 
level. In Haryana, where larger-scale dairy 
farmers are more likely to be found than in 
western  India,  scale-related  differences  in 
mean efficiency are also observed.
  Results  for  Brazilian  milk  production 
(Table 7.4) show decreases in mean profit 
efficiency up to 50–70 cows, although the 
results  are  not  significant,  and  show  in-
creases thereafter. These results may be ex-
Table 7.3    Mean relative profit efficiency of swine farms across farm sizes by  
country, 2002
  Farm size (number of head)
  Small  Medium  Large
Country  (1–100 head)  (101–1,000 head)  (more than 1,000 head)
Brazil  N = 10  N = 59  N = 72
  61  70  72
Thailand
    Weaners  N = 7  N = 44  N = 3
  85  89  94
    Finishers  N = 10  N = 52  N = 30
  67  90  96
  Small/medium (1,000 or fewer head)  Large (more than 1,000 head)
  Independent  Contract  Independent  Contract
Philippines  N = 87  N = 23  N = 67  N = 30
  77  64  67  75
Sources: Authors’ estimation using data from CEPEA-ESALQ/USP-FAO/LEAD (2002); TDRI-FAO/LEAD 
(2002); UPLB-IFPRI (2003).
Note: Mean relative profit efficiency is reflected by the percentage of maximum profit efficiency for the country 
and commodity in question unless otherwise indicated.plained by the profit-efficiency advantage 
to smallholders of not costing family labor, 
which is less with increasing scale. It seems 
likely  that  not  costing  family  labor  has  a 
lesser  impact  on  relative  profit  efficiency 
as scale increases; furthermore, the largest 
scales may bring in new technologies and 
practices. On Thai dairy farms (Table 7.4), 
mean profit efficiency increases with scale, 
as in the case of Indian dairy farms. The dif-
ference in mean profit efficiencies between 
small  farms  and  large  ones  is  significant 
(s.e.  =  0.04),  but  not  that  between  small 
and medium farms or between medium and 
large farms, as shown in the distribution of 
their efficiency scores (Figure 7.5).
  The overall results from comparing rela-
tive profit efficiency across countries, com-
modities, and degrees of vertical integration 
are mixed. Small dairy farms are not neces-
sarily less efficient at securing profits, espe-
cially once they reach the level of 20 cows 
per farm. Larger independent farms in the 
sample  were  clearly  more  profit  efficient 
than independent smallholders for broilers 
and layers in all four countries. For swine, 
all farms operated at comparable levels of 
relative profit efficiency.
  In almost all cases where contract farm-
ing was observed, the mean relative profit 
efficiency of contract farmers was signifi-
cantly higher than that of independents at   
all levels of scale. Contract farming appears 
to significantly improve relative profit ef-
ficiency, more so for smallholders than for 
large  farmers  (except  for  small  contract 
swine farmers in the Philippines), but sig-
nificantly for both.
  Hypothesis 2 (that small farms are more 
profit-efficient than large farms) is thus not 
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Table 7.4    Mean relative profit efficiency of dairy farms across farm sizes by  
country, 2002
  Farm size (liters of milk per day)
Country  Fewer than 20 liters  20–40 liters  41–80 liters  More than 80 liters
India
    West  N = 98  N = 80  N = 50  N = 30
  68  76  77  82
    North  N = 98  N = 67  N = 54  N = 34
  60  65  72  76
    Pooled  N = 196  N = 147  N = 104  N = 64
  64  71  74  79
  Farm size (number of head)
  50 or fewer head  51–70 head  More than 70 head
Brazil  N = 67  N = 33  N = 60
  73  71  77
  20 or fewer head  21–50 head  More than 50 head
Thailand  N = 32  N = 33  N = 19
  56  60  73
Sources: Authors’ estimation using data from CEPEA-ESALQ/USP-FAO/LEAD (2002); IIM-IFPRI (2003); 
RISDC-IFPRI (2003); TDRI-FAO/LEAD (2002).
Note: Mean relative profit efficiency is reflected by the percentage of maximum profit efficiency for the country 
and commodity in question unless otherwise indicated.well  supported  by  the  empirical  analysis 
for broilers, layers, and milk, with the large 
farms  exhibiting  greater  profit  efficiency 
than small farms. However, Hypothesis 2 
is well supported by the greater profit ef-
ficiency  of  independent  small-scale  hog 
fatteners  vis-à-vis  large-scale  independent   
hog  fatteners  in  the  Philippines  (statisti-
cally significant at the 1 percent level). The 
relative  profit  efficiency  of  smallholders 
increases when going from the backyard to 
the smallholder commercial model, but dis-
appears fairly quickly with increasing size 
of operation, perhaps because the unit cost 
advantages  of  family  labor  stock  become 
less important.
  Hypothesis  6  (that  contract  farms  are 
more  profit-efficient  than  independent 
farms  at  comparable  scales)  is  supported   
by the preceding results for poultry (both 
small-scale and large-scale operations) and 
swine  (large-scale  operations  only)  in  the 
Philippines. The hypothesis is not supported 
by the results for small-scale swine produc-
ers in the Philippines, which was surprising 
to us. There is clearly more work to do in 
this area. Almost all dairy farming in the 
samples involved vertical coordination with 
cooperatives, which is also a form of con-
tract farming. The relative profit efficiency 
for these dairy farms increases when going 
from small to large/commercial operations. 
This is also true for broiler farms in Brazil 
and  Thailand,  where  most  of  the  farms   
sampled are engaged in contract farming. 
Thus,  contract  farming  seems  to  work  to 
improve efficiency (and thus competitive-
ness)  by  reducing  transaction  costs  faced   
by independent small farms, as is investi-
gated further later. The next section gives 
insights  on  which  transaction  costs  and 
other factors explain why specific farms are 
profit-inefficient.
Explanation of Farm-Specific 
Profit Inefficiency in Terms 
of Differential Transaction 
and Environmental 
Mitigation Costs
The previous chapters and sections of this 
chapter  yield  the  data  and  methodology 
necessary to formally test Hypotheses 4 and 
5 from Chapter 1: Uncompensated negative 
environmental externalities favor the nomi-
nal profit efficiency of large farms over small 
ones, ceteris paribus, and Profits of small-
scale producers are more sensitive to “trans- 
action costs” than are those of large-scale 
producers.
  Understanding  why  some  farms  are 
closer or farther from the stochastic profit 
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Figure 7.5    Distribution of mean profit efficiency scores for dairy farms in Thailand
Source: Authors’ calculations using TDRI-FAO/LEAD (2002).frontier will clarify how differences in ac-
cess to information, assets, subsidies, and 
the  benefits  of  not  paying  for  negative 
externalities associated with one’s produc-
tion affect the relative competitiveness of 
livestock  farms.  The  measures  of  relative 
profit  efficiency  reported  in  the  previous 
section are computed from the residuals of 
the frontier for the commodity and country 
concerned. An example of such a frontier 
is given for broiler farms in the Philippines 
in Table 7.5 (the pooled model). All coef-
ficients  reported  in  the  tables  are  statisti-
cally different from zero at the 90 percent 
confidence  level  or  better.5  As  discussed 
in  Chapter  3,  the  coefficients  in  Tables 
7.5–7.14 are maximum likelihood estima-
tions  of  the  influence  of  prices  and  farm 
fixed resources on maximum profits that a 
farm in the category concerned can make.
  The previous section discussed the mea-
sure  of  farm-specific  efficiency  derived 
from  the  residuals  (unbiased)  of  equation 
(3) in Chapter 3 of the stochastic profit fron-
tier analysis and compared these across sub-
groups of farms within the same estimating 
equation.6  The  present  section  examines   
results from equation (4) of the model in 
Chapter 3. This regresses the residuals from 
equation (3) of the model (measures of the 
amount that a given farm falls below the 
frontier ideal) against a series of proxy vari-
ables  for  farm-specific  transaction  costs/ 
policy distortions and our measure of farm-
specific  environmental  mitigation  (instru-
mented where appropriate).
  Results for broiler producers in the Phil-
ippines  are  given  in  Table  7.5.  In  all  the   
regressions except those for contract farm- 
ers, the key variable significantly explain- 
ing a reduction in relative inefficiency (that   
is,  an increase in profit efficiency) within   
the subsample is the measure of environ- 
mental  mitigation.  A  negative  coefficient 
means  that  the  variable  reduces  ineffi- 
ciency  and  explains  why  some  farms  are 
closer  to  the  frontier,  and  this  is  a  factor 
in both the large and small farm samples. 
Expending a higher degree of environmental 
mitigation  effort  is  associated  with  being 
more profit-efficient for smallholders, large 
farmers, and independents, which are mostly 
large farms. However, the effect is not sig-
nificant in the pooled regression involving 
all samples. The interpretation of this result   
is that those who pursue more environmentally 
sustainable  practices  in  manure  and  dead 
animal disposal most likely have lower mor-
tality rates and other efficiency gains rela-
tive to other farmers who are less careful.
  Access  to  a  telephone  (typically  a  cell 
phone) and access to credit for feeds are sig-
nificant factors distinguishing more or less 
relative profit efficiency among small farm-
ers, but not among large ones (all of whom 
have at least cell phones and could buy feeds 
in bulk). Access to feed credit proxies, better 
access to assets, and access to phones proxy 
better access to information; both are signifi-
cant transaction cost issues for smallholders.
  For small farmers, higher education of 
the household head is associated with in-
creased  profit  inefficiency,  an  unexpected 
result. The seemingly perverse effect of ed-
ucation on profit efficiency for smallholder 
farms may reflect the increased opportunity 
cost for more educated persons, particularly 
when the scale of operations of the broiler 
business is relatively small. In such cases, 
the attention of more educated people may 
be diverted to alternative economic under-
takings (48 percent of the sample of small 
farmers  are  engaged  in  a  secondary  non-
livestock  occupation).  Thus,  the  effect  of 
education on livestock profit efficiency is 
not clear-cut.
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5The null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero is rejected with less than a 5 percent chance of error using a 
two-tailed test.
6The residuals should be unbiased for the purposes of estimating farm-specific inefficiency and constructing the 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.  The  results  for  Thai  broiler  producers  in 
Table  7.6  suggest  that  the  most  efficient 
broiler  farms  are  run  by  female  decision-
makers  and  with  greater  environmental   
mitigation efforts. Farms that tend to be clus- 
tered in areas with a higher density of chick-
ens  within  a  1  km  radius  tend  to  be  less   
profit-efficient. These farms are more likely 
to be located in traditional broiler farm areas, 
where conventional housing sheds (poorly 
ventilated  sheds)  are  used,  and  this  fact, 
correlated with location, may explain poorer 
production performance in terms of higher 
mortality rates and lower returns per bird.
  In the case of the Indian broiler sam- 
ple (Table 7.7), experience was a signifi- 
cant contributor to higher relative profit ef-
ficiency, particularly for large-scale farms, 
as expected. Furthermore, the more distant 
farms  are  from  market  outlets,  the  more   
relatively profit-inefficient they are, ceteris 
paribus.
  On Brazilian layer farms (Table 7.8), re-
gional and spatial differences are paramount 
to explaining relative profit efficiency. The 
most profit-efficient farms, ceteris paribus, 
tend to be those operated by older farmers 
and  located  in  the  south  (São  Paulo)  and 
southeast  (Paraná)  regions.  Characteristics 
that are associated with profit inefficiency 
are  higher  educational  levels  of  decision-
makers (probably due to additional nonfarm 
occupations, as in India and the Philippines), 
location in areas of higher concentrations of 
animals that are closer to big cities, and hav-
ing access to information (which probably 
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Table 7.6    Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit 
inefficiency on Thai broiler farms
 Explanatory variable  Coefficient  Standard error
Stochastic profit frontier
    Constant  8.34  0.66
    Log of output price  n.s.
    Log of feed price  n.s.
    Log of day-old-chick price  –0.27  0.15
    Log of capital cost  0.53  0.06
Explainers of inefficiencies
    Delta (constant)  n.s.
    Farmer is female (dummy variable)  –7.34  1.86
    Log of age of farmer  n.s.
    Log of farmer’s years of education  n.s.
    Log of density of chickens (1 km radius)  0.53  0.21
    Log of distance to nearest town (km)  n.s.
    Environmental internalization  –2.74  0.24
  s2  39.09  8.30
  g  0.99  0.002
N  170
Log likelihood function  –281.01
LR test (one-sided)  225.97
Source: Authors’ estimation using TDRI-FAO/LEAD (2002).
Note: n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.captures  high  transaction  costs  in  gaining 
access to information). In addition, a higher 
degree of environmental mitigation effort is 
associated  with  being  less  profit-efficient, 
which  could  simply  indicate  that  broiler 
farms are in remoter areas and tend to invest 
less in environmental mitigation.
  For  Indian  layer  farms  (Table  7.9), 
being in the north and having an older oper-
ator tends to be associated with being more 
profit-efficient. Making greater relative ef-
forts at mitigation of environmental exter-
nalities  tends  to  be  associated  with  being 
relatively less profit-efficient, as in the case 
of Brazilian broiler farms. If only the large-
scale layer samples are considered (Table 
7.9,  second  column),  the  relatively  most 
profit-efficient  farmers  are  those  who  are   
located in the north, are older, and are the 
best  educated.  In  the  case  of  these  large 
commercial  operations,  higher  education   
is  more  likely  to  be  used  to  support  the   
layer enterprise as opposed to commuting   
to a nonfarm job (contrary to what may well 
be the case for less industrialized smaller 
farms).
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Table 7.7    Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit 
inefficiency on indian broiler farms
  Smalla  Largea  Pooleda
Explanatory variable  (N = 93)  (N = 42)  (N = 135)
Stochastic profit frontier
    Price of chicks  –0.77 (0.27)  –2.35 (1.00)  n.s.
    Wage rate  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Price of feed  n.s.  –1.21 (0.53)  –1.58 (0.36)
    Price of output (broiler)  3.59 (0.58)  5.59 (0.86)  4.64 (0.56)
    Family labor  n.s.  2.11 (0.96)  n.s.
    Value of capital stock  n.s.  –10.79 (0.73)  0.79 (0.39)
    Wage rate × family labor  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Interest rate  n.s.  –54.29 (0.95)  2.79 (0.92)
    Value of capital stock × interest rate  n.s.  8.22 (0.55)  –0.55 (0.29)
    Constant  n.s.  146.30 (0.99)  –6.89 (1.17)
Explainers of inefficiencies
    Constant  n.s.  n.s.  –2.90 (1.21)
    Age of the decisionmaker  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
  Information source (dummy variable = 1 for  
        radio, TV, newspaper)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Region (dummy, North = 1)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Pollution abatement costs  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Has access to credit (dummy)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Output market distance  0.64 (0.33)  n.s.  0.81 (0.16)
    Experience  n.s.  –0.90 (0.33)  n.s.
    Log likelihood function  –100.72  –36.39  –165.74
    LR test (one-sided)  39.92  9.35  64.85
  g  0.94 (0.04)  0.51 (0.36)  0.15 (0.30)
Source: Authors’ estimation using RISDC-IFPRI (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.
aContract farmers not included.  Swine production in the Philippines has 
been analyzed, and several patterns emerge 
from the analysis of the determinants of rel-
ative profit inefficiency in Table 7.10. First, 
having access to information through media 
is an important driver of relative efficiency, 
particularly for smallholders who are mak-
ing  the  key  production  decisions  them-
selves. Second, farmers who sell to itinerant 
traders (viajeros) are typically less profit- 
efficient than farmers who have other mar-
keting  arrangements;  the  viajeros  provide 
personalized  service  to  backyard  farmers, 
but  at  a  price.  Third,  fee  contractors  are 
more profit-efficient for the overall sample 
than  are  independent  and  price  contract 
farmers, other things equal.
  Fourth, greater efforts to promote envi-
ronmental mitigation are associated with in-
creased profit efficiency for the overall sam-
ple and for large-scale farmers considered in 
isolation, but not for smallholders and inde-
pendents as groups. A higher degree of en-
vironmental mitigation effort by smallhold-
ers suggests that they pay a price in terms   
of financial competitiveness. Some small-
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Table 7.8    Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit 
inefficiency on Brazilian layer farms
Explanatory variable  Coefficient  Standard error
Stochastic profit frontier
    Constant  –0.317  0.106
    Feed price  –0.400  0.026
    Price of hired labor  n.s.
    Price of electricity  –0.180  0.006
    Price of freight  –0.089  0.045
    Land includes agricultural land  0.030  0.015
    Family labor  1.039  0.007
  Capital  0.111  0.017
Explainers of inefficiencies
    Constant  –4.395  0.763
    Level of education of decisionmaker  0.919  0.332
    Age of decisionmaker  –3.518  0.639
    Length of time of decisionmaker in activity  n.s.
    Animal concentration on the farm  1.701  0.236
    Environmental cost  1.087  0.578
    Distance from the city  1.572  0.298
    Information index  0.935  0.300
    State dummy São Paulo  –2.221  0.899
    State dummy Paraná  –7.458  1.686
  s2  3.244  0.454
  g  0.999  0.000
    Log likelihood function  –15.699
    LR test of the one-sided error  202.57
  N  89
Source: Authors’ estimation using CEPEA-ESALQ/USP-FAO/LEAD (2002).
Note: n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.holders,  unfortunately,  can  still  get  away 
with throwing manure over their back wall 
into the river instead of spreading it, and 
they make more money as a consequence.
  Fifth,  access  to  formal  sector  credit   
increases  relative  profit  efficiency  in  the   
overall  sample,  among  smallholders  and 
independent farms, but a dummy for distin-
guishing access to credit for feeds in par- 
ticular reverses some of the benefit of better 
credit (particularly for smallholders), sug-
gesting that credit for longer-term capital in- 
vestment is more important to relative profit 
efficiency for swine producers in the Philip-
pines than is short-term suppliers’ credit for 
inputs.
  The last column of Table 7.10 shows an 
interesting contrast for large-scale commer- 
cial pig farmers. Here, the only factors ex- 
plaining better performance within the group 
are environmental cost mitigation (probably 
with an explanation similar to the case of 
Philippine and Thai broiler farms) and loca- 
tion  (Bukidnon,  the  more  profit-efficient 
zone, is a region of Northern Mindanao is- 
land far from Luzon, where the industrial 
swine sector is relocating as environmental 
pressures rise in Luzon). Another factor is 
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Table 7.9    Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit 
inefficiency on indian layer farms
  Small  Large  Pooled
Explanatory variable  (N = 62)  (N = 96)  (N = 158)
Stochastic profit frontier
    Wage rate  80.75 (0.51)  1.89 (0.01)  0.91 (0.29)
    Price of feed  –3.99 (1.21)  1.85 (0.008)  –1.94 (0.82)
    Price of eggs  n.s.  –9.33 (0.02)  –5.29 (1.01)
    Family labor  n.s.  –2.68 (0.03)  –2.89 (1.19)
    Value of capital stock  n.s.  0.10 (0.001)  0.03 (0.01)
    Slope of labor housing  0.04 (0.02)    0.04 (0.02)
    Wage rate × family labor  n.s.  0.75 (0.01)  0.77 (0.32)
    Wage rate × scale dummy  159.72 (0.95)    –0.41 (0.05)
    Constant  12.94 (2.86)  –2.17 (0.04)  11.85 (1.59)
Explainers of inefficiencies
    Constant  n.s.  7.26 (1.15)  –3.78 (1.15)
  Age of decisionmaker  –9.42 (4.90)  –41.59 (3.31)  –42.75 (5.79)
    Region (dummy, North = 1)  –29.14 (4.29)  –23.51 (2.29)  –38.42 (2.59)
    Pollution abatement costs  n.s.  9.54 (1.03)  11.66 (1.79)
    Education of decisionmaker  12.02 (1.60)  –8.29 (1.90)  n.s.
    Decisionmaker has access to credit (dummy)  n.s.  18.97 (1.46  n.s.
    Information source (dummy variable = 1 for  
        radio, TV, newspaper)  18.82 (5.50)  n.s.  7.60 (2.78)
    Output market distance  n.s.  5.63 (0.77)  3.83 (1.02)
    Log likelihood function  –74.65  –170.18  –272.14
    LR test (one-sided)  139.79  148.35  243.14
  g  0.99 (0.0005)  0.996 (0.000)  0.99 (0.001)
Source: Authors’ estimation using the RISDC-IFPRI (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.EMPiRiCAl REsulTs      105
Table 7.10    Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on 
Philippines swine farms
  Pooled  Independent  Contract  Smallholder  Large/commercial 
Explanatory variable  (N = 207)  (N = 154)  (N = 53)  (N = 110)  (N = 97)
Stochastic profit frontier
    Constant  3.92 (1.67)  n.s.  n.s.  4.79 (1.75)  9.58 (1.08)
    Price of hogs  0.63 (0.20)  n.s.  n.s.  1.30 (0.40)  1.61 (0.27)
    Price of piglets  n.s.  n.s.    –0.41 (2.29)  n.s.
    Price of weanlings  –0.19 (0.09)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Price of feed  –0.93 (0.20)  –0.98 (0.18)  n.s.  –0.46 (0.20)  –1.30 (0.29)
    Contract dummy (1 if contract)  0.83 (0.38)      0.60 (0.30)  3.42 (0.96)
    Wage rate  0.47 (0.17)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  0.11 (0.04)
    Free board and lodging (dummy)  n.s.  n.s.  0.81 (0.39)  n.s.  n.s.
    Lowest interest rate  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Value of inventory  0.17 (0.03)  0.53 (0.06)  n.s.  –0.68 (–0.04)  n.s.
    Buildings and equipment  0.34 (0.13)  0.23 (0.13)  n.s.  n.s.  0.19 (0.06)
    Family labor  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Farm size (in ha)  0.12 (0.04)  0.09 (0.04)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Mortality rate  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  0.03 (0.02)  n.s.
    Farrow-wean (dummy)  1.77 (0.85)  4.16 (1.8)    6.28 (1.12)  8.70 (1.47)
    Combined farrow-wean and farrow-finish  n.s.  n.s.    1.89 (1.02)  2.56 (0.62)
    Family labor × wage rate  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  –0.13 (0.05)
    Buildings and equipment × lowest interest rate  –0.18 (0.11)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  6.63 (1.37)
Explainers of inefficiencies
    Constant  –2.79 (1.43)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Age of decisionmaker  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Experience of decisionmaker in hog business  n.s.  –3.20 (0.32)  n.s.  –1.48 (0.79)  n.s.
    Education of decisionmaker  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Formal/informal training of decisionmaker  n.s.  3.97 (1.26)  n.s.  3.89 (1.48)  n.s.
  Feeds credit (dummy)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  2.86 (1.10)  n.s.
    Capital credit (dummy)  –3.36 (0.82)  –2.21 (0.85)  n.s.  –2.58 (1.12)  n.s.
    Information  –6.94 (1.42)  n.s.  n.s.  –5.30 (1.70)  n.s.
    Buyer is a viajero  8.03 (1.55)  7.42 (1.47)    3.09 (1.10)  n.s.
    Environmental cost  –0.17 (0.09)  0.36 (0.10)  n.s.  0.61 (0.21)  –0.11 (0.03)
    Fee contract (dummy)  –6.25 (1.89)    n.s.    –0.86 (0.46)
    Region (dummy; Bukidnon = 1)  –2.26 (0.85).  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  –0.68 (0.20)
    Log likelihood function  –263.32  –171.24  –49.45  –107.98  –101.17
    LR test (one-sided)  50.07  60.24  14.89  72.42  27.99
  g  0.88  0.97  0.68  0.95  0.11
Source: Authors’ estimation using UPLB-IFPRI (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.that  vertically  integrated  operations  (en-
gaged  in  fixed-fee  contractual  arrange-
ments) are more profit-efficient, even in the 
case of larger-scale operations. The proxies 
for access to information (such as educa-
tion, age, experience, formal/informal train-
ing,  and  various  sources  of  information, 
such  as  local  media  and  cellular  phones) 
and  assets  (feeds  and  capital  credit  dum-
mies) are not significant for the regression 
with larger-scale farms and contract farms. 
This is not surprising, probably because all 
these larger farms and contract farms have 
solved their access issues, unlike the smaller 
farms and independent farms, where there   
is more variation. Thus, access to various 
sources of information, such as local media 
and cellular phones, was significant when 
large and small farms were pooled, but not 
for large farms alone.
  Brazilian  swine  farms  (Table  7.11) 
showed interesting results. Unlike dairy and 
layer farms, the profit-efficient swine farms 
were  headed  by  more  educated  decision-
makers who had been in the swine business 
longer  and  by  those  located  in  the  south 
(Paraná)  and  center-west  (Mato  Grosso, 
Mato  Grosso  do  Sul,  and  Goiás)  states. 
The location effect could be explained by 
the fact that the swine industry has already 
begun to concentrate geographically in re-
moter areas of the center-west, which is also 
true in the case of broiler farms, but not to 
a greater extent than are layer farms, which 
are more concentrated in the southern and 
southeastern  states.  Farm  characteristics 
that are associated with profit inefficiency 
are having older operators who have been 
managing the farm for a longer time. Age 
and experience seem to be related to a lack 
of  enthusiasm  to  adopt  new  management 
skills and technologies. Another proxy for 
access  to  information  is  the  information 
index that turned out to be associated with 
profit  inefficiency.  It  is  possible  that  the 
more informed the farmers are, the less ded- 
icated they are to farm activities, probably 
because the contractor or integrator and not 
the farmer is in charge of most of the techni-
cal and economic decisions on the farm.
  The results for dairy farms are shown in 
Tables 7.12–7.14. As in several other cases 
described earlier, Table 7.12 shows that for 
Indian dairy farmers, hypothesized greater 
access to information (proxied by age, edu- 
cation, and access to different media sources) 
as an explainer of relative profit efficiency 
has a significant positive effect on the profit 
efficiency (that is, negative effects on in- 
efficiency) of the small and large and com- 
mercial farm sample, but more so for small 
farms.  Also,  farms  located  farther  from 
the market are less efficient, ceteris paribus. 
As for the medium-sized farms producing 
more than 20 but less than 80 liters of milk 
per day (with 4–10 milk cows), access to 
information  has  no  significant  effect  on 
relative profit efficiency, which means that 
differential  access  to  information  did  not 
distinguish medium-sized farms from each 
other.
  For  medium-sized  and  both  large  and 
commercial dairy farms in India, environ-
mental mitigation cost had no significant ef-
fect on profit efficiency. It had a significant 
effect only on small-sized farms, where it 
shows  up  as  increasing  relative  profit  ef-
ficiency. The truth is probably that waste 
disposal is less of a problem in the Asian 
dairy context than in any of the other cases 
described  earlier,  because  cow  manure  is 
actively  sought  as  a  soil  amendment  and 
even for fuel in some cases.
  Thai dairy farms exhibit the same pat-
tern as the larger-scale Indian dairy farms, 
and in fact most of the dairy farms in the 
Thai sample are close in size to the larger 
Indian dairy farms; for example, medium-
scale dairy farms in Thailand (41 percent 
of  the  total  dairy  sample)  have  the  same 
average  number  of  in-milk  cows  (15)  as 
the commercial dairy farms in India; Thai 
small-scale dairy farms (34 percent of the 
total dairy sample) have the same average 
number of in-milk cows (6) as the large-
scale dairy farms in India. Differential ac-
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Table 7.11    Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit 
inefficiency on Brazilian swine farms
Explanatory variable  Coefficient  Standard error
Stochastic profit frontier
    Constant  0.677  0.259
    Price of feed  –0.520  0.894
    Price of hired labor  n.s.
    Price of output  0.490  0.156
    Dummy complete cycle (1 = yes; 0 = no)  –0.163  0.043
    Dummy integrate (1 = yes; 0 = no)  0.231  0.068
    Land includes agricultural land  n.s.
    Family labor  n.s.
    Capital  n.s.
Explainers of inefficiencies
    Constant  –0.897  5.335
    Length of time of decisionmaker on this farm  1.413  0.570
    Level of education of decisionmaker  –0.473  0.290
    Age of decisionmaker  1.753  0.930
    Length of time of decisionmaker in activity  –1.182  0.460
    Animal concentration on the farm  n.s.
    Environmental cost  n.s.
    Distance from the city  n.s.
    Information index  0.300  0.131
    State dummy Santa Catarina  –3.055  1.175
    State dummy Paraná  n.s.
    State dummy Mato Grosso do Sul  –2.303  1.130
    State dummy Mato Grosso  –3.757  1.725
    State dummy Goiás  –3.018  1.675
    State dummy Rio Grande de Sul  n.s.
  s2  1.067  0.462
  g  0.996  0.003
    Log likelihood ratio  –25.16
    LR test  123.72
  N  141
Source: Authors’ estimation using CEPEA-ESALQ/USP-FAO/LEAD (2002).
Note: n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.
cess  to  information  (proxied  by  age  and 
years of education), distance between farms 
and the nearest community and waterway, 
and environmental mitigation efforts did not 
help  distinguish  relative  profit  efficiency 
among Thai dairy farms. The relative profit 
efficiency of Brazilian dairy farms (Table 
7.14) is driven positively by the degree of 
family  involvement  in  the  enterprise  (the 
negative coefficient means that it is good   
for  efficiency),  the  decisionmaker’s  being 
the owner and living on the farm, access to 108      CHAPTER 7
Table 7.12    Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit 
inefficiency on indian dairy farms
      Large and
  Small farms  Medium farms  commercial farms
Explanatory variable  (N = 196)  (N = 147)  (N = 168)
Stochastic profit frontier
    Constant  5.91  5.63  2.43 
  (0.96)  (1.50)  (0.80)
    Price of milk  n.s.  –0.45  0.42 
    (0.22)  (0.21)
    Price of fodder  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Price of feed  n.s.  n.s.  –0.68 
      (0.20)
    Family labor  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Wage rate  –0.93  n.s.  0.49 
  (0.31)    (0.19)
    Family labor × wage rate  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Land  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Building and equipment  n.s.  0.16  0.07 
    (0.04)  (0.03)
    Land × building and equipment  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
Explainers of inefficiency
    Constant  –2.28  n.s.  n.s. 
  (1.22) 
  Age of decisionmaker  –1.59  n.s.  n.s. 
  (0.60) 
    Education of decisionmaker  –0.45  n.s.  n.s. 
  (0.09) 
    Distance of land from market  2.41  n.s.  n.s. 
  (0.82) 
    Access to information  –8.84  n.s.  –0.90 
  (0.67)    (0.49)
    Access to credit  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.
    Environmental cost  –1.27  n.s.  n.s. 
  (0.44) 
    Zone dummy  3.95  n.s.  1.29 
  (0.90)    (0.69)
  g  0.96  0.99  0.90
    Log likelihood function  –198.42  –98.57  –105.52
    LR test (one-sided error)  71.80  44.85  30.34
Source: Authors’ estimation using IIM-IFPRI (2003).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.EMPiRiCAl REsulTs      109
Table 7.13    Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit 
inefficiency on Thai dairy farms
Explanatory variable  Coefficient  Standard error
Stochastic profit frontier
    Constant  –10.627  4.721
    Log of output price  7.580  1.911
    Log of price of concentrate feed  n.s.
    Log of price of roughage  n.s.
    Log of capital cost  0.251  0.099
    Log of farmland  0.207  0.105
Explainers of inefficiency
    Delta (constant)  n.s.
    Male operator (dummy variable)  n.s.
    Log of age of operator  n.s.
    Log of years of education (maximum years of operator’s or  
        spouse’s education)  n.s.
    Log of distance of farm to community (km)  n.s.
    Log of distance of farm to waterway (km)  n.s.
    Environmental cost incurred (baht per head) (predicted value)  n.s.
  s2  n.s.
  g  0.981  0.064
  N  84
    Log likelihood function  –110.73
    Wald c2 Test (5)  36.66
    Number of restrictions  6
Source: Authors’ estimation using TDRI-FAO/LEAD (2002).
Note: n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.
different media sources (information index), 
and  location  (as  in  the  case  of  eggs  and 
swine producers). Environmental mitigation 
efforts had no significant effect on profit ef-
ficiency for dairy farms in Brazil.
  In sum, unlike the direct mass balance 
approach in Chapter 7, which clearly shows 
that large farms pollute more per unit of out- 
put,  the  indirect  econometric  approach  of 
this chapter provides mixed results with re- 
gard to Hypothesis 4 (that uncompensated 
negative  environmental  externalities  favor 
the relative profit efficiency of larger farms 
more than smaller ones). This is probably 
due to the facts that the environmental mea- 
sures used in the econometric work are of 
uneven quality across the country and com-
modity case studies and also that they are 
likely  to  be  correlated—and  in  different 
ways across cases—with other factors that 
might be relevant to explaining profit effi- 
ciency, but were not included in the analysis.
  Of  the  ten  cases  examined  in  Tables 
7.5–7.14, the environmental mitigation vari- 
able  was  negative  and  statistically  signif-
icant  in  four  of  the  country/commodity 
regressions—for Philippine and Thai broil-
ers,  Philippine  swine  (large-scale  farms 
only), and Indian milk (small farms only)—
suggesting that greater environmental miti-
gation efforts decreased the distance from 
the profit frontier (that is, increased relative 110      CHAPTER 7
Table 7.14    Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit 
inefficiency on Brazilian dairy farms
Explanatory variable  Coefficient  Standard error
Stochastic profit frontier
    Constant  8.216  0.646
    Humid feed price  –0.066  0.022
    Dry feed price  n.s.
    Medicine price  –0.059  0.034
    Genetic price  0.033  0.016
    Hired labor price  n.s.
    Output price  0.554  0.111
    Membership in a cooperative  n.s.
    Land includes agricultural land  n.s.
    Family labor  –1.340  0.091
    Capital  –0.227  0.088
Explainers of inefficiencies
    Constant  –7.774  2.567
    Decisionmaker is owner  –1.957  0.883
    Decisionmaker is family member  –2.522  0.885
    Decisionmaker has experience in dairy (years)  0.643  0.288
    Decisionmaker lives on property  –1.659  0.653
    Age of decisionmaker  1.239  0.703
    Education of decisionmaker  n.s.
    Decisionmaker had training  1.638  0.632
    Distance between the farm and the city (km)  n.s.
    Information index  –0.689  0.199
    Environmental cost  n.s.
    State dummy Rio Grande del Sul  n.s.
    State dummy Santa Catarina  n.s.
    State dummy Paraná  n.s.
    State dummy São Paulo  –2.169  0.896
    State dummy Minas Gerais  n.s.
  s2  1.342  0.185
  g  0.992  0.004
    Log likelihood function  –38.826
    LR test of the one-sided error  229.32
  N  160
Source: Authors’ estimation using CEPEA-ESALQ/USP-FAO/LEAD (2002).
Note: n.s., statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.profit efficiency). The opposite was the case 
for Brazilian layer farms and large Indian 
layer farms. This is a case where the more 
environmentally friendly behavior of small 
and large farms may also be associated with 
other  practices  conducive  to  productivity 
but  not  adequately  measured  by  the  first 
equation in the frontier model.
  The regressions for Indian layer farms 
(large farms only) and Brazilian layer farms 
both  suggest  that  increased  mitigation  is 
associated with decreased profit efficiency. 
This  suggests  that  increased  expenditure 
on mitigation comes at a net financial loss 
relative to profits (as would probably be the 
case for small-scale and independent swine 
farms  in  the  Philippines).  Nevertheless, 
larger farmers are more likely than small-
holders  to  be  held  accountable  for  pollu- 
tion in all the countries studied. Therefore, 
internalization of the cost of pollution as a 
counterweight to the cost of mitigation may 
in  some  cases  make  mitigation  expendi-
tures better for profits and profit efficiency 
for  larger  farms  than  for  smaller  ones,   
ceteris paribus, as suggested by the ambigu-
ous results for Philippine broiler producers 
in Table 7.5 and for Indian dairy farms in 
Table 7.12.
  Thus,  while  the  direct  mass  balance 
estimates of the previous chapter strongly 
suggest that large farms reap the benefits 
of not paying for their pollution to a greater 
extent  than  do  small  farms,  the  indirect 
econometric  approach  here  has  difficulty 
replicating  this  result  across  commodities 
and countries. The bottom line is probably 
that Hypothesis 4 is true, but not enough so 
to seriously affect the relative competitive-
ness of large and small farms to the extent 
of excluding the small from the market.
  With regard to Hypothesis 5 (that the 
relative profit efficiency of small farms is 
more sensitive to transaction costs than is 
that of large farms), farm-specific transac-
tion costs matter significantly in explaining 
relative profit efficiency in both the small 
and large farm samples, and this is a fairly 
consistent result across countries and com-
modities.  On  the  whole,  the  econometric 
work does not support the “more” part of 
Hypothesis 5, except in the case of Philippine 
and Indian broiler farms and Indian dairy 
farms  (particularly  medium-sized  farms 
with more than 20 but fewer than 70 milk 
cows). For smallholder producers, the main 
issues  appear  to  be  differential  access  to 
telephone service and the market informa-
tion that goes along with this and access to 
formal  sector  or  cheaper  suppliers’  credit   
for feed purchases. The same things matter   
for larger farms, but these farms appear on 
the whole to have dealt with access issues, 
so these variables do not serve well to ex- 
plain  interfarm  differences  in  profit  effi-
ciency among larger farms.
Summary of Results for  
the Hypothesis Tests
What does all of this mean for smallhold-
ers? Table 7.15 shows a summary of results 
for the issues posed in Table 1.3.
Hypothesis 1: Small-scale producers have 
higher or equal profits per unit of output 
than  do  large  producers.  The  results 
here were mixed, but for the most part 
independent smallholders did better on 
profits per unit of output than did large 
independent  livestock  farms  in  India 
and the Philippines, but not in Brazil and 
Thailand. The latter two countries and 
their country samples had larger farms 
than  the  first  two,  on  average.  It  is 
probably not too much of a stretch to 
conclude that smallholder livestock pro- 
ducers  were  doing  relatively  worse  in 
the more advanced agricultural economies 
of  Brazil  and  Thailand.  On  the  other 
hand, they seemed to be largely holding 
their own in India and the Philippines, 
at  least  for  the  time  being,  especially   
if family labor is not costed. If unit prof-
its give a snapshot of current competi-
tiveness,  the  next  item  yields  insights 
as to where things will go in a market 
economy.
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Table 7.15    summary of empirical results
Hypothesis tested  Actual findings  Source
H1: Smallholders have profits per unit of output    Independent smallholders have higher profits per unit than  Tables 5.4–5.7 
      that are higher than or equal to those of       large farms: broilers in the Philippines and India, layers in  
large producers.        India (w/o costing family labor) and Thailand, milk in  
India and Brazil (n.s.), and swine in the Philippines. Small  
contract farms in the Philippines did better than large ones  
in the case of broilers (n.s.) and swine. Large contract  
farms did better than small contract farms in the case of  
broilers in India (w/o costing family labor), Thailand, and  
Brazil (n.s.). 
H2: Smallholders are more profit-efficient users    In cases where significant numbers of small-scale and large-  Tables 7.1–7.4 
    of farm resources than large producers, other       scale farms were observed, only one case has shown that  
    things equal.        smallholders have greater profit efficiency than large ones,  
and this is the case of independent swine farms in the  
Philippines. 
H3: Small farmers expend a greater amount of   Smallholders in all cases, except large dairy farms in   Tables 6.10–6.12 
    effort/investment in abatement of negative        Thailand, pay more per unit of output in mitigating        
    environmental externalities than do large farmers.      environmental externalities than do large farmers. 
H4: Uncompensated negative environmental    Large farms, particularly layer farms in India, are polluting  Tables 7.5, 7.7, 
    externalities favor the nominal profit efficiency         more, but evidence is mixed: for large Indian layer farms,       7.9–7.10;     
    of large farms over that of small ones.      being environmentally friendly comes at a price and hurts       Figures 6.4–6.7 
      competitiveness; for large Philippine broiler and swine    
      farms, spending more on environmental mitigation gives        
      them a profit edge by achieving lower mortality rates and  
      other efficiency gains relative to other farmers who are  
      not environmentally friendly. 
H5: Profits of small-scale producers are more    Profits of smallholder swine producers in the Philippines and  Tables 7.10 and 7.12 
    sensitive to transaction costs than are those of       dairy farmers in India were sensitive to transaction cost  
    large-scale producers.      variables in terms of access to information.   
H6: Contract farmers are more profit-efficient   In cases where significant numbers of contract and indepen-  Table 7.1 and 
    than independent farmers at comparable scales       dent farms were observed, only small and large contract       Figure 7.1b;   
    of operation.      farms for broilers in the Philippines were more efficient       Table 7.3 
      than independent farms at comparable scales of operation;        
      small independent swine farms were more profit-efficient  
      than small contract swine farms. 
Note: n.s., not significant.
Hypothesis  2:  Small-scale  producers  are 
more efficient users of farm resources 
to  secure  profits  than  are  large-scale 
producers, other things equal. Unfortu-
nately for smallholders, this hypothesis 
was  supported  only  for  the  Philippine 
swine case when considering indepen-
dent farms, and even there the relative 
advantage  of  smallholders  over  large 
farms  was  small.  The  hypothesis  was 
not  supported  for  any  of  the  contract 
farming  cases,  although  smallholder 
contract farmers in the Philippines were 
more  profit-efficient  than  independent 
smallholders producing broilers.
Hypothesis  3:  Small  farmers  expend  a 
greater  amount  of  effort/investment  in 
abatement  of  negative  environmental 
externalities per unit of output than do 
large  farmers.  As  shown  in  Chapter 
6, the hypothesis was supported by all 
samples  except  those  of  larger-scale dairy  producers  in  Thailand.  Regard- 
less of motive or end use, smallholders 
clearly “spent” more resources in terms 
of time and money in dealing with ani-
mal waste.
Hypothesis  4:  Uncompensated  negative 
environmental  externalities  favor  the 
nominal profit efficiency of large farms 
over  small  ones,  ceteris  paribus.  This 
hypothesis is supported by statistically 
significant results only in the stochastic 
profit frontiers for large farms produc-
ing  broilers  and  swine  in  the  Philip-
pines.  There  may  be  significant  spin-
off effects of environmental mitigation 
efforts  that  our  analysis  cannot  fully 
explore. For example, larger farms that 
spend  more  on  environmental  mitiga-
tion  may  recoup  their  investment  by 
achieving  lower  mortality  rates  and 
other efficiency gains relative to other 
farmers  who  are  not  environmentally 
friendly. Further, large farms that spend 
a lot on environmental mitigation may 
also recoup their investment by selling 
animal waste as fertilizer.
  Other things equal, the results also sug-
gest that a large environmental mitigation 
effort  was  actually  associated  with  lower 
relative  profit  efficiency  for  small  swine 
farms in the Philippines and for large Indian 
layer farms. For these farms, being environ-
mentally friendly comes at a price and hurts 
competitiveness  vis-à-vis  those  who  get 
away with polluting.
  On  the  other  hand,  the  mass  balance 
results clearly show that small farms are in 
a much better position than large ones to 
absorb excess animal wastes on their land.   
If they in fact do so, as suggested by the 
higher  mitigation  expenditures  of  small-
holders per unit of output, it could be in-
ferred that they are polluting less than large 
farms  and  thus  are  internalizing  a  higher 
share of the negative externality from ani-
mal waste.
  On balance, the evidence is not convinc-
ing that uncompensated pollution is giving 
large farms a decisive profit edge over small 
farms, although it seems likely that they are 
in  fact  polluting  more  per  unit  of  output   
and that if environmental regulations were 
fully  enforced  in  the  sample  countries,  it 
would cut into unit profits at least as much 
and probably more for large farms than for 
small ones.
Hypothesis 5: Profits of small-scale produc-
ers are more sensitive to “transaction 
costs” than are those of large-scale pro- 
ducers. Although the relative profit effi-
ciency of most farm groups investigated 
was  sensitive  to  the  transaction  cost 
variables  included,  this  was  unique  to 
smallholders in the case of India broilers 
and was actually contradicted in the runs 
for Indian layers, where these variables 
were much stronger for larger farms.
Hypothesis 6: Contract farmers are more 
profit-efficient  than  independent  farm-
ers at comparable scales of operation. 
Although only the Philippine case study 
had large enough samples of large and 
small contract farmers and large and small 
independent farmers to allow for a ro-
bust four-way comparison, this hypoth-
esis was well supported by Philippine 
broiler  farms  but  not  by  swine  farms. 
Smallholder independent swine farms are 
more profit-efficient than small contract 
producers.
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Conclusions
T
his study has assessed the outlook for smallholders in livestock farming in a selec-
tion of fast-growing developing countries, given the growing share of output coming 
from larger farms, particularly in the case of pig and poultry products, which have 
accounted for roughly three quarters of the growth in developing country livestock production 
since 1980. The potential negative impact of increased livestock production on the environment   
was also assessed in terms of how it affects and is affected by the scaling-up of individual   
farm sizes. The overall objective was to explore the scope for policy measures to provide a 
more level playing field for smallholders if in fact the fast pace of scaling-up is unduly driven 
by factors other than nondistorting incentives, such as economies of scale in technology or 
management.
  The empirical approach lay in distinguishing “genuine” economies of scale (such as those 
resulting from lower unit prices for feed bought in bulk and from higher feed conversion 
ratios) through the specification of a stochastic profit frontier model with inefficiency effects 
(Battese and Coelli 1995; Coelli, Rao, and Battese 1998) from “false” economies of scale 
(such as scale non-neutral subsidies, externalities, and transaction costs). The frontier model 
yields a view of the average relative profit efficiency of specific groups of producers. Coupled 
with the actual profit performances of the groups in question, this approach indicates which 
groups are likely to be more competitive over time. The inefficiency term yields insights as 
to how much the frontier model results are driven by factors that are distortionary and that, in 
principle, should and can be influenced by policy action.
  All the country studies confirmed that livestock production was both growing and con-
centrating rapidly, with more and more animals being kept per square kilometer. Production 
in the 1980s and 1990s tended to concentrate around capital cities and other major demand 
centers. Concentration over the period studied tended to be led by large-scale investments in 
monogastric livestock production, and there is evidence of significant environmental issues 
associated with this expansion. Since the late 1990s, in all study countries, expansion of larger 
farms has begun to move away from periurban areas to remoter areas where environmental 
issues, disease control, and feed supply are less problematic.
  The country studies also indicated that smallholder output is continuing to grow in most 
cases, and at high rates in cases such as those of milk in India and swine in the Philippines. 
Smallholder dairy producers in Thailand have persevered largely due to high levels of policy 
support. For some commodities, such as broilers and eggs, smallholders in all four countries 
have been rapidly losing market share. Although there have been smallholder exits from poul-
try activities in all countries, some former smallholders from the early 1990s are now large 
farmers in all countries, sometimes migrating to new areas, such as the center-west in Brazil, 
or expanding in situ, as in southern India.
114Profits and Relative Profit 
Efficiency: Who Does Best 
across Size Groups?
Comparative Unit Prices and 
Profitability by Class of Farm
The results here, detailed in Chapter 5 and 
the  country  studies,  show  that  in  several 
cases  if  family  labor  is  not  costed,  inde-
pendent smallholders made statistically sig-
nificantly higher profits per unit than larger-
scale farmers (7 out of 11 cases examined). 
Cases in point were slaughter hogs in the 
Philippines, broilers in India and the Philip-
pines, eggs in India and Thailand, and milk 
in Brazil and India. Large farms had higher 
unit profits in the cases of swine, milk, and 
broilers in Thailand and in the cases of eggs 
and swine in Brazil. This finding disappears 
for contract farms, however, where in three 
out of five cases large contract farms did 
better per unit than small farms and there 
was  no  statistically  significant  difference 
between unit profits of large and small farms 
for the other two cases. The unit profit ad-
vantage of independent smallholders vis-à-
vis large independents also largely vanishes 
in the Philippines if family labor is costed at 
market rates, and it disappears altogether in 
India, even though unit profits themselves 
remain positive. As argued previously in this 
report, costing family labor at full market 
rates is inappropriate, so these results should 
be thought of as a lower bound on small-
holder competitiveness.
  As noted in Chapter 3, the farm-specific 
average output prices collected varied signifi- 
cantly across farms. Large farms in the sur- 
veys  received  on  average  higher  output 
prices per unit than small farms; the two ex- 
ceptions in the country surveys were inde-
pendent broiler farms in the Philippines and 
contract hog farms in the Philippines. Further 
research might well be directed to explaining 
this anomaly. As discussed previously, prices 
reflect a variety of supply and demand fac-
tors. On the supply side, larger farms that are 
more efficient may increase their competi-
tiveness by discounting prices to bulk buyers. 
On  the  demand  side,  buyer  perceptions  of 
higher quality and safety in relatively more 
branded  products  from  larger  farms  com-
mand price premiums in the market.
  It  is  difficult  to  know  how  much  of 
buyer perception is due to true quality dif-
ferences and how much is due to transac-
tions costs, which, as shown in Chapter 7, 
has a disproportionate effect on smallhold-
ers. If a buyer is not sure that a product is 
safe or of high quality—neither one of which 
can  be  observed  at  sale—and  the  farmer 
cannot brand the output somehow, buyers 
will pay only the lowest common denomi-
nator price. Larger farms with higher and 
steadier volumes of output can build up a 
steady clientele and establish market trust 
and reputation more easily than can small-
holders. The same is true of integrators.
  The  fact  that  smaller  farms  typically 
receive  lower  prices  for  their  output  and 
still manage to realize higher unit profits in 
some cases is only partly explained by not 
costing family labor, which, ceteris paribus, 
lowers the unit costs of smallholder produc-
ers more than those of large producers. The 
quality of supervision and care exerted by 
smallholders over their own stock is clearly 
superior to that in large enterprises in some 
cases  as  well.  Given  the  higher  level  of 
output prices received by large farms and 
the lower prices per unit paid for purchased 
inputs such as feed, as shown in Chapter 5, 
the issue of increasing output prices is of 
particular importance to smallholders.
  Two  issues  are  critical  here:  how  to 
improve  the  actual  quality  of  smallholder 
livestock products and the separate issue of   
how smallholders can gain recognition in 
the marketplace for improved quality when 
their sales are infrequent and increasingly 
anonymous as market chains become longer. 
Insights on this come from the five cases of 
contract farming studied, involving slaugh-
ter  hogs  in  the  Philippines  and  Thailand   
and broilers in India, the Philippines, and 
Thailand.
  There  was  less  variation  in  prices  re-
ceived by large and small contract farmers 
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large  and  small  independents.  There  was 
also not much of a gap between prices re- 
ceived  by  large  independents  and  those   
received by contract farmers, large or small. 
Scale-related differences in unit profits for 
contract farms are driven more by the cost 
side,  unlike  in  the  case  of  the  indepen- 
dent farmers. It seems likely that the con- 
tract farming schemes for monogastric live-
stock serve in some sense to brand small- 
holder  products,  certifying  the  quality  of 
output based on the certifiable quality of in- 
puts provided by integrators.
  Although further, more action-oriented 
research is required in this area, it seems 
clear from the present study that contract 
farming is a promising way to help small 
farms establish market trust and reputation 
and  thus  to  maintain  their  competitive- 
ness vis-à-vis large independent farms. Even 
without  contracting  and  with  costing  of 
family  labor,  smallholders  in  some  com-
modities  in  the  Asian  cases  were  able  to 
achieve higher unit profits than larger farm-
ers, suggesting that the latter will have some 
difficulty driving the former out of the mar-
ket for some time to come. However, the 
outlook for small farms in Brazil is not very 
rosy according to the results here, nor is the 
two-cow dairy farm likely to be able to sur-
vive long in Thailand with further subsidy, 
unless producing milk is a hobby activity.
  Furthermore,  even  the  cases  where 
smallholders  had  higher  unit  profits  need   
to  be  kept  in  perspective.  In  the  Philip-
pines for example, the total average annual 
income  from  swine-raising  for  farms  in 
the  independent  smallholder  sample  was 
US$309  per  farm,  whereas  for  the  larger 
farm sample it was US$9,650 per farm. The 
latter does not include the profits of the larg-
est farms, which belong directly to integra-
tors and were not surveyed here. Even more   
pronounced  gaps  could  be  observed  be-
tween  the  incomes  of  large  and  small   
farms in Brazil and Thailand. Thus, despite 
the  better  per-unit  profit  of  smallholders, 
large farmers might still drive them out if 
they are more efficient users of resources 
for production.
Comparative Profit Efficiency
Unlike profit per unit, which is a descriptive 
variable, relative profit efficiency per farm 
is an analytical result from a modeling ef-
fort. Chapter 7 computes and compares mean 
relative profit efficiencies across countries, 
commodities,  scales  of  farm,  and  degree 
of vertical integration. Overall, the results 
support the view that small farms are less 
efficient at securing profits than large farms, 
even when family labor is not costed, and 
more so if it is.
  Of the 12 country/commodity cases re-
ported in Chapter 7 where sample size per-
mitted testing small-scale versus large-scale 
farms without costing family labor, only one 
unambiguously showed a greater mean rela-
tive profit efficiency for smallholders. This 
was the case of independent swine farmers 
in the Philippines. When this case is re-run 
with profits reflecting costed family labor, 
the  greater  relative  efficiency  of  smaller 
operations largely disappears. For the three 
cases involving independent farm samples 
tested, the large farm group did better on 
average,  although  the  difference  was  not 
significant in two of these cases (layer and 
swine farms in Brazil). In all four of the 
cases where sample size permitted testing 
smallholder  contracts  versus  larger  scale 
contracts, the latter did significantly better.
  The  examples  of  swine  in  Brazil  and 
Thailand,  poultry  in  Thailand,  broilers  in 
India,  and  milk  in  India  and  Thailand   
show that the efficiency advantage of small-
holders increases substantially when going 
from the smaller backyard producers to the 
smallholder commercial model, but relative 
efficiency  is  fairly  static  in  the  middle 
ground  and  rises  again  only  with  much 
larger sizes of operation. In part this is be- 
cause  the  unit  cost  advantages  of  small- 
holders in the calculations arising from an 
uncosted stock of family labor become less 
important as output increases. More impor-
tant, there appear to be especially signifi-
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finishing, say, 15–20 piglets a year, as in 
the backyard case, to finishing 150–200, as 
in the smallholder commercial case.1 The 
smallholder  commercial  model,  which  is 
really a scaled-up and improved version of 
the backyard model, would seem to be a vi-
able route in Asia for technology and insti-
tutional development targeted at improving 
smallholder livelihoods through swine, and 
it will probably require some form of verti-
cal coordination to be successful over the 
medium term.
  Milk production clearly suggests greater 
profit efficiency in the Asian sample countries 
when going from relatively small to large-
scale  operations  (consistent  with  roughly 
15–30 milking cows). All cases of milk pro-
duction suggest that there are greater profit-
efficiency gains for much larger farms. It is 
not clear from the results whether milk pro-
duction is and will continue to be a small-
holder activity in Asia. It seems likely that 
1- to 2-cow dairy farms will grow in size to 
10- to 20-cow farms in the Indian and Thai 
contexts over the medium run.
  As shown in Chapter 7, vertical coor-
dination such as fixed-fee contract farming 
and dairy cooperatives clearly improves the 
relative  profit  efficiency  of  smallholder 
farmers, even if unit profits were typically 
lower for contract farmers because capital 
costs and risks are shared by the integra-
tor.2  Contract  farming  works  to  improve 
efficiency (and thus competitiveness) by re- 
ducing transaction costs. The next section 
gives  insights  on  which  transaction  costs 
and other factors explain why specific farms 
are profit-inefficient.
  All of this abstracts from possible econ-
omies  of  scale  in  collection,  processing, 
and distribution of products such as milk 
and poultry, where scale economies on the 
marketing  (not  production)  side  may  be 
major.3 The future of smallholder livestock 
farming  in  developing  countries  will  be 
largely driven over the medium to long run 
by  the  issue  of  whether  collective  action 
such  as  that  of  producer  associations  or 
cooperatives  or  contract  farming  schemes 
can reduce the transaction costs facing in-
dividual smallholders sufficiently that they 
can continue to compete with larger farms. 
The next section will look in detail at the 
factors that explain why specific farms were 
more or less profit-efficient.
Why Are Some Farms  
More Efficient at Making 
Profits than Others?
The same analytical approach that yielded 
the results on efficiency levels in the previ-
ous subsection also permits assessment of 
the determinants of relative profit efficiency 
across farms. In effect, we are simultane-
ously explaining why some farms are less 
profit-efficient than others in terms of cross-
farm differences in environmental mitiga-
tion  behavior,  differences  across  farms  in 
access to information and assets, and differ-
ences (if any) in access to policy subsidies.
The Role of  
Environmental Externalities
Two indirect approaches were used to get at 
scale differences in the capture of environ-
mental  externalities  (in  other  words,  why 
one farm incurs costs while another receives 
the benefits). The first approach measured 
the  ability  of  a  household  to  absorb  the 
nutrients created by its livestock operations 
on the household land surrounding the op-
eration by calculating individual household 
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1That is, going from the annual output of a single sow to that of 8 to 10 sows.
2The Philippine and Thai cases show that profits can actually be higher for contractors in situations of acute 
competition where even large-scale independents are having trouble remaining profitable.
3This assertion is not investigated by this study but is widely and probably correctly believed.mass balances. The second approach con-
structed an index of the cost of mitigating 
potential environmental problems per farm, 
which was then used as a regressor in the 
inefficiency  term  of  the  stochastic  profit 
frontier as an indirect measure of the farm- 
specific  degree  of  internalization  of  envi-
ronmental  impact.  It  was  not  practical  to 
perform more direct measures of environ-
mental harm specifically attributable to the 
activities of each farm.
Mass Balances.    The mass balance calcu-
lations were used as rough indicators of po-
tential soil nutrient loading from livestock 
waste. The mass balance estimates for swine 
production in all the study countries showed 
a range of excess nitrogen and phosphorus 
balances across farms. For each of the three 
countries  in  which  swine  production  was 
sampled,  the  larger  producers  showed  a 
greater degree of nutrient loading and thus 
a need to specifically implement adequate 
disposal methods for manure. Each coun-
try  had  some  households  with  sufficient 
land  to  assimilate  the  nitrogen  produced. 
Smaller producers were much more likely 
to  have  positive  balances  from  the  op-
eration of crop land that could potentially 
absorb the nutrients. Whether or not they 
use the manure this way is another matter; 
the Philippines survey reported that some 
smallholders simply dump swine waste on 
the  slopes  leading  to  creeks.  Brazil,  with 
its larger amount of land availability, had 
many households with positive balances in 
every size category. However, most of the 
sampled large-scale producers in the rest of 
the study countries had negative balances 
stemming from inadequate land on which to 
dispose of the manure generated from their 
livestock operations.
  Nutrient  balances  for  poultry  showed 
wide variation between countries. The house- 
hold surveys indicated that large producers 
are much more likely to have large negative 
mass balances, while smaller producers are 
more likely to have very small deficits in 
absorption or none at all. The more nega-
tive the mass balance, the greater the risk of 
nutrient loading. However, in some of the 
study  countries  large-  and  medium-scale 
producers were found to have small deficits 
(only  faintly  negative  mass  balances).  In 
Thailand,  most  small-  and  medium-scale 
broiler producers had only mildly negative 
mass balances, although large-scale produc-
ers had more negative mass balances, and 
some  of  them  were  quite  negative.  Only 
India had small producers with nutrient bal-
ances of less than –10 metric tons, indicat-
ing a more uniform potential among small-
holders  for  sustainability.  However,  India 
had no households with positive balances, 
which is indicative of the higher number of 
households  producing  on  relatively  small 
plots of land.
  Relative to pig and poultry production, 
the mass balances for dairy production are 
comparatively in balance. Dairy production, 
by its nature, requires land. Thus, produc-
ers  may  have  sufficient  land  to  properly 
dispose of manure or may have access to 
nearby land. It is possible that small-scale 
producers in India or Thailand may not need 
sophisticated manure disposal mechanisms 
as long as the ratio of animals kept to land   
remains at the current average levels. On   
the other hand, the semiarid areas of these 
countries are largely deficient in soil organic 
content, and there cow manure is a vital soil 
additive.
Environmental  Mitigation  Effort.    A  sec-
ond empirical approach was also used that 
gets around the issue of whether households 
actually  exploited  the  potential  resources 
they  have  for  environmental  mitigation. 
This yielded a farm-specific measure of en- 
vironmental mitigation in terms of money 
units of mitigation effort per farm and per unit 
of output. This assumes that negative ex-
ternalities within a country and commodity 
group  are  equal  for  each  unit  of  output. 
Farmers who make an effort, financial or 
otherwise, to prevent problems by spread-
ing  manure  or  otherwise  cleaning  up  or 
compensating their neighbors for problems 
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portion of the negative externalities created 
per unit of output. If externalities are the 
same per unit of output, greater mitigation 
effort (measured in terms of money spent 
per unit of output) means greater internal-
ization, other things equal.
  All  the  country  studies  found  that  for 
broilers, smaller producers mitigated more 
per unit of output. However, this difference 
in  mitigation  effort  by  size  was  striking. 
Smaller producers scored on average more 
than five times more in environmental miti-
gation effort per unit of output than large 
farms in each country except Brazil. In the 
latter case, the difference was a factor of 
two.  For  Thailand,  the  mitigation  efforts 
per unit for egg-producing households were 
greater  than  for  broiler-producing  house-
holds. In Brazil, the opposite was seen. In 
the Philippines, small contract broiler pro-
ducers were found to have made a smaller 
effort  on  environmental  mitigation  than 
independents,  but  larger  contactors  made 
more of an effort than independents.
  Small-scale swine producers also made 
a greater effort per unit of output than did 
larger producers. The exception was found 
in the Philippines, where larger independent 
producers  expended  more  per  liveweight 
kilogram of output than medium-scale inde-
pendent producers, but less than small-scale 
producers.  Larger  producers  in  Thailand   
expended  considerably  less  per  unit  than 
smaller producers. In India, dairy producers’ 
environmental effort per liter of milk output 
declined with increasing size. Efforts were 
relatively constant across scales in Brazilian 
dairy. Small producers expended very little 
on  environment-related  costs  in  Thailand, 
but medium-sized producers expended five 
times more than large producers.
  On  the  whole,  the  mass  balance  and 
mitigation expenditure approaches are con-
sistent. As discussed in Chapter 6, small-
holders make a significantly greater effort 
to  mitigate  negative  environmental  exter-
nalities than larger-scale farmers. However, 
the  absolute  orders  of  magnitude  do  not 
suggest  that  this  is  a  major  explainer  of 
scaling-up, although it may be one factor.
  Chapter 6 also showed that results are 
mixed with regard to whether large farms 
are helped more by uncompensated negative 
externalities associated with their livestock 
production than is the case for small live-
stock farms. Differences in environmental 
mitigation across farms did not appear to be 
strong explainers of differences in relative 
profit efficiency.
  The brunt of the evidence is that within 
the class of large-scale operations for swine 
and poultry, greater effort to mitigate envi-
ronmental externalities seems to be associ-
ated with greater relative profit efficiency. 
This is clearest in the case of broiler and 
swine producers in the Philippines. Interest-
ingly, these tend to be mostly independent 
operations that are transitioning toward more 
industrial production, at least compared with 
other samples studied. It is conceivable that 
more environmentally responsible behavior 
on  the  larger  farms  is  correlated  with  the 
use of other best practices that, as a whole, 
boost  agricultural  productivity.  The  results 
for smallholders are more mixed, especially 
if contract and independent subsamples are 
considered  together.  Most  fee  (or  wage) 
contractors have to follow a standard set of 
environmental practices as part of their con-
tract, and they resemble larger-scale farmers 
in this respect more than other smallholders.
  The  environmental  mitigation  variable 
did  not  seem  to  have  much  influence  on 
relative  profit  efficiency  in  the  Brazilian 
and Thai dairy, Indian dairy (medium- and 
large-sized farms), India broiler, and Brazil 
swine samples. Egg producers in Brazil and 
India and smallholder swine producers in 
the  Philippines  that  spent  relatively  more 
on environmental mitigation tended to have 
lower relative profit efficiency at the end of 
the day, other things equal. It is interesting 
to speculate whether these subsamples op-
erated in conditions where it was relatively 
easier  to  ignore  environmental  issues  or   
perhaps  harder  to  follow  environmentally 
sound practices because of land scarcity.
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Information and Assets
Farm-specific  transaction  costs  seem  to 
matter greatly in explaining relative profit 
efficiency across farms in most of the sub- 
samples  studied,  large  and  small.  This 
means that relatively greater difficulties in 
securing  access  to  assets  and  information 
are prime explainers of differences in rela-
tive  profit  efficiency  within  the  group  in 
question. However, the differential impact 
across sizes of farm was different in differ- 
ent countries and for different commodities.
  Milk  production  is  one  sector  where 
farm-specific differences in transaction-cost 
proxy  variables  did  little  to  explain  dif-
ferences across farms in relative profit ef-
ficiency. It is likely that transaction costs 
for milk production almost all occur in the   
marketing chain (where they may be very 
high in fact; witness the success of dairy-
marketing  co-ops  worldwide)  and  not  at 
the level of production. Feed is mostly for-
age (avoiding the high credit- and quality-
related transaction costs packed into using 
concentrate feeds), and the timing of sales 
is a foregone conclusion, viz. daily.
  Yet even if transaction costs occur in dis- 
tribution and processing, they may be greater 
for integrators or dairy cooperatives dealing   
with smallholders than for those dealing with 
larger  farmers.  This  is  the  conclusion  of   
the Brazil country study as to why small- 
holders (in the Brazilian sense) are leaving 
milk production so quickly in Brazil: they 
are considered too costly to service by dair-
ies that are free to not do so since the recent 
repeal of the cooperative law.
  Transaction  costs  play  a  much  more 
defining  role  in  the  production  of  mono-
gastrics, where the timing of sale is more 
discretionary, the quality of inputs (genetics 
and feed concentrates) is critical to quality 
(requiring information), and 85 percent or 
the cost of production needs to be spent up 
front in feeder stock and feed. Broiler and 
egg sellers in the Indian samples, for exam- 
ple, had profit margins of less than 4 percent 
but could face up to 10 percent daily fluc-
tuations  in  prices.  Keeping  a  broiler  on 
feed for an extra two days beyond the usual   
42-day  cycle  would  wipe  out  the  profit 
margin. Philippine smallholder hog finish-
ers who could not convince buyers that they 
had animals with low percentages of back-
fat and no off-flavors of meat were paid up 
to 10 percent less per kilogram liveweight 
for hogs compared to contract farmers and 
large farms. For those cases where trans- 
action cost variables matter most to small-
holder  producers,  the  main  issues  appear 
to be access to various sources of market 
information and access to credit.
  With  regard  to  Hypothesis  5  (Profits 
of  small-scale  producers  are  more  sensi-
tive to transaction costs than are those of 
larger producers), the nuanced conclusion 
is that transaction costs matter greatly to the 
relative efficiency of smallholders, but they 
seem to matter to large farms as well. In 
some cases, such as for hog finishers in the 
Philippines,  the  transaction  cost  variables 
mattered greatly for the smallholder sample 
but had no statistically significant effect on 
the relative profit efficiency of large farms 
within the large-farm sample. The interpre-
tation of this result is not that transaction 
costs did not matter to those large farmers 
but that all sample members apparently had 
dealt with them sufficiently, so they did not 
explain differences in performance among 
them.
What Is the Outlook for 
Independent Smallholder 
Livestock Farming?
Conclusions  on  competitiveness  from  the 
tests of Hypotheses 1 (about relative unit 
profits)  and  2  (about  relative  profit  effi- 
ciency)  in  Chapter  7  indicate  that  small-
holders have a better chance in milk pro- 
duction  and  in  agricultural  economies 
where scaling-up has not progressed to the 
point it already has in Brazil and Thailand. 
In some cases, such as for hog farmers in 
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more competitive in informal local markets 
than are large-scale farmers, and these in-
formal markets have expanded enough in 
recent years to allow them to expand their 
production rapidly. Results for Hypothesis   
2 in Chapter 7 also suggest that scaling-up 
will  be  different  in  different  places  and 
for  different  commodities  but  is  likely  to 
continue to occur. Furthermore, as markets 
gravitate to higher-end concerns of quality 
and  safety,  smallholders  will  increasingly 
need to be associated with institutions that 
can supply the technology, inputs, informa-
tion, and accreditation necessary for them to 
compete in higher-value markets.
  Given  the  conclusions  in  Chapter  7 
concerning Hypotheses 3 (that smallholders 
mitigate environmental externalities more) 
and  4  (that  environmental  externalities 
favor large farms), it is clear that promot-
ing action on environmental concerns is not 
incompatible  with  promoting  small-scale 
livestock production and that many large-
scale  producers  still  need  an  incentive  to 
clean up their act. It seems plausible that 
over  time,  enforcement  of  environmental 
regulations will be more similar to enforce-
ment of health regulations, where all pro-
ducers will be forced to bear the same unit 
cost regardless of size.
  From findings in Chapter 7 pertaining 
to  Hypotheses  5  (that  smallholder  profits 
are more sensitive to transaction costs than 
those of large farmers) and 6 (that contract 
farmers  are  more  profit-efficient  than  in-
dependents,  especially  the  larger  ones),  it 
seems highly likely that monogastric live-
stock development will continue to see in-
creasing vertical coordination to overcome 
the  high  transaction  costs  faced  by  all  in 
securing low-cost quality inputs on credit 
and achieving market recognition for qual-
ity outputs. However, contrary to expecta-
tions,  it  is  not  clear  that  contact  farming 
will disproportionately favor the interests of 
small farmers over large ones, and it is quite 
conceivable  that  scaling-up  will  occur  in 
tandem with and even be promoted through 
increased  vertical  coordination  within  the 
livestock sector. It seems likely that integra-
tors will have a financial incentive to con-
tract with larger farms if they are free to do 
so and that the increased profit efficiency of 
these larger contract farms will eventually 
capture  market  share  from  smallholders. 
The most likely case for successful small-
holder contract farming is likely to be seen 
where there are few alternatives for proces-
sors or integrators to find alternate sources 
of supply for raw materials.
Implications for  
Poverty Alleviation and 
Sustainability Policies
Effects on Poverty via 
Displacement of Smallholders
The main concern with regard to the forces 
promoting the scaling-up of livestock pro-
duction  in  developing  countries  is  that  it 
might  drive  small-scale  producers  out  of 
business  altogether  in  a  context  in  which 
they  would  not  be  able  to  be  absorbed 
elsewhere in the economy. The issue is not 
whether such displacement will occur but at 
what pace and whether it is being sped up 
artificially by policy distortions, externali-
ties, or structural factors such as transaction 
costs  that  have  a  greater  effect  on  small-
scale farms.
  The study results in almost all the cases 
involving pigs and poultry suggest that the 
smallest  independent  livestock  farms  will 
increasingly have a hard time remaining in 
business to the extent that their livelihoods 
depend on that business, although they may 
remain engaged in part-time activity if the 
opportunity cost of family labor is low. The 
results are more encouraging for the next-
largest group of smallholders, who remain 
very small by world standards. The relative 
profit efficiencies and levels of profit of the 
“top half of the bottom 40 percent” suggest 
that they could make a go of livestock pro-
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the current degree of trade protection and 
especially  with  some  vertical  integration 
in the case of swine. The outlook for small 
poultry and egg producers is not good.
  In the Thai case, it seems that the ab-
solute number of smallholders engaged in 
market-oriented  livestock  production  has 
significantly  decreased  over  the  past  15 
years. Although small-scale livestock farms 
are  mainly  found  in  remote  areas  today, 
they continue to account for a significant 
share of production. As recently as 2003, 
some  43  percent  of  broilers  produced  in 
Thailand  still  came  from  farms  keeping 
fewer  than  10,000  birds  at  a  time  (Table 
2.1), which raises issues on the feasibility 
of culling strategies to control disease out-
breaks such as avian influenza.
  Perhaps because the more marginal pro-
ducers have dropped out in Thailand, the 
Thai data show that livestock income distri-
bution across farms actually became more 
equitable between 1993 and 1998 and that 
the average income of livestock-producing 
households  increased.  Possibly  those  that 
remained  in  business  were  more  willing   
or able to transform as successful market-
oriented producers. In any event, for farms 
engaged in specialized livestock enterprises, 
the smallest farms, on less than one to two 
hectares,  were  the  ones  that  achieved  the 
greatest growth of income.
  Anecdotal  evidence  in  Brazil  suggests 
that many of the small-scale swine farms 
in the temperate south exited the livestock 
sector after they took out loans to increase 
the size of their operations at the request of 
integrators who refused to renew contracts 
with  producers  with  only  a  few  animals,   
and  then  were  unable  to  repay.  Integra-
tors were leery of renewing contracts with 
smallholders because of the increased costs 
being  experienced  by  the  private  sector   
associated  with  providing  technical  assis-
tance,  delivery  of  inputs,  and  pick-up  of   
the final products to many small contract 
growers.  This  reinforces  the  earlier  argu-
ment that increased contract farming may 
actually  promote  scaling-up  rather  than 
serving to maintain smallholder farming.
  The fact remains that public policy that 
is targeted to having a widespread effect on 
poverty  through  keeping  smallholders  in-
volved  with  the  growing  livestock  sector 
needs to harness the resources of the grow-
ing private sector, typically through the pro- 
vision  of  an  environment  that  facilitates 
contract farming. The key for poverty alle- 
viation is to ensure that the form it takes is 
beneficial  to  the  smallholder  growers  as 
well as larger farmers and integrators. In-
vestigating  the  full  costs  and  benefits  of 
different policies to encourage contracting   
with  smaller-scale  farmers  is  a  policy  re-
search  priority.  The  incentives  for  such 
schemes  often  come  in  the  form  of  tax 
breaks to the integrators, and it will be im- 
portant to factor in the costs of forgone pub-
lic revenue when establishing the unit costs 
of the scheme.
  This  study  did  not  assess  the  poverty 
alleviation possibilities offered by employ-
ment opportunities on large-scale livestock 
farms. However, the existence of positive 
unit profits where family labor was costed 
at market wage rates in the Indian and Phil-
ippine cases suggest that smallholders may 
be better off on their own land than working 
for someone else, or at least better off in 
working on their own holdings as much as 
possible. This topic is a priority for future 
research.
Effects on Resource Degradation 
through Nutrient Loading
The major sustainability problem associated 
with the types of growing livestock produc-
tion studied here concerns poor disposal of 
the increased amount of manure and dead 
animals generated in the process. The main 
environmental problems that policymakers 
have  been  concerned  with  are  water  pol-
lution, air pollution, and land degradation. 
Water pollution may occur if nutrients from 
manure enter the water table because they 
are either improperly used or disposed of, 
or it may be associated with improper dis-
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release  nutrients  into  the  groundwater  as 
they decompose. Air pollution may result 
as the nitrogen in manure is converted to 
ammonium and also through incineration of 
dead animals. Land degradation may occur 
if  the  carrying  capacity  of  animals  is  too 
high, leading to overgrazing in the case of 
ruminants, or if the application of nutrients 
over a number of years causes buildup of 
nitrogen, phosphorus, and salt, resulting in 
reduced  crop  yields.  Policymakers  in  the 
developed countries have begun to address 
the environmental ills from nutrient loading 
through stringent enforcement of environ-
mental rules and regulations.
  Rules  and  regulations  have  also  been 
developed in the different study countries 
to control potential environmental problems 
resulting from livestock. Brazil, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand have the most compre-
hensive sets of rules of the four countries. 
India has minimal environmental rules re-
garding  livestock.  The  gist  of  the  matter 
is that general regulations and institutions 
for  protecting  water  quality  and  reducing 
air pollution have been amended over the 
years to apply to livestock, particularly to 
the discharge of wastes from large opera-
tions. Furthermore, major livestock product 
exporters such as Brazil and Thailand have 
already implemented many changes in rules 
affecting  animal  health  and  have  ensured 
compliance. This was done by state institu-
tions with the full support of large-scale pro-
ducers, who have a stake in export markets.   
It seems probable that this trend will con-
tinue and will be extended to environmental 
concerns.
  At the same time, all four study coun-
tries  report  problems  with  environmen- 
tal enforcement. Thailand’s livestock export 
zone has some of the tightest animal health 
regulations of any developing country. Yet 
although a large number of rules and regu- 
lations  on  wastewater  management  have 
been developed in Thailand and some in-
centives are offered to the livestock farms   
to  invest  in  waste  treatment  technology,   
there has been a lack of enforcement even 
there.  The  Thai  Department  of  Livestock   
and Development (DLD) is expected to be   
a key enforcer of environmental protection 
laws,  as  it  currently  is  of  animal  health   
regulations.
  While  the  DLD  has  the  full  support 
of Thailand’s large poultry producers and 
exporters in order to keep foreign markets 
open through disease control, the consensus 
might  break  down  on  environmental  is-
sues. The latter may be less clearly linked 
to export goals and have the potential for 
pitting  producer  interests  against  those  of 
the general population. Thus, it seems likely 
that responsible environmental management 
will  require  building  a  broader  consensus 
and using an institutional base that is not 
subject to conflicts of interest through the 
DLD’s  current  strong  identification  with 
producers.
  Similarly,  in  Brazil,  though  environ-
mental laws exist, there are problems with 
the enforcement of these laws due to lack 
of agreement on the part of farmers with 
government  policies  in  this  area.  In  cer-
tain  regions  the  laws  are  stricter  than  in 
others,  and  the  Brazil  study  found  that 
farmers  were  relocating  from  the  highly 
concentrated  livestock  production  regions 
in the south, where environmental regula-
tions  were  increasing,  to  the  center-west, 
which had fewer environmental regulations 
and was closer to the inputs to production. 
Tellingly,  of  3,505  agricultural  producers 
covered in a survey done in Brazil in 2001, 
76  percent  considered  the  environmental 
issue one that must be dealt with, yet only 5 
percent of the producers approved the cur-
rent environmental plan of the government.
  As  the  livestock  sector  has  become 
more  industrialized,  livestock  farms  have 
tended not only to be larger in size, but also 
to be run more as big businesses. In imple-
menting  new  environmental  technologies, 
such  farm-firms  may  be  able  to  achieve 
economies of scale in environmental miti-
gation,  including  in  unit  treatment  costs, 
using lagoons or manure storage sheds. For 
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under closer scrutiny by national, state, and 
local authorities than is the case for small-
holders. Regulatory agencies in the Philip-
pines, for example, have in the past cracked 
down only on large farms. One such agency 
in  the  high-density  Metro  Manila  live- 
stock zone is the Laguna Lake Development 
Authority (LLDA) in Southern Luzon. The   
resulting trend has been for large-scale op-
erations to move from the periurban areas 
to less populated areas such as Mindanao. 
Anecdotal accounts suggest that LLDA is 
seriously  contemplating  how  to  enforce 
regulations regarding the manure disposal 
practices of smallholders within its mandate 
areas.
  The study suggests several conclusions 
for policymakers concerned with environ-
mental sustainability. First, the institutions 
necessary for the enforcement of environ-
mental standards for smallholders are quite 
different from those for large farms. It is 
not reasonable to expect an environmental 
impact  statement  from  backyard  farmers, 
nor is it easy for a centralized government 
agency to monitor compliance where tens   
of  thousands  of  small  producers  are  in- 
volved. Instead, management will have to   
be community-based, with common techni-
cal guidelines from a central agency. There 
also needs to be a means of appeal to a legal 
authority  outside  the  local  community  to 
protect  both  producers  and  inhabitants  of 
regions dominated by powerful producers. 
Second, it is probable that the government 
will need to find areas closer to inputs to 
production  and  farther  away  from  urban 
areas that are suitable for the scaling-up of 
the livestock sector that is occurring in their 
countries and will also need to provide an 
infrastructure and policy environment that 
will facilitate the relocation of the industry 
to these zones.
Effects on Sustainability via  
Animal Health and Food Safety
Concerns  about  animal  health  and  food 
safety  are  increasingly  becoming  part  of 
the policy dialogue on the sustainability of 
livestock farming in developing countries. 
Recent outbreaks of avian influenza and bo-
vine spongiform encephalopathy and their 
links to fatal human disease have particu-
larly fueled concerns. Policymakers in these 
countries  are  faced  with  the  difficulty  of 
monitoring compliance with disease control 
measures in a context in which large num-
bers  of  smallholders  are  intermixed  with 
large-scale operations. Large operations, for 
the most part, have the resources and under-
standing of the issues necessary to monitor 
their  animals  on  a  continual  basis,  while 
smallholders often lack this capacity.
  The public sector has typically taken the 
lead in providing such coverage for small-
holders in our study countries, but this has 
not been enough. Compensation for culled 
animals  is  an  important  aspect  of  disease 
control. In the case of the 2004 outbreak of 
avian flu in Thailand, policymakers choose a 
stamping-out policy for infected animals that 
involved the wholesale culling and disposal 
of animals. The government provided some 
compensation  (less  than  50  percent  of  the 
market value per bird in most cases). Integra-
tors lost part of the capital they had invested 
in the birds and feed used, but contractors 
lost  their  livelihoods.  Independent  farmers 
lost the ability to fully repay loans for DOCs 
and  feeds,  and  thus  possibly  future  access 
to credit. Initial control strategies that man-
date enclosing poultry in the hot season of 
a tropical country effectively also eliminate 
smallholders if enforced, because the evapo-
rative cooling systems used by large farms 
are prohibitively expensive for smaller ones.
  Whether  small-scale  broiler  producers 
have a chance to remain active participants 
in the sector, even under contractual arrange- 
ments whereby the health of their birds can 
be monitored by large-scale integrated oper- 
ations, remains unclear as of this writing. 
Learning  how  to  better  control  and  share 
catastrophic animal disease risks under con- 
tract farming will be essential to the contin- 
uation  of  this  institution  involving  small-
holders in Asia.
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have  been  struggling  with  how  to  create 
export  opportunities  through  the  develop-
ment of disease-free export zones for beef 
and swine products. Control of OIE List A 
diseases without vaccination is still the stan-
dard for exports to the developed countries 
and increasingly to other countries as well. 
Control requires effective surveillance. As 
governments often lack the funds to moni-
tor these regions, lack of public sector ca-
pacity has increased the incentive of large-
scale export producers to co-opt small-scale 
producers into a system of disease control 
that is similar in terms of overhead costs to 
those practiced on much larger farms.
  The Brazilian study reported that pro-
ducers  in  certain  states  that  are  in  the 
process of being declared FMD-free have 
organized  among  themselves  to  pay  into   
an  indemnity  fund.  The  fund  will  help 
ensure that a compensation scheme is avail-
able to encourage those who may not oth-
erwise  do  so  to  report  disease  outbreaks, 
because  the  large  producers  feel  that  the 
government does not have the resources to 
do  so.  Although  such  producer-organized 
indemnity  funds  were  not  described  in 
the  Philippine  and  Thai  reports,  both  of 
these  reports  indicated  that  there  was  an 
expansion of large-scale operations to these 
emerging FMD-free regions. The issue and 
scope for collective action associating inte-
grators and both large and small farms for 
animal disease control are policy research 
priorities.
  In all the study countries, there has also 
been a rising demand for livestock products 
with specific food safety and quality attri- 
butes, probably linked to increased urbani- 
zation and income levels. The private sector 
in the study countries has taken the lead in 
delivering products with the desired attri- 
butes, at least to wealthier consumers patron- 
izing up-market outlets. Large producers in 
all the study countries have also sought a 
form of branding through vertical integration 
with small-scale retail outlets for meat and 
milk that serve the broader urban populace.
  For smallholders to stay involved with 
this  fast-growing  segment  of  the  market, 
they need to meet the evolving food safety 
standards  of  these  companies  and  estab- 
lish credibility for their products with pro-
curement officers. This need typically will 
require that they integrate into high-value 
chains  through  contract  farming  or  other 
forms of institutional arrangements that have 
process-based food safety systems in place 
and can deliver a form of branding.
  These types of contractual arrangements 
ensuring the application of certain quality 
and food safety standards are increasingly 
widespread  in  the  vertically  coordinating 
poultry  and  swine  industries  of  the  study 
countries.  Similarly,  large-scale  dairy  pro-
ducers and dairy cooperatives in the study 
countries  have  succeeded  in  establishing 
market trust and reputation. Such groups can 
depend on repeat sales to the same clients 
who can identify the source of the milk and 
are willing to pay for something they believe 
to be of reliable quality and safety. It will be 
harder for independent smallholders to re-
main involved over time as markets become 
more  demanding  in  terms  of  information 
about the quality of the product at the time 
of sale and as market chains become longer 
and more anonymous.
  The  existing  technologies  that  ensure 
food safety may not be scale-neutral, and 
thus may also be driving scaling-up. For in-
stance, the Brazilian study reported that the 
chilling and milking technologies required 
on-farm in recent years to meet the food 
safety  requirements  of  private  processors 
have made the continued participation by 
producers of less than 100 liters of milk per 
day infeasible. Collective action to involve 
smallholders with the minimum viable scale 
of  such  technologies  is  essential  to  their 
continued involvement.
  Different approaches to food safety are 
at  play  in  the  different  study  countries, 
as noted earlier, principally depending on 
whether  they  are  large-scale  exporters  or 
not. Both Brazil and Thailand use process-
based  approaches  to  food  safety,  such  as 
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systems, which are similar to systems used 
in the developed countries and necessary in 
order to trade with them. The requirements 
applied and the enforcement of the require-
ments  are  largely  driven  by  the  private 
sector. Smallholders will need to find ways 
to  be  vertically  integrated  with  certified 
processing  plants  if  they  wish  to  remain 
involved in the long term. This will require 
that they find ways to meet and follow the 
standards set by processors and integrators.
  Failing  the  emergence  of  innovations 
that improve the access of the mass of poor 
livestock  keepers  to  the  rapidly  evolving 
end  markets  for  livestock  products  in  the 
urban areas, it is hard to see a bright future 
for smallholder livestock production in fast-
growing  developing  countries.  This  will 
require ways to allow smallholders to es-
tablish trust and reputation along the value 
chain. On the other hand, the study results 
also  show  that  it  is  unlikely  that  small- 
holders  will  disappear  anytime  soon,  and 
the  animal  health  examples  underline  a 
broader finding that the livestock sector is 
fundamentally a sector in which all partici-
pants sink or swim together.
  Finally, while poverty is still mainly a 
rural phenomenon in developing countries, 
rising livestock prices can be very harmful to 
poor urban consumers. There is nothing in 
the study results that could or should be used 
to justify public subsidies to livestock pro-
ducers  or  to  artificially  raise  the  prices  of 
livestock  products  as  an  income  support 
measure. Such policies might put off the day 
of reckoning but would be expensive to im- 
plement and ultimately self-defeating if they 
prevented other actions by livestock produc- 
ers or public authorities to build a more com- 
petitive smallholder link to growing markets.
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